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T he Centre for Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) was founded at Söder-
törn University in 2005 to promote and develop 
research and doctoral studies focusing on the 
Baltic Sea Region and Eastern Europe and, at 
the same time, to strengthen multidisciplinary 
research at the University. CBEES organizes 
conferences, workshops, public lectures and 
advanced seminars, and hosts postdocs, guest 
researchers, and PhD students. Also, the centre 
publishes Baltic Worlds, a quarterly scholarly 
journal and news magazine which like CBEES 
is funded by the Foundation for Baltic and East 
European Studies (Östersjöstiftelsen).
This year, we are proud to present a new 
publication series: the CBEES State of the 
Region Report. It is an annual publication, 
reporting and reflecting on the social and 
political developments in the Baltic Sea Region 
and Eastern Europe, each year taking a new 
and topical perspective. The report is written 
by researchers and area experts, from within 
as well as outside of Södertörn University. The 
overall purpose of this initiative is to offer a 
publication that will be of great interest to fel-
low researchers, policy makers, stakeholders, 
and the general public.
The CBEES State of the Region Report 2020 
reveals disturbing tendencies to control and 
politicize the past in several countries of the 
region. Also, it demonstrates the great extent 
to which authoritarian and authoritarian-lean-
ing governments actively intervene in how 
crucial parts of their country’s history are to be 
written, taught, researched, remembered, and 
commemorated – or neglected and ignored. 
Moreover, the report documents the failure of 
some governments to deal with restitution for 
past injustices, and the way some politicians 
forbid access to important state archives, hin-
der the teaching of the history of contemporary 
events, or withdraw funding to or close down 
independent research institutions. 
Ninna Mörner has edited the report, alongside CBEES-associated researchers 
David Gaunt, Tora Lane, Per Anders Rudling, 
Irina Sandomirskaja and Florence Fröhlig. We 
are grateful for their hard work and hope that 
the report will stimulate informed academic 
debate as well as public discussion on the state 
of affairs in the Baltic Sea Region and Eastern 
Europe. ●
Ulla Manns, 
Deputy Vice-Chancellor for Research, 
 Södertörn University
Joakim Ekman, 
Director of CBEES, Södertörn University














Constructions and  
Instrumentalization 
of the Past
I told myself: That’s that. People don’t want to 
go to war museums anymore. They don’t want 
to hear about the siege of Leningrad, and that 
goes for Stalin’s prison camps. It is tiresome. 
And the personal memories of the whole family 
being captured and no one coming back, those 
you must hide away and never tell anyone. 
 Natalia Tolstaya1 
T his regional report initiates a planned series of reports on the social and political situation of 
Eastern Europe by scholars affiliated with the Centre for 
Baltic and East European Studies (CBEES) at Södertörn 
University. This first report focuses mainly on construc-
tions or reconstructions of national historical memory 
and instrumentalizations of the past, which over recent 
decades has become a fiercely debated topic throughout 
the region, and subject of much scholarly research. 
The widespread phenomenon of government com-
memorative politics includes the creation of historical 
commissions and institutions, legislating politicized 
interpretations of historical events, establishing new mu-
seums of national trauma, even getting into international 
conflicts over interpretations of history, sponsoring 
history textbooks for schools, erecting statues to national 
heroes, and instituting new days of national commem-
oration. Despite the authenticity of Natalya Tolstaya’s 
everyday-life observation of public disinterest in memo-
rialization quoted above, and Yuliya Yurchuk’s2 finding 
that nearly all passers-by in Ukraine had no idea of just 
who was portrayed in historical monuments or why, new 
monuments, museums and historical truth commissions 
have been established throughout the region. Now there 
even exist guide books for tourists aiming to visit sites of 
massacres and mass extinction.3 In many countries a gap 
exists between the memorial policies of the government 
and political elite in contrast with popular remembrance 
of the past, neither of which need to be based on facts. 
An astute Polish sociologist, Sławomir Kapralski, writes 
of a split between political forms of commemoration 
and popular memory, that particularly affects Holocaust 
discourse.4 
Some major actors can be identified: one, already 
mentioned, is the governments and political elites who 
desire to establish a worldview perspective showing the 
successful mastering of past events, the intention being 
to develop a triumphant continuity of events that can be 
officially sanctioned through government agencies. A 
case in point would be the canonization of the Bulgar-
ian revolutionary Vasil Levski, a revolutionary of little 
impact, as the prime martyr for Bulgarian freedom.5 
Sometimes these national constructs clash as when a 
high-profile joint historical commission between North 
Macedonia and Bulgaria floundered upon the impossi-
bility of deciding whether Gotse Delchev, a revolutionary 
born in a border region, was a Bulgarian or Macedonian 
hero, leading to diplomatic conflicts spilling over into 
completely different issues. 
O ther types of actors in creation of public memory are representatives of minorities, usually ethnic/
religious/gendered, desiring political recognition of or 
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compensation for past injustices or traumas, or de-
manding a proper place in the national narrative about 
the past. Take for instance the urge to universalize the 
Jewish Holocaust and a similar campaign among Roma 
activists for more general recognition of their World War 
II genocide. 
A large mass of writings can be categorized as “witness 
literature” that, although sometimes fictional, has con-
siderable authenticity because of the  suffering of the au-
thors, such as Primo Levi, Elie Wiesel, Imre Kertesz, and 
Hédi Fried. In recent decades large collections of witness 
statements and video interviews have been deposited in 
universities or research institutes. Institutions now exist 
for educational “memory work” to combat xenophobia, 
anti-Semitism, anti-gypsyism, racism, 
and anti-HBTQ positions. Democrat-
ic governments have been pressured 
to apologize for abuses and violence 
committed in the past. Formal apol-
ogies have been extended to many 
minorities and colonized peoples in 
a spirit that the author Wole Soyinka 
terms mea culpaism. Connected with 
this are academics examining, debat-
ing or joining either on one side or the 
other of conflicts about the past, or 
those who recognize injustices committed by empires or 
colonial structures that suppressed the human rights of 
peoples.6 
And the new versions of the past also form new ways to engage citizens. Non-government organizations, 
often representing suppressed or persecuted groups, 
also participate in the demand for their own historical 
narratives and new forms of commemoration, even their 
own museums and school-books, and are occasionally 
financed (and thus controlled) by the state; sometimes 
however they are combated or rejected by governments. 
Many of these battles over the past go on inside political 
and social elites while citizens stand by, but the latter are 
expected to become politically mobilized and aware of 
the nation’s long-standing historical importance. In the 
wording of Charles S. Maier there can be a “surfeit” of 
memory.7
Conflicting memories of the past have a long tradition. 
During travels in Yugoslavia in 1937 writer Rebecca West 
was taken by different people through difficult terrain 
to obscure places where small chapels held ancient 
manuscripts. Depending on the lettering of the manu-
scripts – Latin, Cyrillic or Ottoman – her guides emphat-
ically maintained that this proved that just their group 
settled here first and thus had the best claim to build a 
national-state in the surrounding country. Even though 
other ethnicities lived there now, they were latecomers 
and outsiders with no legitimate claim and needed to 
be removed.8 Each ethnicity in multicultural Yugoslavia 
maintained their own exclusive view of the past and why 
they lived where they lived, leading finally to the break-
down of Yugoslavia as a country. 
We are thus dealing with an old phenomenon – the 
re-interpretation of historical events for political rea-
sons – in a new form – that of the political manipulation 
of memory and remembrance. Historians are used to 
changing perceptions of the past. Pieter 
Geyl showed how the appreciation of 
Napoleon varied depending on France’s 
political shifts from republic to empire 
and back; Herbert Butterfield iden-
tified the dominant British historical 
narrative as strengthening the liberal 
political view of the inevitable move-
ment towards increasing democracy and 
enlightenment.9 
So, is this more recent interest in 
re-interpreting the past a case of new 
wine into old bottles or old wine into new bottles? What 
does this transformation say about contemporary politics 
in Eastern Europe? Can we say with certainty that the 
phenomenon of manipulation of the past or the need to 
rectify historical injustice is today is more prevalent and 
pernicious in Eastern Europe than ever before?
Readers of Orwell’s 1984 will recall that the protagonist 
Winston Smith worked at the Ministry of Truth in some-
thing very similar to the University of London’s Senate 
building. There were many other ministries: the Ministry 
of Peace dealt with war, the Ministry of Love dealt with 
torture, the Ministry of Plenty dealt with starvation and 
finally the Ministry of Truth that was responsible for the 
“necessary” falsification of historical events. In line with 
Orwell’s critical reasoning we could consider institutions 
claiming to concern National Remembrance rather to be 
about National Forgetfulness or National Amnesia. Any 
way you look at organizations of that type, they appear 
much more to underline the national and much less to 
deal with uncovering the past. 
We have many examples in this regional report on 
remembrance in Eastern Europe of Nazi and communist 
totalitarianism, particularly in those countries that are 
For over a 
decade we 
have seen an in-
crease in memory 
conflicts in terms 




closely associated with the Visegrad group and institu-
tions linked to the Platform of European Memory and 
Conscience. This platform promotes a narrative of the 
past written from the perspective of post-communist Eu-
rope, that rather makes people unconscious of the truth 
of which they can no longer have any direct experience.
  
In the politics or wars of memory that are taking place in particular in the former countries of the Eastern 
bloc, one can see how memory has penetrated right to 
the core of the political problems and the problems of 
politics of our time. The widespread “memory boom”, 
dating approximately from the 1990s and still growing, 
features a large interest in different forms of memories, 
reminiscences and commemorations as well in historical 
documents and other forms of documentations. For over 
a decade we have seen an increase in memory conflicts in 
terms of memory politics and memory wars, in particu-
lar in the countries of the former Eastern Bloc. Besides 
the memory of communism itself, it is in particular the 
“memory” of the Second World War that causes fierce 
debates, and there are many reasons for this in this part 
of Europe. But besides apparent historical and geo-
graphical aspects, as Eastern Europe was arguably the 
deadliest battle line of the world war with the greatest 
number of victims and the most atrocious crimes against 
humanity, recent memory conflicts 
show that there are also ideological and 
cultural issues linked to the very notion 
of ‘memory’ and its status in Eastern 
Europe today. 
As French historian Pierre Nora, 
one of the main theorists of memory, 
noted in 1989, contemporary memory 
discourses are not primarily about 
memory, but rather about interpreting 
history.10 He writes: “The quest for 
memory is the search for one’s history.”11 And the field 
of memory, he adds, has become that of historiography, 
which is not to say that it is more true. ‘Memory’ denotes 
an in-between field, a grey zone between different forms 
of remembering, commemorating and otherwise ad-
dressing the past in the private and in the public sphere. 
What the field or discourse of memory primarily deals 
with has been the personal experience of real historical 
events and how it affects our understanding and narra-
tives of history (as opposed for instance to the forms of 
the art of memory or memorization in ancient, medieval 
and Renaissance times). But since personal and private 
experiences interfere with the larger and supra-person-
al public forms of history writing, in particular in the 
official sphere, this field of ‘memory’ has proven to be 
problematic. And memory politics has opened a Pando-
ra’s box, where past conflicts resurge as conflicts over 
the past. The specters of European communism seem to 
find no rest in their graves, but is it not because we are 
troubling them with a new meta-perspective that implies 
an instance of revisionism? Is there any narrative, or is 
there any other form of settling accounts with the past 
that could bring them peace?
 In the period of perestroika and especially after the fall of the Berlin wall, discourses of memory in post-com-
munist Central and Eastern Europe took the form of 
emancipatory movements, allowing people to express 
long repressed truths, debunking the politicized histor-
ical narrative of the communist regimes, and contribut-
ing to its black book. Finally, through the mouths of its 
citizens one would hear of the crimes committed by the 
communists towards individuals, regions and nations. 
It was considered a civil right. And indeed, there were 
many truths to be told, in particular since history played 
a crucial role in Soviet culture. Not only does the Soviet 
narrative of history start with the October Revolution; 
history in terms of dialectical materialism also provided 
legitimization to the new state and its 
political consciousness was based on 
a theory of history. 
It is perhaps therefore no wonder 
that the Soviet legacy expressed in 
official and public culture shows a 
predilection for grand and ritualized 
historical narratives, monuments 
and parades. It was proud of its past, 
and it celebrated it, first in the form 
of the revolution as the victory over 
capitalist bourgeois society, and second in World War II 
as the victory over fascism and the Soviet Union’s entry 
into global great power politics. In the Soviet Union, his-
tory as grand narrative and teleology probably reached its 
apex. But to the extent that this history also involved the 
memory of the sacrifices of its masses, it was replete with 
censorship and suppressed stories of contradictory or 
contradicting events, and in particular, events that would 
question the historical political claim of being the victory 
over fascism. 
Soviet monumental culture was ultimately challenged 
through a concomitant privatization of historical ex-
In the Soviet 
Union, history 
as grand narrative 





perience and history writing in the form of individual, 
collective and national recollections or commemorations 
of the past that are also vested with the task of critically 
scrutinizing the former official narratives of history. It 
is conceivable that history, especially post-totalitarian 
history, has made us wiser. There was also a moral aspect, 
which translated the German call for Vergangenheitsbe-
wältigung or Aufarbeitung der Vergangenheit, that is the 
need for Germany to deal with the past so that the crimes 
committed by the Nazi regime would never be possible 
again, into the context of European communism. The 
appeal to deal with the past was based on the Freudian 
psychological theory of the need to deal with a repressed 
experience of the past.12 It applies to singular personal 
experiences of traumas of the past in Eastern Europe, as 
Florence Fröhlig shows, but it has proven problematic 
when transposed into a political or otherwise collective 
and supra-personal theory of memory. In particular, 
as it can be difficult to distinguish the victims from the 
perpetrators when it comes to traumas of the communist 
past. As the documentary work of Svetlana Aleksievich 
has illustrated, many people became victims precisely be-
cause of their engagement with the Soviet history of com-
munism. In her 1986 book The Unwomanly Face of War, it 
is the women of the hero-people (geroi-narod) that were 
forced into traumatic sacrifices and sufferings.13 And not 
only that; they also lived a life of deep, but of course also 
not unproblematic, pride over their personal commit-
ment in a sense that later would be deemed as sovkovost’, 
that is, as Soviet mentality.14
A ll this points toward other reasons why the in-be-tween sphere of mediation between different forms 
of remembrance and different historical narratives has 
become a conflict zone not just of perspectives, but also 
political and economic interests. In the redemptive and 
liberating role of settling accounts with a past replete 
with complex ideological oppositions, the memory of 
the actual experience sometimes seems irreconcilable 
with current democratic and/or liberal ideals. As Bar-
bara Törnquist-Plewa writes in her contribution, from 
memory as the testimony of the truth of the past and the 
right to express it, and a form of dealing with trauma, 
the discourse became tasked with the role of reconciling 
the nation in several Eastern European countries. But 
already, primarily due to the nationalist turn, the urge to 
“own” the past was not without power politics, and one 
could pose the question of how liberal society could be 
tasked with settling accounts with a past of a different 
historical and political engagement. According to “Eu-
ropean memory”, as proclaimed by the European Union, 
“the totalitarian past must be condemned and truth 
restored”.15 And the Declaration on European Conscience 
and Communism (2006), calls for: 
reaching an all-European understanding 
that both the Nazi and Communist totalitarian 
regimes each to be judged by their own terrible 
merits to be destructive in their policies of sys-
tematically applying extreme forms of terror, 
suppressing all civic and human liberties, start-
ing aggressive wars and, as an inseparable part 
of their ideologies,  exterminating and deport-
ing whole nations and groups of population; and 
that as such they should be considered to be  
the main disasters which blighted the 20th  
century.16
The declaration in itself is both political and Eurocentric, 
and besides the problem of putting equal signs on all 
points of accusation, from today’s perspective, there is a 
case for arguing that ecological disasters ought to be in-
cluded under the term “main disasters”. More important, 
dealing with the past is also a form of settling political 
accounts with the past. Still, what perhaps concerns 
Eastern Europe with regards to its memory in the most 
acute way is, as Yulia Yurchuk’s contribution about mem-
ory in Ukraine shows, how the problem of the memory 
of the opposition and fight between the two totalitarian 
regimes on Ukrainian ground during the World War II 
now resurges as the opposition of memory in the context 
of the war between Ukraine and pro-Russian forces. 
In Ukraine, proto-fascist or Nazi sympathizers have 
been heroized for their opposition to Soviet (Russian) 
Communism, which by reverse legitimized the latter’s 
warfare as the fight against Fascism, including the sep-
aratist Ukrainian movement. This is perhaps one of the 
most apparent instances of how the historical opposition 
echoes in political conflicts today. And it also shows how 
the memory of private experiences and public commem-
orations, the memory of this historical moment, can 
resurface in current politics as indications of a nationalist 
turn in certain post-Soviet countries. 
This is not only the case with Ukraine, but also 
Belarus’, Poland, Lithuania and others, as the contribu-
tions show. And again, it brings us back to the notion of 
memory as this mediating sphere between public com-
memorations and private experiences of history, and the 
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question if there is not also a revisionist moment in the 
way that politics is being done or undone in its relation 
to history.
How can we understand this shift in the very form of 
history writing? From the point of view of scholarship: 
does the shift away from traditional historiographical 
discourses between historians to investigating high-level 
“memory politics” engaging NGOs 
and political power holders bring 
any new insight? Yes, but not on the 
past events they use as a starting 
point; rather, such study reveals how 
discourse about the past locks into 
everyday party politics. Privatizing 
the past has become a form of ap-
propriation of the grand narratives, 
not a critique of them. Thus, several 
discussions presented here aim at 
explaining the “usefulness” of mem-
ory in the form of falsified, manipulated, or weaponized 
history for politics in countries that are democratic in the 
sense of needing to mobilize voters at elections, by argu-
ing that historical facts in some way humiliates them as a 
collective, as a nation, and therefore must be suppressed 
for the sake of the nation’s honor which can only be re-
deemed through lying about what really happened.
   
What characterizes CBEES’ status of the region report is a critical, broad and multidisciplinary 
approach to the topic. Several contributors are histo-
rians, but there are also social and cultural scientists, 
some engaged in memory activism through their work. 
We seek to give an overview of different issues of history 
and memory that are at stake, and different actors and 
institutions involved in the production of memory, the 
development of memory culture and politics of memory 
in Central and Eastern Europe today. We will look at the 
dynamics of its form of dealing with the past as memo-
ry, trauma and/or political conflicts as well as the more 
recent trends of instrumentalization and use and abuse 
of memory issues in political conflicts. It is important 
to examine the how, how memory is constructed and/
or instrumentalized, but also to examine how it affects 
the what, and the way that the two are interconnected. 
What is remembered in private memories is not only the 
private, but also the national and political, since they 
were connected in the Soviet times, and they remain so 
for that very reason until today. Discharging memory 
from history and politics is impossible (and the reverse), 
and therefore, instead of calling for or arguing for a 
de-politicization of memory, we ought, in the accounts of 
the politics of memory, ask how the memory of politics 
works in contemporary memory and what the forms or 
anti-forms of this memory are. 
Memory is not a thing, but rather is a relationship 
between the person/institution/collective/state ministry 
thinking about how to use the past in 
a way beneficial to it, thus deeming it 
necessary. The use of memory is mul-
ti-faceted and multi-levelled. It is very 
important to identify the persons/
groups/political parties that are mak-
ing the representations. Here Anna 
Bikont’s investigative report from the 
reaction of Jedwabne’s residents to 
the news (well known to themselves) 
that Polish civilians willingly killed 
Jewish neighbors. From a journal-
ist-psychologist perspective, she uncovers the who, when 
and methods of creating untruths about the Polish popu-
lations murdering their neighbors in Jedwabne and other 
small towns in 1941 – and also how others in the commu-
nity have been permanently silenced by the perpetrators, 
and how for various reasons priests and some nationalist 
historians join in as cheer-leaders for denialism.17 
Popular misrepresentation, abuse of and lying about 
past events has a long history. Historians used to call 
such misrepresentations myths or legends not worth a 
second thought. Only recently have scholars come to deal 
with these misrepresentations through serious research. 
An ethical reason is the thought that behind some of 
the unproven statements about the past, one can find 
substantial truths about what has happened to repressed 
minorities or discriminated groups and these therefore 
need to be re-discovered hand in hand with members of 
these groups. This latter type of memory study can be 
very disruptive – as in the case of Jan Gross’s book on the 
role of Poles in the Jedwabne massacre.
 
From the view of governments and of the agencies and Institutions dependent on them, memory/remem-
brance/commemoration work becomes a routine process 
of selection, exclusion, hegemony, and repression. That 
is to say, good-old-fashioned power politics. It is conceiv-
able that the rise of interest in using history is a result of 
the death of the grand narratives of political ideologies. 
Instead of mobilization through ideology, mobilization is 
made through creating and maintaining unique national 
The memory 
of the actual 
experience some-
times seems irrecon-





identities formed by history into a story of long-standing 
victimhood or heroism or martyrdom. Thus, a politicized 
master memory narrative in the eyes of its adherents 
transforms into a quasi-religious standpoint that can 
tolerate no doubt and those who dare to doubt are treated 
as heretics. 
A lthough master narratives of remembrance strive towards absolute dominance, some are quite happy 
with merely causing confusion and uncertainty about 
the facts. This plays into the increased higher education 
among the population as academic education teaches 
students to be open to multiple interpretations and treat 
them with equal interest. An important aspect of making 
remembrance or commemoration into an ideology is 
the building of barriers between the conflicting inter-
pretations. In this way the contours of memory are 
shaped more by what it is against and what it hates and 
less by what it on the surface stands for and adores. In 
this way the study of memory-work refers not to official 
remembering, but concerns the consequences in the 
form of forgetting, silencing, suppressing, repressing. 
Future research should focus on the barriers between 
interpretations rather than the description of what the 
various interpretations and representations contain. 
From the historical perspective, memory cannot perform 
a redemptive task vis-à-vis the past, but it must remain 
truthful to its aporetic character: to all the paradoxes, 
disgraces and irreconcilable conflicts that it entails. 
Only thus can we get away from a politics of the past and 
understand the role of politics in the past and the past in 
politics in this region. ●
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Eastern and  
Central Europe as  
a Region of Memory.  
Some Common Traits
In his foreword to the anthology Memory and Change in Europe, Jeffrey K. Olick strongly argued for the useful-
ness of adding the concept of “region of memory” to the 
arsenal of analytical concepts within the field of mem-
ory studies. He pointed to the importance of examining 
multiple systems of memory of which “region was one, 
along with the global system a level up, and nation states, 
localities, families and even individuals as other analyti-
cal – but not concretely – independent systems”.1
This volume aims to pay attention to Eastern and 
Central Europe as a particular region of memory, while 
at the same time avoiding the trap of essentialization and 
myths of its uniqueness and incomparability with other 
regions. The question regarding the specificity of Eastern 
and Central Europe has been debated in scholarly liter-
ature for a long time.2 Leaving aside the detailed argu-
mentation of all parties in this never-ending discussion3, 
this introduction sides with those scholars that argue for 
treating the area as a particular region of memory.4 The 
peoples and inhabitants of Eastern and Central Europe 
share considerable common or similar historical experi-
ences that result in an entanglement of their memories 
and lead them to face similar challenges in their memory 
work. Nevertheless it should be emphasized at the same 
time that Eastern and Central Europe is a part of Euro-
pean and global arenas of memory work and its borders 
are by no means fixed. In addition, Eastern and Central 
Europe as a particular region of memory should certainly 
not be seen as uniform, since the differences between the 
countries of this region are far from negligible. However, 
in the following the focus will be on the common traits 
that constitute the framework of memory of this region. 
The Eastern and Central European landscape of memory may be characterized as post-colonial, 
post-catastrophic and post-socialist.5 More specifically, 
the distinct historical legacy of the region consists chiefly 
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Background
result of the region’s peripheral status, semi-colonial 
development due to the long-time control of the region 
by imperial states, belated nation and state building, 
and, last but not least, the experience of life and extreme 
violence under two totalitarian regimes – Nazism and 
Communism, followed in both cases by rapid and radical 
transformations of society. While the double experience 
of Nazism and Communism is unique to Eastern and 
Central Europe, the other features make many states in 
the region more similar to some post-colonial countries 
in Latin America or Asia than to Western Europe. 
Politics of Memory and Conflicting Views  
on the Use of the Past in the Present 
The historical conditions enumerated above have left 
traces in the memory of the inhabitants of Eastern and 
Central Europe and influenced their way of viewing the 
past and its role in their present. The dominant approach 
is to treat the past as a source of collective national 
identities and values such as heroism or sacrifice.6 This 
traditional understanding of history is a legacy of 19th 
century national movements. 
The mythologized past fulfilled the emancipatory function. It was used as a tool to 
create a feeling of national belong-
ing and common identity in the 
nation-building processes. This was 
strongly pronounced among the na-
tional movements that struggled for 
independence against the imperial 
powers which at that time domi-
nated the region: the Habsburgs, 
the Ottomans, the Russian Empire, 
Prussia and, for a shorter time, the 
German Empire. The first modern 
nation-states in Eastern Europe 
came into being as late as at the end 
of the 19th and the beginning of the 
20th century and their sovereignty 
was tenuous. They also lost their independence as a 
result of the Second World War and regained it as late 
as at the beginning of the 1990s. Thus, in the situation of 
recurrent threats, prolonged oppression and struggles 
for independence, the memories of heroism and sacrifice 
maintained their appeal. They were used to mobilize for 
resistance and create cohesion within national communi-
ties.7 This approach to the past was further strengthened 
during communist rule since it was adopted both by the 
communists8 and by the opposition (e.g. memories of 
armed uprisings).9
The end of the Cold War and the fall of Communism in 
Eastern Europe as well the integration of large parts of 
Eastern and Central Europe into the EU and the West-
ern security system created conditions for revisions of 
the traditional approaches and the emergence of a new 
understanding of the past, one more in line with the dis-
course of human rights and the memory work promoted 
by the EU.10 This entailed seeing the past as a warning 
and cautionary tale,11 and most importantly, critically ex-
amining each nation’s deeds towards the Others, asking 
questions about responsibility, the need for apologies, 
reparation and mourning. 
Thus, the new approach could be described as non-na-
tional, self-critical, and cosmopolitan (i.e. not centered 
on the own national or ethnic group but focused on the 
suffering of Others).12 Indeed, the decades that followed 
1989 saw the rise of this new approach in Eastern and 
Central Europe. The new attitude to the past became 
visible in the activities of individuals and organizations 
working with the memory of the Holocaust, as well as 
with the revival of the memory of those former inhabit-
ants of Eastern and Central Europe that were murdered 
or expelled due to the ethnic cleans-
ings that occurred in the region in 
the 20th century.13 
However, these acts aiming at changing their societies’ 
vision of the past have met strong 
resistance by those who believe that 
memories of the past should be used 
to mobilize forces behind the nation 
and the state, considered to be vul-
nerable and in need of constant pro-
tection. For them, memory and his-
tory are matters of security.14 Thus, 
collective memories should serve to 
strengthen the national community, 
contribute to its cohesion, be a source of pride and deliv-
er role models for new generations, preparing them for 
future sacrifices for their country.15 
The proponents of this view criticize the cosmopolitan 
visions as imports propagated for Eastern Europe from 
the hubs of Western European political and economic 
power and thus as an expression of the normative hegem-
ony of the West. Since the end of the 1990s those active 
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along these two different lines of understanding the past. 
This is not unique for the region, but the intensity of 
the struggle between them is rather unparalleled in the 
Western part of the continent. The two camps clash with 
full strength in public debates about the commemoration 
of historical events, monuments, contents of museum 
exhibitions and about acts of legislation regarding what 
should be remembered and how.17 Moreover, both sides 
tend to define their positions in strong 
normative and even moral terms as ex-
pressions of “good” and “evil”.
The Legacy of Nazism  
and Communism
The legacy of two totalitarianisms, Nazism 
and Communism, constitutes a particular 
feature of Eastern and Central Europe 
as a memory region. The history of these 
two regimes became entangled in this part 
of Europe in a unique way18 and resulted 
in a multiplicity of painful and mutually 
conflicting memories. Millions of peo-
ple starved to death, were killed or expelled from their 
homes at the highest points of the rule of these regimes 
(before, during and shortly after World War II). 
The pre-war multicultural co-existence in the region collapsed, and interethnic clashes took place in the 
shadow of the raging war (e.g. Polish, Ukrainian or Lith-
uanian pogroms of Jews, massacres of Poles by Ukrain-
ians in Volhynia). Perpetrators, victims and bystanders 
changed places with the unfolding events. A hero one day 
could become a villain the next and vice versa. Difficult 
moral choices had to be made in the struggle for survival, 
giving history a truly tragic dimension. On top of it all, 
the burdensome memories of this particular period (from 
the 1930s to the 1950s) were suppressed by the post-war 
communist regimes and were able to resurface only after 
their fall. 
Consequently, the 1990s saw a memory boom, and 
memory activists on the local, national and even interna-
tional level started to involve themselves in the processes 
of working through traumatic memories, often dealing 
with mutual atrocities committed in the past. Locally, 
this meant for instance raising new monuments or taking 
care of the graves of the victims; nationally, writing new 
history books, opening new museums and producing 
films dealing with the difficult past, and transnationally, 
working for instance in committees of historians from 
formerly conflicting sides (German-Polish, Czech-Ger-
man, Polish-Ukrainian etc.). Special attention has been 
paid to the discussion of collaboration in the Holocaust 
on the local level. This work on reconciliation has in-
volved many individuals and organizations: international 
and national, governmental and non-governmental. 
However, activities of this kind have also led to con-
frontations between memory actors promoting different 
views on the use of the past and accord-
ingly different politics of memory. Those 
traditionally and nationalistically minded 
are mostly critical of the acts of regret and 
mutual apologies expressed by the propo-
nents of reconciliation, arguing that they 
blur the difference between victims and 
perpetrators and dilute the question of 
responsibility. They also have not hesitat-
ed to commemorate historical figures who 
served the own nation yet at the same time 
could be held responsible for the deaths of 
civilians of other nationalities, e.g. Stepan 
Bandera in Ukraine19 or several of the 
“cursed soldiers” i.e. anti-Communist guerillas, active in 
the few post-war years in Poland.20 This, in turn, is unac-
ceptable for those who work for a memory that promotes 
human rights and mutual understanding.
The double experience of the Nazi regime and Soviet-style Communism, both of them of equal im-
portance for the nations in Eastern and Central Europe, 
also gives rise to memory politics on an international 
level, especially on the EU level. Following the Prague 
Declaration of June 3, 2008, a number of the Eastern 
European Members of the European Parliament called 
upon the EU to condemn communist crimes, in the same 
way as the crimes of Nazism. For them, the turning of the 
memory of the Gulag and other communist crimes into 
a common, innate, European, not only East European, 
memory would mean the recognition of their axiological 
equality. 
However, most of the Western European MEPs 
perceive these demands as an attempt to relativize and 
diminish the importance of the Holocaust remembrance 
that has become fundamental in EU memory politics.21 
They regard the claims as an expression of victimhood 
competition and an attempt to avoid the questions about 
complicity in the Holocaust. In turn, this distrust is 
interpreted on the part of Eastern and Central Europe as 
a demonstration of superiority, and is even described by 
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Euro-sceptics as a “post-colonial attitude”.22 Thus, the 
clashes over the memory of the Holocaust and the Gulag 
constitute a substantial obstacle in the construction of a 
common European memory.
A lthough it is already several decades since the communist regimes collapsed, the memory of 
Communism as well as the memory of the first decade of 
the intensive social transformation that followed its fall 
are of crucial importance in Eastern and Central Europe, 
and they still continue to create political divisions in the 
countries of the region. The so-called “revolutions” of 
1989–1991 were in fact generally peacefully negotiated 
and thus did not provide a clear-cut break with the past. 
Many former communists had the opportunity of joining 
the new establishment. 
The processes of transitional justice, that is, dealing 
with the communist state’s violation of human rights, 
were delayed.23 The left-leaning liberals accepted this 
course of events in the conviction that reconciliation, and 
not retribution, was the best way to promote democratic 
development. However, it produced a reaction among 
many of those previously engaged in anti-communist 
opposition for whom the memorialization of commu-
nist crimes has been of the utmost importance. Thus, 
they supported a politics of memory that focused on 
communist oppression and its remembrance in a vast 
variety of forms: monuments, museums, books and media 
products, judicial actions such as a few trials, lustration 
laws, “memory laws”24 and the establishment of state 
institutions investigating the crimes of 
the communist regimes (e.g. Institutes 
of National Remembrance in Poland, the 
Czech Republic, and Ukraine). 
While intended to achieve justice and 
truth about the past, these measures 
almost immediately became politicized 
and used in internal political struggles, 
primarily between the Left and the Right. 
The archives of the communist security 
forces have been used to compromise 
political opponents as former denun-
ciators. The Right also blames all the 
social problems that emerged during the 
post-communist transformation on “the 
unfinished revolution”.25 
However, these hard-line politics of memory are a 
double-edged sword. They alienate many people who 
lived through Communism and remember it in a more 
nuanced way, with its negative but also some positive as-
pects. Unlike Nazism, the communist system in Eastern 
and Central Europe lasted for many decades and went 
through both more and less repressive phases. People 
learnt to live with it and many of them had difficulties 
adjusting to and accepting the new post-communist, 
neoliberal order. Some became memory activists, 
defending their positive memory of Communism and 
even expressing a kind of nostalgia for the communist 
past. They are mostly visible in popular culture26 and in 
social media.27 In Russia (and partially also in Belarus) 
the state consistently promotes nostalgic memories of 
Communism and even Stalinism.28 However, in other 
parts of Eastern and Central Europe they do not usually 
get any official support. Settling accounts with Com-
munism is still an unfinished process in Eastern and 
Central Europe and it belongs to the core of politics of 
memory in the region, alongside the other focal points 
mentioned: Nazi occupation and the ethnic cleansings of 
the 20th century.
The Surfeit of Memories and Other Features 
of Memory Politics in the Region 
Eastern and Central Europe was the central zone of 
conflicts in the 20th century, the “century of extremes”29 
that shook the region profoundly and exposed it to rapid 
and drastic shifts: in borders between states, in the ethnic 
composition of local populations and in the political and 
economic systems. 
The swift and profound changes continued into the 
21st century when Eastern and Central 
Europe underwent a speedy moderniza-
tion, and after decades behind the Iron 
Curtain was rapidly exposed to Euro-
peanization and trends of globalization. 
It may not be surprising that after such 
an exhaustive experience, societies are 
in urgent need of making sense of their 
difficult past, and their memory work 
acquires a special dynamic and intensi-
ty. Accordingly, the obsession with the 
past and a surfeit of memories became 
another distinctive feature of Eastern 
and Central Europe. It is rooted in the re-
gion’s traumatic events and long periods 
of suppression of the memories of them, 
but it is exacerbated by the dominant view of history as a 
pillar of national identity and of a vulnerable nation that 
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The mnemonic activities in the region are extremely intensive and marked by ideological and politi-
cal struggles. The debates about even one mnemonic 
issue can penetrate all arenas of social life: scholarship, 
education, politics, legislation, media of all kinds, art, 
literature, religious institutions, etc. A good example is 
the never-ending dispute in Poland on Polish complicity 
in the Holocaust. Its crucial moment, the publication of 
Jan T. Gross’ book on the murder of Jews by Poles in the 
town of Jedwabne in June 1941, resulted not only in an 
immense debate in Polish media, and official statements 
of Polish politicians and representatives of the Catholic 
clergy, but also reverberated in Polish cinematography, 
plays and novels, art, historical works, and textbooks for 
schools and museums. 
One of the latest stages of the dispute between those 
memory activists who admit Polish culpability and 
those who want to deny it was the attempt by the Polish 
conservative-nationalist government in 2018 to issue 
a law criminalizing claims of Polish responsibility or 
co-responsibility in crimes like the one in Jedwabne. 
Strong international criticism prevented the adoption of 
the law in its planned wording.30 Nevertheless, the case 
is illustrative of the politicization and 
juridification of memory,31 both being 
symptomatic of the surfeit of memories 
in Eastern and Central Europe. The 
legislative acts criminalizing certain 
statements about the past (so called 
“memory laws”) are not unique to East-
ern Europe. In fact, several countries 
in Western Europe have laws banning 
Holocaust denial or the denial of the 
Armenian genocide. However, the large 
scale of this legislation, its focus on 
self-victimhood, and the use of laws in 
memory conflicts both within and be-
tween the countries makes the region 
stand out in this respect. Moreover, the authoritarian 
regimes in the region use memory laws for nationalist 
mobilization and for limiting freedom of expression. The 
most typical example is the law (called the Yarovaya act) 
adopted in Russia in 2014. The law was presented as an 
act preventing “rehabilitation of Nazism” but it sought in 
fact to hide the crimes of Stalinism and penalized among 
others statements describing the Soviet-German collab-
oration at the beginning of the Second World War or the 
crimes committed by the Red Army.32 Moreover, the law 
was adopted in the midst of the Ukraine crisis and thus 
assisted the Russian propaganda campaign against the 
Ukrainian national movement, labeled as “Nazis”. 
The juridification of memory points yet to another feature of Eastern and Central Europe as region of 
memory: the strong presence of the state as a memory ac-
tor. It is of course hard to find any state in the world that 
does not engage in memory politics, since history and 
memory are intrinsically connected to the legitimation of 
power. However, the large scale of state involvement in 
the politics of memory in the region is striking and had a 
tendency to increase with the rise of national populism 
and authoritarian disposition of the ruling regimes in the 
second decade of the 21st century. State institutions have 
been involved in the ”memory wars” between the advo-
cates of the cosmopolitan memory, mostly supported by 
leftist and liberal parties, and the conservatives’ and na-
tionalists’ side that stands for the traditional understand-
ing of history as a source of pride and national cohesion. 
Thus, depending on which party holds the governmental 
power in a country, the state supports their vision of the 
politics of memory. 
The last aspect to be mentioned in the discussion of the 
characteristics of memory politics in East-
ern and Central Europe is the prominent 
role played by the dominant churches and 
religions. After the decades of state-driven 
secularization under the communist re-
gimes the churches re-emerged as impor-
tant societal actors. The Catholic church 
has a crucial influence on the formation of 
collective memories in Poland,33 but also 
puts its mark on memories in Slovakia34 or 
Croatia.35 The Orthodox Church in Romania 
tries to assume a similar role,36 not to speak 
about the significance of the Orthodox 
Church in Putin’s Russia. Both the Russian 
Orthodox Church and religion are instru-
mentalized in the state’s politics of memory.37 Never-
theless, even in the countries in which religion has been 
less important as a hallmark of national identity (e.g. 
Ukraine or Armenia), religious language and symbols 
are frequently used in dealing with memories, especially 
those traumatic and morally difficult ones. In this regard, 
Eastern and Central Europe displays more similarity to 
such countries outside Europe as South Africa than to the 
Western European neighbors. It seems that memories of 
mass violence, provoking ultimate questions about life 
and death as well as about human nature, make peo-
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ple prone to reach for religion as a provider of tools for 
coming to terms with the past. Religion may help people 
to restore meaning to the world after the experience of 
atrocities. When the past is seen as existential drama, as 
is the case in the post-catastrophic landscape of Eastern 
and Central Europe, religion offers symbolic resources 
and interpretative frames to handle this past.
In sum, it can be argued that the specific historical experiences of Eastern and Central European societies, 
especially their temporal proximity to violence and rapid 
and radical social changes, have given rise to some dis-
tinctive features in the politics of memory of the region. 
These have been briefly described above. However, the 
question that remains to be answered is whether that dis-
tinctiveness requires new analytical tools in the studies 
of the mnemonic processes in the region. This should be 
a subject for further research. ●
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astern Europe has been confronted 
with many violent experiences in the 
20th century and the representation of 
these events has become a battlefield in 
the process of reconstructing and rene-
gotiating the past in post-communist societies after 1989. 
Today’s travellers in Eastern Europe can only be struck 
by the new nations’ tendencies to put to the fore “their” 
particular histories and “their” own traumas. 
In this article I discuss the intense and peculiar forms 
that Stalinist terror and World War II have taken in 
post-communist European societies as symptomatic of 
an undigested past and thwarted mourning. The Sovi-
et-imposed representation of World War II prevented 
the working through of war experiences and led to the 
repression of all experiences that did not fit into its narra-
tive. And as Sigmund Freud warned us in his work on the 
uncanny, whatever is repressed returns in distorted, frag-
mented, or monstrous forms.1 Hence if the deeds of the 
past are not recognized, the perpetrators not condemned, 
and the victims not compensated: “The memory of the 
past becomes indistinguishable from the obsessive fear of 
its repetition, and the dread of the future takes the shape 
of compulsory repetitions or creative remembrances of 
the past.”2
I borrow here the psychoanalytic “metaphor” of neu-
rosis and obsession for its hermeneutical efficacy rather 
than as an explanatory schema. In this article, I will first 
show how Soviet-imposed memory led to a re-narration 
of the past and nation-building myths rooted in traumas. 
The new identification processes based on victimhood 
are seen as the continuation of the dreadful violent 
experiences into the present and the current memorial 
obsession as the return of the repressed. In a second 
part, I discuss the problematic of uncertain death which 
entails the work of mourning and condemns the unbur-
ied to haunt the living. I argue that the former thwarted 
memory becomes the new imposed memory, leading to 
new imbalance.
The Return of the Repressed
In the aftermath of World War II, the USSR, like the oth-
er victorious powers, were portrayed as heroes, and the 
losers together with their allies as villains. In this “Grand 
Alliance narrative”, the USSR was presented in a positive 
light and as an ethical protagonist. What is at stake is the 
fact that the winners of war, here the USSR, write history 
and determine heritage. This narrative comes with an 
authorized, official narrative of the war, through which 
states impose the selection of events to be remembered, 
memorialized and commemorated, with respect to the 
common identity. The narratives served to strengthen na-
tional communities and legitimized Soviet authority on 





evitably to its abuse by those who hold power. The forced 
memorialization led to an excess of memory and com-
memorations which proved to be obsessive. One can just 
remember the Soviet tradition of taking wedding photo-
graphs in front of World War II monuments. Too much 
memory, like too little memory, can be “reinterpreted in 
terms of the categories of resistance and compulsion to 
repeat”, as the philosopher Paul Ricœur argued, which 
inevitably entails the work of remembering.3 And what is 
at stake is that the excess of memory obscures the expe-
riences of war that do not fit in the dominant framework. 
Yet memories of humiliation and loss do not disappear 
but become rather symbolic wounds stored in the 
archives of the collective memory that call for healing. 
Abuses of memory and forgetting are thus particularly 
problematic since the imposed historical representation 
of the past is “placed in the service of the circumscription 
of the identity defining the community.”4 
A fter 1989, the new emerging nations challenged the narratives about the Great Patriotic war and 
delegitimized the heroic anti-fascist struggle along with 
the communist regimes. The new narrative of the end of 
World War II was reframed as a loss of sovereignty, for 
instance. In this new narrative, “Yalta” was no longer “the 
symbol of liberation and the Allies’ victory over Nazism, 
but of the partition of Europe, in which half the continent 
was abandoned to four decades of repression.”5 The fact 
that Latvia was occupied and not liberated by the Soviets 
in 1944 was, for instance, the American- Latvian history 
professor Paulis Lazda’s main concern when he initiated 
the Museum of the Occupation of Latvia in 1993.6
In these new historical reconfigurations, the trauma 
of communist crimes is placed at the core of histori-
cal representation. From this perspective, the period 
before Communist rule is portrayed as a golden era. 
Communism is depicted as the greater evil and the Nazi 
occupation is even used to present an anti-communist 
interpretation of the past.7 In the narratives presented 
at the Estonian Museum of Occupations in Tallinn or 
the Lithuanian Museum of Occupations and Freedom 
Fights (previously the Museum of Genocide Victims), 
the representations of the horrors of Nazism clearly 
avoid giving rise to feelings of sympathy for the idea of 
the Soviet Union as liberator. Further, the memories of 
the victims of Nazism should not drown out the suffering 
The first exhibition on the crimes of Stalinism, called “Week of Conscience,” was held thanks to Perestroika in November 1988 at the 
club of the Moscow electric lamp factory. PHOTO: DMITRY BORKO / WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
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of the victims of communism. In the Estonian Museum 
of Occupations in Tallinn, the anti-communist framing 
determines which evidence is presented. For instance, 
in the part concerning the “War and the German years”, 
German wartime propaganda films warning of the “red 
terror” and “Bolshevik assaults” are used as evidence of 
Soviet atrocities. As for the Lithuanian Museum of Occu-
pations and Freedom Fights, located in a former prison 
of the Soviet secret services, the NKVD and later the 
KGB, the spotlight is turned on the victims from the two 
Soviet occupations (e.g. before and after 
WWII) and the fact that the building 
served as a Gestapo prison from 1941 to 
1944 is only mentioned in passing on 
a “tiny board at the exhibition on the 
ground floor.”8 
In the post-communist period, vic-timhood thus became the new dom-
inant narrative and the new emerging 
nations rooted their identity in trau-
mas, often using the term “genocide” 
to label the violent experiences they 
were subjected to during the Stalinist 
period.9 This has notably been the case 
in Ukraine, where the memory of the 
Holodomor (the famine of 1932–33, induced by the Bol-
shevik government) became one of the founding myths 
of the post-Soviet Ukrainian state. The recognition and 
representation of the Stalinist repressions is undeniably 
crucial to coming to term with the past. The problem, 
however, is that the status of nation-victim and the 
externalization of communism provides “a moral alibi”. 
As the philosopher Tzvetan Todorov argued, “To have 
been a victim gives you the right to complain, to protest, 
and to make demands.”10 In this way, the wrongdoings 
of one’s own nation are justified as defensive actions. 
The position of victim also offers the possibility to dispel 
one’s own group’s collaboration, voluntary or forced, in 
Nazi crimes against the Jews. And when director Heiki 
Ahonen of the Museum of Occupations in Tallinn, for 
instance, was asked what the museum contained from 
the Holocaust, he answered: “Estonia never had a Jewish 
question and we just simply don’t have any physical items 
from these people who were killed.”11
Even in the ambitious Polish museum POLIN in 
Warsaw, anti-Semitism is externalized by blaming some 
external forces, from the Cossacks to the German and 
Soviet occupiers. In this way, any complicity or collabo-
ration, voluntary or forced, in Nazi crimes by some Polish 
citizens can be drowned out. This is also the case in the 
narrative offered at the Jasenovac death camp exhibition 
in Croatia, the only death camp in German-occupied 
Europe operated by local collaborators where the role of 
Croat perpetrators is carefully blanked out.12
What is even more problematic is when perpetra-
tors are reframed as “anti-Soviet resistant fighters” 
or “freedom fighters” and especially when politicians 
instrumentalize the symbolic wounds that were tabooed 
or disfigured in the Soviet official 
narratives and reframe them as objects 
of glory and celebration. Thus, the 
“reordering of meaningful worlds”13 
after the collapse of the Soviet Un-
ion led to a process of reclamation of 
history, well attested for instance by 
the reconfiguration of the Ukrainian 
nationalist movement.14 It is of course 
legitimate to address the historical 
wounds suffered by one’s own group, 
but the problem is when the reclaimed 
past is cleared of any difficult aspects 
of past events that could damage the 
group’s self-identity. And when the 
duty of memory “proclaims itself to be 
speaking for the victims’ demand for justice”15 it becomes 
an obligatory memory which has the same signs of abuse 
as the previous Soviet-imposed authorized narrative. 
The Return of the Undead
The forced memorialization of the Great Victory led 
to another phenomenon, i.e. blocked memory. Indeed, 
imposed memory drowns out mourning for the victims 
and serves as a way to avoid confronting one’s own deeds 
during the war (for instance the rape of women by Soviet 
soldiers). Hence, only the memories of the soldiers who 
fought for the Soviet Union were commemorated in 
Estonia or Latvia during the Soviet period while the men 
who had been mobilized by Nazi Germany, voluntarily or 
forced, were silenced.16 Their experiences were conse-
quently ostracized. This led to a double silence, since 
these sorts of traumatic experiences were not recognized 
and commemorated, and the suffering of these men had 
to be silenced for their own survival and for the sake of 
their relatives. It also creates an insidious divide within a 
society between citizens who are allowed to pay tribute 
to their dead and those who are silenced. This sort of ta-
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traumatic experiences and marks an impossible mourn-
ing process. 
In Eastern Europe, where millions remain unburied, 
the repressed continue to torment the living and the dead 
return as the undead “in novels, films, and other forms of 
culture that reflect, shape, and possess people’s mem-
ory”, as the historian and cultural scientist Alexander 
Etkind put it.17 Missing citizens and soldiers cannot be 
properly mourned if the circumstances and place of their 
deaths are not known. And as Freud warned us, 
If the dead are not properly mourned, they 
turned into the undead and cause trouble for 
the living. If the suffering is not remembered, 
it will be repeated, If the loss is not recognized, 
it threatens to return in strange though not 
entirely new forms, as the uncanny.18
Soviet terror left indelible aftereffects in societies, which are very difficult to come to terms with for 
several reasons. Firstly, it is difficult to 
frame the experiences of Soviet terror 
in one single narrative since the experi-
ences could take many different shades, 
from house arrest to detainment in a 
penitentiary or disciplinary institu-
tion (prison, gulag camp, psychiatric 
hospital, orphanage, Soviet army), from 
ethnic resettlement to collectivization 
or forced industrialization. Secondly, 
the lines between victim and perpetra-
tor were blurred. As Etkind suggested, 
“the same person could be a perpetra-
tor during one wave of terror, and the 
victim during the next”,19 which complicated any attempt 
at mourning. And thirdly, families were left without 
information and in uncertainty and whether the victim 
came back or not, their fate affected deeply the lives of 
their descendants for generations. Those who returned 
from the camps returned as different people, still alive 
but no longer themselves, which was very difficult for 
descendants to face and created a wall between the trau-
matized victims of the gulag and their families. 
The work of mourning is impeded when the fate of 
one parent is uncertain and/or the circumstances of 
death in the camp remain unknown. The uncertain loss is 
destructive both for survivors and for the memory of the 
dead, “nothing could be worse for the work of mourning 
than confusion and doubt; one has to know what is bur-
ied and where.”20 Families kept hoping that the missing 
relative would reappear from captivity. This hope of an 
eventual return postpones and complicates the families’ 
mourning. 
Not knowing where a loved one is buried indicates an 
impossible mourning process. As the cultural theorist 
Aleida Assmann argues, “it is precisely this cultural and 
religious duty of laying the dead to rest that is so shock-
ingly disrupted after periods of excessive violence.”21 A 
human being’s passage on earth is annihilated when s/
he is refused a place of burial or at least a ritual through 
which the place and time of her/his departure is attested. 
The act of throwing bodies into a mass grave or leaving 
human beings in the anonymity of a communal grave is 
a powerful statement: It erases their passage in life. The 
relatives and next of kin’s identification of the victims’ 
bodies attest that “she or he has lived and is dead”. The 
refusal of this last homage to a human being is, as Jean-
Luc Nancy pinpoints, to steal his/her death. To set up 
right relations between living communities and their 
ancestors is crucial and as the anthro-
pologist Katherine Verdery put it, 
“though it is never easy to learn which 
relations are ‘right’, wrong relations 
are universally believed to be unfair 
to the dead and dangerous for the 
living.”22 Proper burial is a prerequi-
site for the memory of the dead in our 
world view. As anthropologist Johanna 
Dahlin shows, war is not finished until 
the last fallen soldier is buried. This 
motivates some people organized in a 
voluntary search movement in Russia 
to offer a belated funeral to missing 
soldiers in action whose remains are buried in the woods 
and bogs of the Kirov district near St. Petersburg. In this 
way, war is brought to an end and the unburied can rest 
in peace.23
The rehabilitation of the victims of Stalinism is incom-
plete, however, and very few persons have been com-
pensated. No consensus about the representation or the 
remembrance of the losses has been developed.24 If the 
unlawfully killed are not mourned they are condemned 
“to return in strange though not entirely new forms, as 
the uncanny” and hover around the living.25 The duty of 
memory is usually transmitted to the third generation. 
While the survivors and/or the direct descendants of the 
unburied are struggling with their trauma and loss, the 
next generation is left with the responsibility of reassess-
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ing the place of one’s ancestors in history and to “revise 
national genealogies, inserting the person as an ancestor 
more centrally into the lineage of honoured forebears.”26
Yet the felt demand of memory raised by wounded and 
impassioned memories encompasses a threatening tone 
to the proclamation of the duty of memory. If no cultural 
or political frameworks for giving meaning to the losses 
are available, the demand of memory can take the form of 
new abuses. This is notably the case when descendants 
and/or representatives of the diaspora initiate museums 
and decide how the past should be represented, which 
has been the case at Occupation museums in Tallinn, 
Riga and Vilnius. 
The third generation, sensitive to the grandparents’ feeling of injustice, might also turn to violence to 
make their request heard. This is notably the topic of 
the film Don’t Tell Me the Boy Was Mad (Une histoire de 
fou, 2015) produced and directed by Robert Guédiguian, 
which show the radicalization of an Armenian refu-
gee’s grandchild and his attempt to make the Armenian 
genocide publicly recognized in France through an act 
of terrorism. The issue of unburied victims is also taken 
up in the film Aftermath (Polish, Pokłosie) from 2012 by 
Władysław Pasikowski. In the film, based on the tragic 
event in the town of Jedwabne in June 1941 (see Törn-
quist-Plewa in this volume), a man relentlessly gathers 
Jewish tombstones displayed in the neighborhood and 
moves them into his own field to save them from oblivi-
on. His agency met the opposition of the town residents, 
reluctant to face their deeds against local Jews during the 
war. Indeed, repressed unlawful deeds are condemned to 
return in distorted and monstrous forms. 
As Etkind shows, films and literature in the post-com-
munist societies not only reflect the societies’ obsession 
with the past but “extend the work of mourning into 
those spaces that defeat more rational ways of under-
standing the past.”27 The proliferation of ghosts, vampires 
and zombies in post socialist countries’ high and pop-
ular cultures prove an obsession with the return of the 
undead. From films like Repentance (by Tengiz Abuladze, 
1987) and Zero City (by Karen Shakhnazarov, 1988) to 
film 4 (by Ilya Khrzhanovsky, 2004) and Terra Nova (by 
Aleksandr Melnik, 2013), the public space is haunted by 
undead and uncanny monsters. 
Call for an Appeased Future
The current historical reconfiguration in Eastern Europe 
proves that the past has not yet been crystallized in a con-
sensual memory. The region, as Barbara Törnquist-Plewa 
argues in this volume, is struggling with a multiplicity of 
painful and conflicting memories. The unappeased pasts 
continue to haunt the citizenry and urge various groups 
in Eastern Europe to compete for recognition of “their” 
past, their “trauma” which was long silenced or obscured 
in the official discourses. This tendency to construct a 
“national Holocaust” tied up the new nations in a victim 
status that make it difficult to find commonalities with 
the traumas experienced by other groups. Thus, the 
symbolic wounds stored in the archives of collective 
memory are grafted onto the demand for identity. We 
are witnessing here the need of groups and individuals 
to reclaim their past and restore “the damage inflicted 
on their identities by abusive power systems.”28 This 
reclamation of history is often accompanied by the claim 
for historical justice. What is at stake is that the affirma-
tion of historical justice in the name of one’s own group is 
often accompanied by the obscuring (or even erasure) of 
injustices and atrocities inflicted on other ethnic groups, 
which inevitably affects the capacity to acknowledge 
another groups’ past, perceived as a danger for one’s own 
identity. 
The current historical representation in post-com-munist countries remains captive to the symptom of 
obsession and makes memory waver continually be-
tween use (recognition of the victims) and abuse (victim 
status). The competition of victimhood nevertheless 
leads inevitably to new abuses of memory and creates 
a new imbalance between a “we” and a “them”.29 Thus, 
the re-framing of the Soviet period as occupation or 
colonization impacted on the current social relationship 
between communities in the post-communist nations. 
The colonisation paradigm dictated the political debate 
in Estonia and Latvia during the early 1990s and impact-
ed on the decision to create ethnic democracies in which 
only those who lived in Latvia and Estonia prior to the 
occupation by the Soviet Union and their descendants 
(mostly ethnic Baltic people) were considered legitimate 
citizens.30
This regressive character of the abuse carries us back 
into the uses and abuses of memory under the sign of 
thwarted memory during the Soviet period. We have 
reached a point when yesterdays’ thwarted memory 
becomes todays’ imposed memory, proving that the 
repressed past is subjected to resistance and repetition 
since it has not undergone the ordeal of the difficult work 
of remembering. The undigested past turns to obses-
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sion and entails descendants engaging with the work 
of memory and of mourning. And as Etkind warns us, 
mourning and trauma are similar in relation to repe-
tition: “In mourning as well as in trauma, the subject 
obsessively returns to certain experiences of the past, 
and these returns obstruct this subject’s ability to live in 
the present.”31 Post-communist societies need to face the 
violent experiences they have been subjected to and to 
work on the representation (the mechanism of making 
the non-present relevant for the present) and the process 
of “remembering”, e.g. “to reconnect the lost member 
with its peers.”32
This process of working through is essential to recon-
struct the societies and avoid the return of the repressed 
as uncanny phenomena (from ghosts to act of terrorism). 
This process is unavoidable if an appeased standpoint is 
to be reached: We are indebted to those who have gone 
before us for part of what we are. As Ricœur argued, 
“The duty of memory is not restricted to preserving the 
material trace, whether scriptural or other, of past events, 
but maintains the feeling of being obligated with respect 
to these others, of whom we shall later say, not that they 
are no more, but that they were. Pay the debt (…) but also 
inventory the heritage.”33 Indeed, the duty of memory is 
also a duty of working through the inherited past. An ap-
peased future cannot be reached without taking respon-
sibility. There is a need to reach some social consensus 
and to renegotiate the knowledge presented in memorial 
museums which are not only core sites for the negotia-
tion of historical narratives but a place for social, ethnic 
and religious in-groups and out-groups’ inclusion.34
These acts of re-member-ing are thus crucial for post- 
communist societies to regain coherence and vitality.  ●
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13   Katherine Verdery, Political Lives of Dead Bodies: Reburial and 
Postsocialist Change (New York: Columbia University Press, 1999), 
50.
14  see Yuliya Yurchuk’s contribution in this volume.
15  Ricœur 449.
16   Ene Ko-resaar, Soldiers of memory: World War II and Its Aftermath 
in Estonian Post-Soviet Life Stories (Amsterdam: Dodopi, 2011) and 
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isual culture produced under communist 
regimes has nowadays become a contested 
object. A direction appeared in post-socialist 
visual culture studies that focuses on com-
munist visuality. Formerly a field dominated 
by communist and anti-communist propaganda, visual-
izations of communism nowadays attract a new gener-
ation of scholars who see it as “a sphere that illustrates, 
narrates, debates, questions, confronts, and ultimately 
remembers the dream of a better future”.1 The value of 
communism is in its utopian imagination, the value of 
the image is in providing communism with a language to 
get hold of and retain the spirit of utopia. This is a new 
attempt to awaken the public from the all-embracing 
nostalgic daydreaming, the neoliberal utopia that Zyg-
munt Bauman called “retrotopia”: “the global epidemic 
of nostalgia” that came with the era of neoliberalism to 
replace “the epidemic of progress frenzy in the relay race 
of history.”2  
Bauman’s retrotopia is fundamentally ahistorical and 
should not be confused with memory only because it 
is also oriented to the past. It is phantasm, a politically 
reactionary flight both from history and from the present 
into the imagined domain “reconciling, in the long term, 
security with freedom.”3 The trend is now visible in many 
former socialist societies where political regimes seek 
stability by using police violence and enforcing tradi-
tional values. In this part of Europe, utopia and belief in 
historical progress used to be strictly prescribed to every 
citizen. Visualizations of communism also came into 
being in the spirit of utopia and historical progress, and 
were prescribed as its representations and instruments. 
The question is, how communist visuality is re-appropri-
ated within the framework of retrotopian desires – and 
if there is a way to use it as a compass out of the mire of 
nostalgic fetishism back into history.
In order to find out what happens to communist visual-ity in some cases of its present-day reuses and re-
makes, we have to know what it is. At the risk of recapit-
ulating what is known to everyone, I nevertheless intend 
to start with a brief overview of communist visuality as it 
was invented by the revolutionary avantgarde and given 





demise of cinematic representation with the arrival of 
digital technologies. The question is, what is it that makes 
visuality “communist” in the original meaning? Then, 
to illustrate how communist visuality is appropriated in 
visual culture today, I will present three cases. One is the 
HBO miniseries Chernobyl, a period production based on 
historical facts; another is Dau, an international project 
at the crossroad of cinema, immersive theater, and per-
formance art. The third case was chosen for its critical 
perspective: documentary films by Sergei Loznitsa as 
examples of historical research and cinema for the criti-
cal interpretation of history. Thus, I will be following the 
itinerary of communist visualization from its invention 
during the age of communism (the image) to its simula-
tion in post-communist commercial entertainment (the 
afterimage) and its deconstruction by confrontation with 
the historical fact (counterimage).
Visualization of What?
Communist visuality nowadays is a visuality without an 
object: communism does not exist any longer, not as glob-
al power, not as social utopia, not as a moral code, and, 
importantly, not as an economic system within which 
film industries could operate in countries ruled by com-
munist parties. If communism does return from the past, 
it returns not as a specter but as a memory of the specter, 
nostalgic dreamwork made of media images and narra-
tives and their new applications. Is the memory of the 
communist past ultimately colonized by retrotopia? Can 
it be that the visuality from the recent past still retains 
a share of communist potential to support “the safety of 
the planet, democracy, and human solidarity”?4
Strictly speaking, it is not possible to instrumental-
ize, use, misuse, or abuse history. Yet, when historical 
meaning and value are projected onto artefacts, history 
becomes objectified and therefore manipulable as far as 
their content is concerned. A visual image is different 
from other bearers of historical significance, but it is also 
a material object, a thing that is made (planned, directed, 
filmed, developed, montaged, distributed, and so on). 
As such, the image constitutes an object of value, and as 
value it can be further invested to produce new value. In-
Filming of the film Dau on the Railway Station Square in Kharkov. PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
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stead of serving as an ideological instrument of the state, 
the communist image then acquires value as symbolic 
capital.
What is it that constitutes a visual image as a com-munist one? “Communist“ means not only time, 
place, and terms of production, but, importantly, aesthet-
ics and ideology, a poetics of politics (or a politics of poet-
ics). We associate visuality with communism as concrete 
historical contexts: the black-and-white picture and the 
dynamic montage of the Soviet avantgarde, or the bleak 
and blurred, faded color images of the auteur cinema of 
the 1960–70s. In what follows, I will narrow down all vis-
uality to film images because cinema, due to the mimetic 
desires it inspires in its audiences, is no less than political 
repression and communist education responsible for the 
symbolic constitution of communist subjectivity. 
Early communist film images produced an alphabet of 
visualizations of revolution in general as the masses’ ef-
fort towards a new beginning of world history. Left-wing 
cinematography in post-war Europe expressed its revolu-
tionary aspirations by appropriating the politics of the 
film image invented by the Soviet avantgarde. Nowadays, 
as during the Cold War era, “communist” rather means 
visual styles and images from Socialist Realism includ-
ing its decline in the 1960s–80s. It is an open question 
whether these new appropriations should be subsumed 
under “communist visuality” or rather under “post-mod-
ern Stalinism” (Jonathan Brent’s term).5 But it is notice-
able that intellectuals’ interest in Stalinist aesthetics ap-
pears to grow parallel to the rise of Stalinist sympathies 
in popular culture, a remarkable coincidence that would 
be worth discussing in greater detail elsewhere. 
The Communist Image:  
“Comrade, Not Commodity” 
At the dawn of communist visual culture and its great 
cinematic experiments, in the Soviet 1920s, “communist” 
was attributed to the political economy of the image, and 
not its effects, its aesthetics being inseparable from its 
politics. Thus, LEF, the group of leftist artists and critics 
in the USSR, saw cinema as a constitutive part of socialist 
economy and film as an instrument of socialist construc-
tion. They evaluated all artistic expression in terms of its 
use value, its ability to satisfy the needs of the proletarian 
and the proletarian state. Alexander Rodchenko declared 
that the socialist thing is “not a commodity but a com-
rade”, and this maxim also applied to the image. Boris 
Arvatov, the leading LEF theorist, proclaimed that the 
value of the film image lies in “the methods of its produc-
tion and reception … not in the properties of the product 
but in the properties of the collective process of artistic 
production: by whom, how, and with what practical pur-
pose the film is produced.”6 A communist visual regime 
rejected fetishistic pleasures provided by bourgeois 
entertainment. LEF even suggested eliminating cine-
ma theaters and replacing them with film departments 
within Soviet administrative bodies for the use of film in 
“cinematic research, education, propaganda, and infor-
mation … to socialize the function of the art of cinema.”7 
Thus, the making of communist visuality started with the 
remaking of the principles of its production, distribution, 
and useful application; film for profit was to be replaced 
by non-surplus-value cinema. 
This led LEF to divide film into right-wing and left-
wing. On the right, Arvatov placed movies with actors 
and a fictional “fabula”; this kind of film distorted 
objective reality. On the left, there was a non-acted film 
without a “fabula”, therefore, true-to-life.8 This rather 
straightforward attempt to formalize and politicize vis-
uality failed to account for the role of the audience and, 
more broadly, for the politics of seeing that constitutes 
the regime of visuality. In order to establish cinema as a 
communist project to be deployed in the achievement 
of communist goals one needed to develop new skills 
of reception and appreciation in the proletarian audi-
ence. Dziga Vertov was most efficient educating Russian 
workers and peasants in communist vision. In his earliest 
film experiments he designed his films as a collective 
“cinema-eye” for the political class. During the years of 
the first five-year-plans, he created visual epics filling the 
cinema-eye with the content of Soviet industrialization. 
Even at the end of his career, as a newsreel film director, 
Vertov was still trying to increase the use value of his 
cinema by making newsreel a vehicle of objective com-
munist knowledge. He proposed, among other things, 
the method of squeezing the grand time of the Socialist 
Realist epic into the mini-format of a ninety-second 
long episode, so that an ultra-short film could cover the 
immensity of Soviet spaces and projects, experimenting 
with time-space compression long before it was discov-
ered by post-modern theory.9 
A ccording to Jean-Luc Godard, the master of film  socialisme, cinema lost its grounds to television 
when the small screen (watched by an individual view-
er) came to replace the wide screen (watched by the 
masses).10 It was Godard who most radically opened up 
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the film image towards everyday life when he took his 
filming onto the streets. Instead of carefully planning and 
controlling the logic of the gaze of the camera moving in-
side the constructed set, he preferred to choose just one 
point of view, “like in a documentary”, and then watch 
things happen in the field of vision “as if by themselves”.11 
That was his contribution to the general trend of democ-
ratization of cinema after the war, against fetishism and 
towards a greater social and individual awareness. In 
television, the medium that came to replace film and 
the subject of filmic vision, “there’s no creation at all 
anymore, just broadcasting”,12 the viewer alone with his 
gadget. Digital technology has no genetic or functional 
connection with cinema; digitized cinema changes not 
simply in appearance, but also in its nature as an event. 
We will also see some examples of how this change in 
visual regime from “communist film” to “bourgeois tele-
vision” affected communist visuality.
The Afterimage: Remembering the Trauma
Throughout the history of Soviet modernization, film 
served as a powerful factor encouraging mimetic desire, 
the wish to imitate in everyday life the ideal images 
presented on the screen. The power of cinema as the pro-
ducer of dream images is tantamount, but, according to 
André Bazin, even in the dream worlds of its imagination, 
film invariably acts as “a social documentary”.13 Even 
re-medialized with the use of digital technologies, cine-
ma still remains “a social documentary”, even though the 
structure of this new documentality becomes consider-
ably more complicated, its dream worlds more complex 
and remote from immediate experience. Streaming ser-
vices are where communist visuality is located nowadays, 
and this is where the audiences receive communism as 
information and sensation: the digital image is an after-
image of communism. 
An afterimage is an illusion that remains after a period 
of exposure to the original image, after the object itself is 
no longer present. We are all familiar with the phenome-
non: a negative “imprint” on the retina that lingers float-
ing in the field of vision after we looked for some time at a 
brightly illuminated object. 
Soviet visuals representing the reality of the USSR 
as a communist society in construction were produced 
within the framework of the socialist economy. Yet 
nowadays, inherited by capitalism and capitalist enter-
tainment, they are used as images of dystopia to repre-
sent communism’s “better world” doomed from the very 
beginning. Dystopia is the legacy of the Cold War, when 
western media and film interpreted Soviet communism 
as a typically “Russian” thing, the radical Other of the 
rest of the rational world or, according to Boris Groys, an 
“unconscious, unpresentable mode of being, alien to any 
historicity.”14 This way of alienating communist experi-
ence from world history is quite prominent in two of my 
examples later in this essay, one of them (Chernobyl) pro-
moting itself as a historical narrative with a twist of the 
present-day apocalypse, the other (Dau) an investigation 
of dark fantasies about communism in the post-commu-
nist collective unconscious. Thus, not only melancholy 
and sentimental nostalgia, but also much heavier issues 
are at stake when the present-day media and art subject 
communist visuality to scrutiny, trying to make out what 
exactly our time has inherited after the demise of com-
munism, and what potential of expression can be gained 
from re-medialization of communist visuality. 
Chernobyl, an award-winning historical miniseries produced by HBO and Sky UK in 2019, is an inter-
esting case of reuse. It was seen by eight million people 
across various streaming platforms and highly acclaimed 
both by critics and the general public. A mixture of 
reality-based and period productions, Chernobyl recy-
cled quite a lot of Soviet symbolic material, especially 
narrative and visual devices from (late) Socialist Realism. 
Such were for instance the tragic episodes based on the 
historical accounts of Chernobyl’s struggle, the self-sac-
rifice of the rank-and-file who fought a hopeless fight full 
of enthusiasm but without any protection whatsoever. 
In its rendering of facts Chernobyl proved remarkable in 
the way it borrowed narrative and visual patterns from 
Soviet war movies and post-war “socialist humanism”, 
especially the combination of melodrama depicting indi-
The film Chernobyl borrows narrative and visual patterns from 
















vidual lives with tragedy in the interpretation of national 
history. 
The way Chernobyl used reconstructed Soviet envi-
ronments was especially impressive: Those insignificant 
things that were so recognizable for everyone born in the 
USSR surrounded the characters tightly and intimately. 
The property team worked wonders collecting exclusive-
ly authentic objects and environments for the set. Due 
to its high definition technology, Chernobyl could easily 
serve as a museum of the 1970s – or a museum of 2020s 
historical fetishism. Added in post-production were 
also effects simulating the chiaroscuro of Soviet movies, 
giving Chernobyl an atmosphere of almost otherworldly 
bleakness, as if seen through a screen of smoke (or tears), 
and reproducing sovcolor (Soviet color) as a sign of “typi-
cally Soviet bloc” cinema.15
Chernobyl locations have nowadays themselves be-
come objects of tourist interest.16 
Yet, neither this, nor excellent props helped to fully 
convince, and even made some people quite angry. The 
claim to facticity was predictably questioned by Cher-
nobyl veterans, as well as (also predictably) by Russia’s 
Communist Party and culture ministry who rejected the 
project as counter-historical and “Russophobic”.17 By 
progressive critics, Chernobyl was reproached for ex-
ploiting anti-communist clichés of the Cold War era, but 
at the same time positively evaluated for acting out “some 
of our collective fears about the safety 
of the planet, democracy, and human 
solidarity.”18
It is still unclear how exactly the simple idea of shooting a biopic 
about the Soviet nuclear physicist 
Lev Landau gradually transformed 
into Ilya Khrzhanovskii’s opus 
magnum Dau, described by himself 
as a “unique, epic, and ever-chang-
ing project …[that] combines film, 
science, performance, spirituality, 
social and artistic experimenta-
tion”.19 Its production was generously financed by private 
donors and took over ten years. From the outside Dau 
appears a mixture of hard-core authenticity, historical 
re-enactment and shamanic journeying therapy – except 
that both re-enactment and therapy were professionally 
documented on film throughout the period and later 
converted into cinema and TV formats for distribution. 
The theme of this reenaction (or therapy) was everyday 
life under Stalin, to be reconstructed in every detail, 
complete with top level classified regime members on the 
premises, the NKVD in period uniforms, denunciations 
and psychological violence during night-time interro-
gations, as well as abundant non-simulated scenes of 
nudity, sex, violence, etc. 
In the heated post-factum discussion of Dau’s gran-diosity mania, little attention has been given to its 
director’s profoundly ahistorical philosophy and his 
almost religious, if not obsessive, belief that authentic-
ity guarantees historical truth and can indeed “activate 
history”.20 In the spirit of pop-cultural historical recon-
structions and motivated by the myth of the Milgram ex-
periment, Dau set out to prove that homo sovieticus could 
be re-awakened in the present-day individual by me-
ticulous reconstruction of material and social environ-
ments. Authenticity, the Holy Grail of the digital image, 
here replaced historical fact with a “feeling of history”, 
assuming feeling to be identical with fact. What started 
as a historical project and a parody of communist vis-
uality, with time and thanks to an uninterrupted flow of 
money, withdrew into fantasies, into “a cinematographic 
bubble”, in which the visual and other history of com-
munism under Stalin’s rule got “remixed, circulated, and 
reproduced”, turning history into a digital affect.21 That 
all historical memory and not only communist visuality 
could be “remixed” in such a way is a 
possibility, given the nature of digital 
technologies and the tension they 
produce in general, between symbol-
ism and indexality, or the knowledge 
and experience of history, on the one 
hand, and the “feeling” on the other.
The Counter-Image:  
Un-Forgetting Communism
This tension shows itself in the 
craving for “the real thing”, the 
authentic and the genuine under the 
rule of the digital, and this concerns 
also the “sincere and direct” communist representation, 
the “truth” of the documentary or media image and the 
blindness of the audience that cannot discern construct-
edness in the image, in its constitution as an artefact. 
Documentary footage fascinates and mystifies the fetish-
ist consumer not less than the spectacle of “the balleri-
na’s underpants”, as Vertov in the 1920s summarized the 
fetishism of bourgeois cinema. 
Due to its 
high definition 
technology, Cherno-
byl could easily serve 
as a museum of the 
1970s – or a muse-




On the other hand, the kind of politically aware per-ception promoted by the Soviet avantgarde with its 
program of emancipation could not help relying on cine-
ma’s totalizing power, which agreed with the communist 
ideology but originated in cinema’s own power to pro-
duce fascination in the viewer. The image of communism 
deployed by Vertov in One Sixth of the World made visible 
the geographic, historical, and ethnic diversity of the 
territory of the USSR, but such inclusiveness was based 
on the assumptions of structural homogeneity and visual 
control. Not only bourgeois, but communist visuality, too, 
requires a critical deconstruction to mobilize the image 
against the imperialist potentialities inherent in its tech-
nology and aesthetics.
The effects of the film image as total representation 
are the object of Sergei Loznitsa’s critical intervention 
in Soviet documentary film from Stalin’s time.22 By using 
material that had been for some reason excluded from 
the final version, he seeks to subvert Stalinist visuality 
by means of visuality itself – and thus calls into question 
the ideological and technological criteria of communist 
aesthetics that allowed images born out of the spirit of 
revolutionary emancipation to find useful application for 
themselves in the regime of total terror.
Loznitsa’s Protsess (The Trial, 2018), uses leftovers 
from Iakov Posel’skii 1930 documentary 13 dnei: protsess 
po delu “Prompartii” (Thirteen Days: The Trial of the 
Industrial Party). This was one of the earliest events in 
the history of Stalin’s show trials, a staged act of mock 
justice by “socialist legality”. Prompartia was an OGPU 
falsification used to justify political repression against 
the technical intelligentsia who could be blamed for the 
economic failures of Stalin’s regime. One person died 
during the investigation and another was executed with-
out trial, which probably helped secure the cooperation 
of the rest of the victims.
Loznitsa reconstructed the story by restoring much 
of what Posel’skii had left out. He thus made visible the 
In 1930 in Moscow, USSR, the Soviet government puts a group of top rank economists and engineers on trial, accusing them of 
plotting a coup d’état. The charges are fabricated and the punishment, if convicted, is death. Image from The Trial by Sergei Loznitsa.
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nature of the Prompartia trial as a theatrical event, a 
staged production directed according to a script, played 
by a group of actors on the stage, and supported by audi-
ence in the hall and outside the courtroom. In Loznitsa’s 
version, it turned out that the central position in the 
scenography of the trial had been given to a film crew; 
the images revealing their presence had been cut from 
the original 1930 documentary to give it the appearance 
of objectivity. Alongside the fragments showing how 
the event was being documented (by film cameras and 
stenographers) Loznitsa also restored the close-ups of 
the procurator’s complete speech and of the accused 
persons delivering their final statements, as well as frag-
ments showing how the public reacted and the organized 
demonstration outdoors howled, demanding capital pun-
ishment. Thus, Loznitsa’s montage not only completed 
the factual content but also revealed the anatomy of this 
major provocation, a historical forgery and a fake act of 
fake justice that ended “for real”, with death and prison 
for the innocent victims.23 
 
Another film from Loznitsa’s series of archival res-torations is Gosudartvennye pokhorony (The State 
Funeral, 2019). Here, Loznitsa again worked with found 
material left after another earlier film production, Velikoe 
proshchanie (Great Mourning, 1953), a detailed chronicle 
of the three days after Stalin’s death, crowds marching 
to see Stalin’s body, and public mourning ceremonies 
all over the USSR. Great Mourning was commissioned 
on the day of Stalin’s death to be distributed all over the 
USSR, which never happened; historically, it is the last 
in a whole series of Stalinist documentaries filmed by 
dozens of cameramen all over the 
country and put together using the 
principles of Vertov’s montage to rep-
resent the USSR on screen as a tem-
poral and spatial totality. The 10,000 
meters of footage were produced in 
the project out of which only a frac-
tion was usable in the final version. 
Such a gigantic over-expenditure or 
time, money, and effort would in itself 
already be a massive monument suitable to commemo-
rate Stalin’s greatness. Then unexpectedly Great Mourn-
ing was not interesting anymore and all materials were 
sent to the archives where they remained until found out 
by Loznitsa.24
Here again, just like he did in The Trial, Loznitsa wish-
es to follow the process closely and to allow national grief 
to be visible in all its detail, face after face, group after 
group, site after site. He found a way of re-using criti-
cally the way original camera work captured the event: 
In the same location where the Prompartia trial had 
taken place twenty years earlier, crowded by the griev-
ing masses and security forces, the camera could only 
capture the events from one and the same angle, the same 
monotonous movement of endless processions, people 
wearing the same expressions on their faces, of either 
sorrow, or boredom, or curiosity. Due to this emphasis 
on the ceaseless and meaningless repetition – in fact, 
the mystery behind the effectiveness of Stalin’s version 
of communism – Loznitsa’s image in The State Funeral 
became a counter-image of its prototype, Great Mourn-
ing. The original film shows the loss of the genius leader 
in allegorical tableaux, groups of citizens expressively 
frozen in sculptural poses of motionless grief. In Loznit-
sa’s remix, instead of frozen images, society appears 
to scatter and melt and flow in formless and aimless 
fluxes. “Everything that is solid melts into air”, and the 
uncomfortable monumental memory starts dissolving. 
However, Stalin’s burial can signify the end of Stalinism 
and by the same token the beginning of its forgetting. To 
undo the forgetting is the critical intention here: in order 
to un-forget the inconvenient heritage of communist 
visuality, Loznitsa brings it back into the field of vision to 
counter the nostalgic imagination of the present day and 
to challenge its uncritical memory. 
What Is Left of Communism?
Together with communism’s claim to be the end of all 
human history, communist visual symbols have lost their 
pretensions of totality – but then, in 
what sense do they remain commu-
nist, if at all?
For present-day political phi-
losophy, the idea of communism is 
relevant not as a “system”, nor an 
“era”, but merely as “a communist 
moment” (Alain Badiou) or ”the 
communist hypothesis” (Jacques 
Rancière): “Communism is think-
able to us as the tradition created around a number of 
moments, famous or obscure, when simple workers 
and ordinary men and women proved their capacity to 
struggle for their rights and for the rights of everybody, 
or to run factories, companies, administrations, armies, 
schools, etc., by collectivizing the power of the equal-
ity of anyone with everyone.”25 “Communists without 
Loznitsa re-
constructed 
the story by restoring 
much of what Po-
sel’skii had left out.
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proper communism” nowadays find communism usable 
as “a dream of a better future” and hope to find a way of 
reinvesting “the forgotten aspects of communism … the 
expanse and effectiveness of communist cultural work.”26 
Communism is no longer politics but cultural value; com-
munist visuality, consequently, a cultural asset. 
It cannot be denied that “emancipation and equality of 
anyone with everyone” is needed more than ever before 
in the present-day world of global disproportions. The 
age of the omniscient and all-powerful digital technol-
ogies has brought with itself an entirely new kind of 
unfreedom. The user of the digital commons can use but 
not govern the resources, and the capitalist subject, to 
quote Gilles Deleuze, is constructed in such a way that 
“the more he obeys, the more he commands, since he 
obeys only himself.”27 A return of communist visuality in 
digital forms might be a signal of Bauman’s retrotopia, 
utopianism’s neoliberal mirror reflection. Alternatively, 
it might be a way to disengage communist visuality from 
its instrumental function in “propaganda, demagoguery, 
primordial nationalism, corruption, and authoritarian-
ism [that] are not the exclusive properties of communism 
and that neoliberal capitalism does not inherently lead 
to democracy and social justice.”28 To quote Rancière 
again, “A rethinking of communism today must take into 
account the unheard-of situation of the failure of the 
capitalist utopia.”29 Such rethinking necessarily involves 
communist visuality, as well as the aesthetics and politics 
of visualizing communism, both historical and imagi-
nary. ● 
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The Toxic Memory  
Politics in the  
Post-Soviet Caucasus  
by Thomas de Waal
n May 17, 1989, a team from the 
American human rights organization 
Physicians for Human Rights arrived 
in Tbilisi, the capital of what was still 
Soviet Georgia. They came to investigate 
the deaths of around 20 civilians who had taken part in a 
peaceful protest in the city on April 9 that was violently 
broken up by Soviet troops. 
The arrival of the three physicians in Tbilisi coincided 
with the end of the traditional 40-day period of mourn-
ing for those who had perished that night. On this sym-
bolic date the doctors witnessed a third wave of hospital-
izations in which hundreds of young people complained 
of a mysterious sickness, caused, they said, by exposure 
to a toxic chemical agent. Up to 400 children and young 
people sought treatment and 43 were hospitalized. 
The killings of April 9, 1989 were experienced as an act 
of national martyrdom in Georgia. The brutal dispersal 
of a peaceful demonstration by Soviet troops turned 
Georgians en masse against the Soviet Union and spurred 
on the nationalist movement for independence. Georgia’s 
Communist Party leadership resigned, and the party 
never recovered its authority. Symbolically, the new 
Georgian parliament chose the same date two years later, 
April 9, 1991, to declare independence,1 mentioning the 
1989 killings as a justification for doing so. 
In two short years, from 1989 to 1991, not only Georgia, 
but the two other “union republics” of the South Cauca-
sus, Armenia and Azerbaijan, all of which had been part 
of the Soviet Union since 1922, moved rapidly towards 
independence. During the same period violence began 
and escalated, between Armenia and Azerbaijan, and be-
tween Tbilisi and the Abkhaz and South Ossetians, over 
the status of territories disputed between them.  
The violent and tragic episodes that occurring during 
these formative years are still memorialized and remem-
bered across this region. This is quite natural, but the way 
this memorialization is performed all too often re-enacts 
trauma or perpetuates conflict rather than seeks to over-
come it. This process of remembering and “mis-remem-
bering” of these key events is the subject of this article.  
Mass Trauma in Tbilisi
O n completion of their mission to Tbilisi in May 1989, Physicians for Human Rights issued a damning 
report holding the Soviet authorities responsible for the 
deaths of unarmed civilians on April 9.2  They determined 
that the soldiers may have used a toxic gas against the 
crowd, although they were unable to state conclusively 
whether the deaths had been caused by that agent, by 
asphyxiation or by other means. A mission from the new-
ly elected Soviet parliament, the Congress for People’s 
Deputies, led by the man who later became mayor of St. 
Petersburg Anatoly Sobchak, reached a similar verdict.3 
In a later article,4 the three doctors who had visited 
Tbilisi analysed the health effects of April 9 in a broad-
er perspective. They called the mass hospitalizations, 
especially of children, that followed the tragedy a case of 
“mass psychogenic illness”:  
Subsequent systematic examination of each child 




Photos of the April 9, 1989 Massacre 
victims on billboard in Tbilisi.
PHOTO: GEORGE BARATELI / 
WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
A woman in a car 
holding a black flag 
mourning the victims 
of April 9, 1989.
PHOTO: YURI MECHITOV
Pro-independence Georgian demonstrators 
sit on Rustaveli Avenue in Tbilisi on April 
8, 1989. On April 9, Soviet Interior Ministry 
troops moved in to crush the peaceful pro-
tests, killing at least 20 people and leaving 
hundreds injured or poisoned by gas.
PHOTO: RADIO FREE EUROPE/RADIO LIBERTY
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status. It instead yielded more data consistent 
with a diagnosis of mass psychogenic illness. 
In considering the origins of the symptoms 
seen in the Georgian schoolchildren, the PHR 
team thought that the children were expressing 
somatically the tremendous anxiety, fear, and 
grief felt throughout the community resulting 
from the Soviet military intervention and its 
aftermath. (The MSF team concurred with this 
view.) That their symptoms so closely resembled 
those suffered by the victims of the toxic gases 
appeared related to the emotional identification 
of these children with the victims. There also ap-
peared to be a significant contribution to the ep-
idemic by the adult community-parents, teach-
ers, school officials, and medical personnel-in 
that the children’s symptoms were interpreted 
as having resulted from possible toxic exposure. 
The outbreak (beginning on day 38 and peaking 
on day 39) appeared tied to the renewed focus of 
community attention as the 40th day of mourn-
ing was approached…The 40 days of mourning 
in the Georgian Orthodox Church are meant to 
serve as a vehicle for processing grief, with the 
40th day acting both as the culmination and ter-
mination of the official period of mourning. The 
people of Tbilisi, however, burdened by ongoing 
anxiety, fear, and vulnerability to the Soviet 
forces, could not move toward such closure re-
garding their recent trauma and grief.5 
The report refers to other instances of traumatic events 
leading to this phenomenon of mass psychogenic illness, 
in Kosovo in 1990 and the West Bank in 1983. It refers to 
all three incidents as “a sentinel indicator of community 
suffering in the context of political repression or fear.”
The Tbilisi deaths of April 1989 still constitute a refer-
ence point for collective memory and trauma for Georgia. 
The trauma was real and deepened by the fact that the 
perpetrators within the Soviet armed forces and their po-
litical masters were never prosecuted or held to account. 
But the psychogenic illness suffered by Georgia’s chil-
dren is also a kind of metaphor for how Georgian society 
was infected by these events and cannot shake them off—
in the words of the PHR cannot “move towards closure.” 
The deaths acquired such a significance that that it is still 
almost impossible to discuss them in public as a political 
or historical event.
In a definitive article on the topic, Katie Sartania 
records how even before tragedy struck the protests in 
the centre of Tbilisi had an aura of religious ritual about 
them. Protestors carried crosses and icons as well as 
nationalist symbols. During a public hunger strike a few 
months before, one of the opposition leaders, Merab Ko-
stava, told fellow protestors that “readiness for sacrifice 
was a positive thing.”6 Perceived loyalty to the nation was 
deemed to be even greater than loyalty to the Georgian 
Orthodox Church. At 4AM on April 9, Patriarch Ilya II, 
having spoken to Communist Party boss Jumber Patiash-
vili, asked the demonstrators to leave the street and move 
to Kashueti Church, saying that the “danger is real”. 
Demonstrators refused, saying, “No, we swore.” Protest 
leaders Zviad Gamsakhurdia and Merab Kostava told 
the Patriarch that if they ended the demonstration now, 
people would consider them traitors. 
T his suggests that those who died on April 9 were the victims not just of the callous brutality of the Soviet 
troops who came shortly afterwards to disperse the 
crowds, but also of the inflexibility of the protest leaders, 
who had invoked the language of martyrdom and resisted 
a call to move the crowd out of harm’s way. 
Sartania relates how self-criticism on this issue was 
even a taboo topic in 2018. In that year Georgian journalist 
Tamila Varshalomidze, who had been a child in 1989, made 
a documentary for Al Jazeera named My Soviet Scar. She 
devoted much of it to the 1989 killings, saying that the pro-
tests were the culmination of “two hundred years of Rus-
sian occupation” and that protestors were “killed anony-
mously and deliberately under the cover of darkness.”7
In the documentary Varshalomidze interviewed 
photographer Yuri Mechitov who took a famous picture 
at the time of a young Georgian woman holding a black 
flag to mourn those who died. Mechitov surprised his 
younger interlocutor by saying that he did not believe 
that the Soviet soldiers planned to kill anybody and those 
who died did so in a stampede.
Mechitov was denounced for these words. Members 
of Georgia’s “Anti-Occupation Movement” protested in 
front of his house, calling him a traitor and carrying a list 
of those who had died on April 9. The fact that he had 
personally borne witness to the events was not enough to 
save him from denunciation and he issued an apology. 
Constructing Memory in the South Caucasus
In all three countries of the South Caucasus, tragic events 
from the late Soviet and early post-Soviet period have 
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become reference points of public memory. While Geor-
gia marks April 9, the equivalent date in the calendar for 
Azerbaijan is January 20, “Black January” which marks 
the day when around 130 people died after Soviet troops 
intervened in Baku in 1990. 
However for both Armenia and Azerbaijan the bloody 
Karabakh conflict fought between them has even greater 
resonance than “Black January.” The two tragic events 
associated with the conflict which receive special com-
memoration every year are acts of bloodshed committed 
by the other side: the pogroms against Armenians in the 
Azerbaijani town of Sumgait in February 1988 and the 
killing of civilians fleeing the Azerbaijani town of Kho-
jaly by Armenians in February 1992. These two “sacred 
events” are marked in ways that evoke martyrdom and 
help perpetuate the conflict between the two nations. 
The second Karabakh war of 2020, in which many thou-
sands died as Azerbaijan reversed its 
losses and won a military victory cre-
ated new traumas and bitter memo-
ries which will now be memorialized 
by a new generation.
The nations of the South Caucasus 
are of course the norm, not the ex-
ception, in having powerful national 
myths, edited versions of history and 
constructed identities. Every country 
has its sanctified historical events—
they would hardly be modern nations if they did not. This 
region does have certain some specific features in the 
way its narratives are constructed, however. 
Some differences should be noted first in the world-views of different parts of the South Caucasus region, 
as the Soviet Union broke up. While for Azerbaijani and 
Georgian nationalists in 1989-91 Moscow was identified as 
the “Centre” and the locus of repression, many Armenians 
still regarded Russia as a natural ally in a struggle against 
Azerbaijan and Turkey. For Abkhaz, recent history was 
more complex still—their story was that they had suffered 
under the oppressive Georgianization of their republic 
launched by Stalin in the 1930s, but had benefited from 
Soviet rule both under Lenin and in more recent times.
  When it comes to attitudes on the three events dis-
cussed here—the killings in Tbilisi, Sumgait and Kho-
jaly—there are also noteworthy points of convergence. 
First, all the three events discussed here which defined 
public discourse occurred in the very specific context of 
the rapid disintegration of the  socialist ideology of the 
USSR. These conditions helped to produce a particular 
kind of ethnic nationalism which, as Ernest Gellner wrote, 
“is favoured by a double vacuum: there is no serious rival 
ideology, and there are no serious rival institutions.” In 
other words, the conditions were present for an especially 
strong nationalist ideology to emerge in a context in which 
any alternative political discourse had been suppressed 
by that of state socialism; when the socialist ideology 
itself was discredited, nationalism was the most available 
and most attractive political formula. Moreover, as many 
scholars, such as Ronald Suny, had noted, this nationalism 
was already prevalent in society: the Soviet system had 
actually incubated nationalism, not suppressed it. When 
the historical moment arrived, large parts of the elite and 
professional classes were ready to embrace it.8 
The new nationalist movements which emerged 
in 1988-89 across the Soviet Union all sought to reset 
history and restart the clock on 
what they declared to be stories 
of nation-building that had been 
cruelly interrupted. Each movement 
of course focused on different mo-
ments when history had been more 
favourable for them. For Georgians it 
was their brief independent republic 
of 1918. For Abkhaz it was the period 
in the 1920s under Lenin when they 
had unprecedented autonomy.  
This ahistorical mindset inculcated an intense eupho-
ria about the future, as though, if historical wrongs were 
righted, black clouds would disperse and a new golden 
age would begin. The Sukhumi-born Georgian writer 
Guram Odisharia recalls, “We Georgians thought we’d 
become independent, sell our wine and mineral water 
and live like millionaires. The Abkhaz, with their sea and 
countryside, thought they would break from Georgia and 
become a second Switzerland. We were all going to live 
so well.”9 
A second specific feature of this region is that its rich 
and complex history gave entrepreneurial nationalist 
politicians the opportunity to be selective. It is possible 
to write many different and entirely different histories of 
the South Caucasus. Georgians for example could look 
back to the Middle Ages, when Abkhazia was part of a 
wider kingdom. They could refer to the brief independ-
ent republic of 1918-21 and to the crackdown on the Geor-
gian intelligentsia in 1930s. But periods in the 19th century 
or the Soviet era when relations between Georgians and 
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tially loyal to Russian rule could be overlooked. 
A third peculiarity of this region was that, with the end 
of the Soviet Union, it was harder to forge a cosmopolitan 
narrative that reached across borders and emphasized 
a bigger Caucasian identity. The Soviet Union had been 
both repressive and integrationist, hence to be patriotic 
was now to approve of disintegration. The only other 
experiment in a single unified state in the region, the 
Transcaucasian Federation, had lasted just five weeks in 
1918. If remembered at all, it was as a failure. 
In the mutually exclusive narratives which persist to 
this day Armenia and Azerbaijan can find no place for 
the comparatively recent historical experience in which 
Armenia was home to large numbers of Azerbaijanis and 
vice versa and inter-ethnic relations were mostly har-
monious. The Georgians could access slightly different 
historical narratives, notably the “memory” of how Geor-
gia’s Golden Age under David the Builder presided over a 
multi-national kingdom and an era of tolerance. 
Sumgait and Khojaly 
Despite a history of peaceful co-existence Armenia and 
Azerbaijan have defined their modern statehood around 
the Nagorny Karabakh conflict and therefore in extreme 
opposition to one another. It is anathema for Armenia to 
wish for Azerbaijan to prosper as a country, or vice versa. 
The success of one country is predicated on the failure of 
the other. In recent years this black-and-white discourse 
has spread to the Armenian and Azerbaijani diaspora, 
most of whom had previously stayed detached from the 
conflict. During the cross-border clashes of July 2020, 
Armenian and Azerbaijani market traders in Moscow 
waged war against each other’s business, in a display of 
patriotic fervour.10 That mobilization intensifed in the 
war that began in September 2020.
As noted above, two tragic episodes from the Karabakh 
conflict, the killings at Sumgait and at Khojaly in 1992, 
have been afforded a sacred status. The bloodshed and 
suffering in both cases was certainly real. It is worth not-
ing in passing that distasteful conspiracy theories have 
sprung up that seek to pin responsibility—in defiance of 
all the facts—on the other side for both sets of killings. 
These were even promoted by the leaders of both coun-
tries at the Munich Security Conference in 2020.11
A tendency to paint the horrors in even more lurid tones 
is also real. Both sides have called the events “genocide” 
although neither can be reasonably said to qualify as such. 
Sumgait was a pogrom, Khojaly a massacre and war crime. 
The Armenian government put up a khachkar (cross-
stone) at the Tsitsernakaberd Genocide Memorial in Ye-
revan to commemorate the victims of Sumgait, somehow 
equating those who died at the hands of Ottoman Turkey 
in 1915-16 and those killed in Azerbaijan in 1988. Ceremo-
nies to mark Sumgait are still held there every year. 
The decision to term the killings at Khojaly a gen-ocide began around a decade after the event. The 
massacre is now marked each year with much greater in-
tensity than it was at the time or in the years immediately 
following. The Azerbaijani government funds memorials, 
events and advertising campaigns abroad in a way that 
competes with Armenians’ campaign for recognition of 
the Armenian Genocide of 1915-16. It is declared to be 
emblematic of a consistent Armenian ideology of seeking 
to destroy Azerbaijanis as a people.
If we consider Sumgait and Khojaly as real, if tragic, 
historical events, a picture emerges which affords agency 
to more actors and suggests how things could potentially 
have been different. 
A comprehensive version of what happened in Sumgait 
emerges from interviews conducted with survivors not 
long after the pogroms themselves. The first edition con-
taining 36 interviews, was published as a book in 1989.12 
In his public comments its scrupulous editor Samvel 
Shakhmuradian made it clear that he was not interested 
in a simple morality tale. (Shakhmuradian, a journalist, 
was one of the early leaders of the Armenian democratic 
movement. He was killed fighting in the Karabakh con-
flict in 1992). 
The interviews for example contain many stories of 
how Azerbaijanis in Sumgait sheltered their Armenian 
neighbours from attacks. At the time Shakhmuradian 
also mentioned the story of Ishkhan Trdatyan, a man who 
defended his apartment and family with an axe and killed 
at least one of the attackers in self-defence. Trdatyan’s 
story—one of the most remarkable from Sumgait—was 
not included in the first publication and was only pub-
lished in full years later.13 One can speculate that his story 
of violent resistance did not fit with the official narrative 
of victimhood and genocide that the Armenian authori-
ties wanted to promote. 
Few of the Sumgait Armenians identified themselves 
at the time as protagonists in the Karabakh conflict. One 
darkly ironic aspect of the pogroms was that, although 
the Armenians of the town were targeted and threatened 
with death because of their apparent association with the 
Karabakh cause and their ethnic motherland, Armenia, 
many of them seemed to have spoken Russian better 
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than Armenian and had little connection with Armenia. 
Those who managed to escape the violence took refuge 
in Sumgait’s Palace of Culture. According to Grigory 
Kharchenko, the first Soviet official from Moscow to ar-
rive in Sumgait, most of them asked to be evacuated from 
there not to Armenia but to Russia, on the grounds that 
they were “not real Armenians.”14  
The historical story of Sumgait can be said to be  one 
more of callous incompetence, rumour and the sadistic 
violence of criminal young men than of conspiracy. A 
quicker intervention by the local Azerbaijani authorities 
and Soviet authorities in Moscow might have suppressed 
the violence before it got out of hand. In the event, the 
pogrom set off a chain reaction of conflict and violence 
that persists to this day. 
W hen it comes to the killings outside Khojaly, committed four years later, the initial Azerbaijani 
narrative was more one of domestic politics and betrayal. 
Thomas Goltz, who was one of the first eye-witnesses to 
the aftermath of the massacre, and who first reported it 
in the foreign press, writes of public indifference to the 
conflict in the Azerbaijani capital Baku: “The events of 
February 25-26, 1992, would soon become just a detail, 
just another grim statistic in the ongoing litany of death 
and destruction in Karabakh, the Black Garden.”15 
The Khojaly massacre also shows every sign of having 
been avoidable (even if the wider 
Karabakh conflict was perhaps not). 
Up until that point, the combatants 
in the conflict had aimed to capture 
land and villages with minimum 
bloodshed, leaving a corridor for the 
civilian population to escape. In the 
case of Khojaly in February 1992, the 
feckless Azerbaijani authorities were 
slow to evacuate civilians from the 
village. As the village fell to Armenian 
conquerors, a corridor was left open near the village of 
Nakhichevanik. But two rogue Armenian units, known 
as Aramo and Arabo were in the vicinity and met the 
columns of fleeing villagers, interspersed with some 
fighters, with gunfire. Arriving on the scene too late, the 
diaspora Armenian commander Monte Melkonian was 
furious at the “indiscipline” of the fighters.16 
The traumas of Sumgait and Khojaly persist in part 
because justice was not delivered for their victims. Had the 
Karabakh conflict been resolved politically, it is surely un-
likely that they would be “remembered” as intensely as they 
are today. Around the same time, after all, even worse atroci-
ties were being committed in the Bosnia conflict, which 
have been confronted and at least partially overcome. 
A Toxic Legacy in Georgia
As the Soviet Union began to dissolve and Georgia began 
to contemplate a post-Soviet future, the philosopher 
Merab Marmadashvili (1930-90)  and Georgia’s national-
ist leader Zviad Gamsakhurdia were intellectual antip-
odes. Marmardashvili believed Georgia’s best future to 
be joining Europe, as a law-based democracy, hopefully 
in partnership with a democratic Russia. Gamsakhurdia 
was an ethnic nationalist who believed that the Geor-
gian nation had a special destiny and rejected most of its 
neighbours as enemies. 
Mamardashvili urged Georgians to fight the Soviet 
system with tolerance, respect for law and (quoting Kant) 
as “citizens of the world.” “The battle must be not for 
the attributes of nationhood, but for the freedom of the 
people,” he said. As Gamsakhurdia’s ethnic nationalism 
won more adherents, the philosopher  warned, shortly 
before his death, “We live with phantoms and idols. This 
is idolocracy! If we will construct our new thinking out of 
old concepts, then we will with precise accuracy recon-
stitute all the structures of the totalitarian system and the 
blind will again lead the sighted, who will be hunched 
over in a posture of complete and total submission. It is 
absolutely essential that every day 
someone says to his people, “Did you 
want a leader? Be careful. Know that 
that means slavery.”17 
Marmadashvili’s worst forebod-
ings came true. The aftermath of 
April 9, 1989 handed the initiative 
to Gamsakhurdia, who sought to 
construct just such an “idolocracy.” 
Gamsakhurdia demonized anyone 
who opposed him as “traitors” and 
“enemies.” He painted a Manichean picture of the world 
in which Georgian nation had to fight evil in the form of 
the Russian empire and its treacherous allies amongst 
Georgia’s ethnic minorities. The extreme ethnic national-
ism of Gamsakhurdia—and many others—drove Geor-
gians headlong into conflict with Abkhaz and Ossetians.  
The April protests in Tbilisi which culminated in the 
April 9 tragedy were initially called to protest against 
developments in Abkhazia—a fact that has now also been 
mostly erased from public memory (among Georgians, 
but not Abkhaz).  
The traumas 
of Sumgait 
and Khojaly persist in 
part because justice 




On March 18, the entire ethnic elite in Abkhazia—around 30,000 Abkhaz and 6,000 representatives 
of other ethnic groups--had signed the so-called “Lykhny 
Declaration.” It called for the restoration of the Abkhaz 
Socialist Republic of 1921, which had a higher status, not 
subordinate to rule by Tbilisi. The 1920s were seen as a 
Golden Age for the Abkhaz when local Bolshevik leader 
Nestor Lakoba ran the republic with the blessing of  
Lenin. 
Both the Abkhaz, meeting symbolically in the ancient 
grove of Lykhny next to a Byzantine-era church, and the 
Georgian nationalists were seeking to dissolve seven 
decades of history and return to a glorious—and imagi-
nary--historical moment. For the Georgian nationalists, 
the chosen moment was the independent republic of 
1918-21. This aspiration would eventually be expressed 
in the declaration of independence adopted on April 9, 
1991 by the Georgian Supreme Council. The declaration 
“hereby establishes and proclaims the restoration of the 
independent state of Georgia based on the Act of Inde-
pendence of Georgia of 26 May 1918.” 
Both these symbolic calls for restoration had a darker 
side of course, by excluding facts, developments and peo-
ple who had become a reality in the meantime.  As such 
they fit with Svetlana Boym’s definition of “restorative 
nostalgia.” 
Restorative nostalgia knows two main narra-
tive plots—the restoration of origins and the 
conspiracy theory, characteristic of the most 
extreme cases of contemporary nationalism fed 
on right-wing popular culture. The conspira-
torial worldview is based on a single transhis-
torical plot, a Manichean battle of good and evil 
and the inevitable scapegoating of the mythical 
enemy. Ambivalence, the complexity of history 
and the specificity of modern circumstances 
is thus erased, and modern history is seen as a 
fulfilment of ancient prophecy. ‘Home,’ imagine 
extremist conspiracy theory adherents, is for-
ever under siege, requiring defense against the 
plotting enemy.18 
Armed with their rival worldviews, the two sides first 
engaged in violence in July 1989 with clashes over the 
status of the Abkhaz State University. Full-scale war 
followed in 1992-93.
Georgian society has a greater capacity for debate than 
either Armenia or Azerbaijan, even if that debate is often 
angry and uncivil and rarely touches “sacred” topics such 
as the events of 1989. Facts on the ground have shifted so-
cietal debate, sometimes imperceptibly. Georgia has de-
throned successive idols since Gamsakhurdia first came 
to power in 1990, beginning with the violent overthrow of 
Gamsakhurdia himself in December 1991. The rejection 
of each leader, each very different from his predecessor, 
has opened up a little more space each time for critical 
reflection on the nature of Georgian politics—although 
it seems many Georgians are still looking for the “idol” 
which Mamardashvili warned them about. 
The return of former Communist Party leader Edu-
ard Shevardnadze in March 1992 was a blow against 
ethnic nationalism and a moment of rehabilitation for 
the professional classes who had done well in the late 
Soviet period and whom Gamsakhurdia had called “the 
red intelligentsia.” This battle would continue across the 
decades. Mikheil Saakashvili who came to power after 
the peaceful Rose Revolution of 2003 also used the same 
term, “red intelligentsia” to disparage his opponents in 
Tbilisi. Although his ideological stance was much more 
pro-Western, Saakashvili also borrowed some of the rhet-
oric of Gamsakhurdia in declaring the Rose Revolution 
was a kind of Year Zero for Georgia in breaking with its 
Soviet past and the influence of Russia. A new state flag 
and series of memorials and an ambitious new building 
programme, especially in the city of Batumi were intend-
ed to make a new reality for Georgia. 
Despite the official discourse, a 2019 poll for the Cauca-
sus Barometer19 found that as many Georgians regretted 
the end of the USSR as welcomed it. A total of 41 percent 
respondents said the end of the Soviet Union was a good 
thing, while 42 percent said it was a bad thing. These 
are private views which are barely reflected in public 
politics. 
Conclusion
The past does not remain the past when there is “un-
finished business” in domestic and international poli-
tics. The case of the massacre of April 9, 1989, is not an 
ever-present reality in Georgia but the way it is publicly 
remembered continues to impact on Tbilisi’s relations 
with both Moscow and Abkhazia.  
Anxiety about Russia and its intentions is a constant 
of life in Georgia under all leaders—an anxiety for which 
April 9, 1989 is an important reference point. Nor is this 
anxiety an abstract thing in the present day as the experi-
ence of war at the hand of Russia in 2008 showed. In the 
summer of 2019, a row over the invitation of a Russian 
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politician to the Georgian parliament quickly got out of 
hand and led to disturbances, a police crackdown and a 
new row between Tbilisi and Moscow. This volatile po-
litical reality will persist for the foreseeable future, even 
as economic links are restored--yet it happens within 
the context of Georgia’s continuing development into a 
strong state where Russian influence declines with every 
year. 
Whatever else happens in other aspects of Georgia’s development (its fairly successful Europeani-
zation project and domestic reforms), the Russia factor 
overshadows the Abkhazia and South Ossetia conflicts. 
Anxiety about Russia is one corner of what might be 
termed a “triangle of insecurity” between Georgians, 
Abkhaz and Russians that obstructs progress in resolving 
the protracted conflict. Put simply, the Abkhaz harbour 
fears of being destroyed or assimilated by Georgia, which 
leads them to turn to Russia for protection (despite his-
torical grievances the Abkhaz also have against Russia.) 
This allows them to overlook the oppression they have 
visited on their own Georgian co-citizens, by expelling 
them and expropriating their property. Georgians for 
their part fear being attacked or taken over by Russia and 
view the Abkhaz as accomplices of Moscow. 
These narratives have a basis in reality. The terrible 
loss of life and home the victims of the 1992-3 suffered 
are fresh in real memories. But as set out here, these 
narratives are also made rigid and inflexible by selective 
memory and memorialization. 
Since 2008, when Russia recognized Abkhazia and 
South Ossetia as independent states and stationed 
thousands of troops there, Tbilisi has called the two 
breakaway regions “occupied territories.” There was said 
no longer to be a Georgian-Abkhaz conflict, but a Geor-
gian-Russian conflict in which the Abkhaz were “hostag-
es” of Moscow. The new Georgian Dream government 
which came to power in 2012 adopted new language call-
ing for “reconciliation” and—in terms rather reminiscent 
of the Soviet Union—the Abkhaz and Ossetians “brothers 
and sisters.” This narrative is rejected in Abkhazia. There 
is no real dialogue between the two sides, just a kind of 
double monologue. 
In the case of both Georgians and Abkhaz an examina-
tion of and dialogue over the “memory politics” that have 
dominated both societies since 1989 is a prerequisite for 
the kind of real dialogue in which both sides can seek to 
understand why they continue to generate such fear and 
insecurity in the other three decades on. ● 
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The Flag Revolution. 
Understanding  
the Political Symbols 
of Belarus
by Andrej Kotljarchuk
elarus remains one of the least known 
countries in western and northern 
Europe. There are several reasons for 
this, the primary one being the fact that 
in modern times, Belarus did not exist 
as a political entity. During this time Belarus had no 
sovereignty, being initially a province of Poland-Lithua-
nia and the Russian Empire.1 The Cold War contributed 
to the disappearance of Belarus from Western politi-
cal and academic discourse. Very few scientific books 
and articles about Belarus were published in the West 
before 1991.2 Despite the Belarusian SSR’s membership 
of the UN, Belarus was absorbed by the Soviet Union. 
Unlike neighboring Latvia or Lithuania, Belarus was not 
independent during the interwar period and had no large 
diaspora in Europe after 1945. Therefore, Belarusians 
were often considered by people outside Eastern Europe 
as so-called ‘white Russians’, a nation without a tradition 
of statehood, native language and culture, or political 
symbols. Belarus made headlines in the global media for 
the first time in its history in August 2020. The rigged 
elections after 25 years of authoritarian rule by President 
Lukashenka led to mass protests across the country for 
the right to vote in free and fair elections. International 
readers are fascinated by the peaceful nature of the pro-
tests and by the thousands of white-red-white flags worn 
by protestors. 
Having a national flag is an old tradition. From the beginning, national flags were an effective medium 
for political messages that could be passed on to people 
without having to rely on a certain level of literacy. Dur-
ing the era of nationalism in Europe, several new political 
nations constructed their own flags that were intended 
to mobilize a movement and unite a nation around a 
powerful political symbol. As Gabriella Elgenius point-
ed out, in the modern world national flags continue to 
be used as political symbols, as tools of propaganda and 
control, and as devices for the inclusion and exclusion of 
different social groups within the entire nation.3 Why do 
protestors and officials in Belarus use different national 
flags? What do the white-red-white and red-green flags 
symbolize for the people in Belarus? Why are the police 




state-run propaganda against peaceful protests focus on 
the white-red-white flag and the history of World War II? 
In this paper, I outline how a study of political symbols of 
Belarus can contribute to a more detailed understanding 
of the ongoing situation in the country.
Historical Background
The Belarusian national movement was one of the latest 
in Europe that emerged after the 1905 revolution in 
the Russian empire. The first political party, the Bela-
rusian Socialist Party Hramada, was founded in Minsk 
in 1905. The first Belarusian-language newspaper was 
established in Vilna (nowadays Vilnius) in 1906. The 
first publishing houses were established in Vilna and St. 
Petersburg in 1906. The first history of Belarus, written 
by a Belarusian writer in Belarusian, was printed in Vilna 
in 1910.4 The first grammar of the Belarusian literary 
language was published in 1918. The first network of Be-
larusian-language schools was created only during World 
Wat I in the German occupation zone.5 As everywhere 
in Europe, students took an active part in the national 
awakening known in Belarusian as ‘the renaissance of a 
nation’ (adradziennie). In the summer of 1917, Klaudzii 
Duzh-Dusheuski, a student at the Petrograd Mining In-
stitute, designed a white-red-white flag. He was born in 
1891 in Hlybokae, Vitsebsk region, into a Roman Catholic 
family of Belarusian farmers. Duzh-Dusheuski came to 
St. Petersburg (aka Petrograd) for his university studies 
because there were no universities in Belarusian lands 
after the tsarist government closed the Jesuit Academy in 
Polatsk and the University of Vilna. The white-red-white 
flag was based on the traditional colors of Belarusian folk 
dress and military banners of the Grand Duchy of Lith-
uania and Ruthenia. Historically, the white-red-white 
stripes appeared on the dress of Belarusian Orthodox 
bishops. The flag quickly became popular among the peo-
ple and the first all-Belarusian Congress, held in Minsk 
in December 1917, accepted it as the national flag. This 
congress, that gathered 1872 delegates from different 
regions of Belarus, was violently dispersed by Bolshevik 
military. Klaudzii Duzh-Dusheuski was one of the found-
ers of the short-lived Belarusian Democratic republic 
(hereafter the BNR). The government of the republic that 
proclaimed its independence in Minsk on 25 March 1918 
adopted a white-red-white flag as a national flag.
In 1921, after the treaty of Riga that divided Belarus between Soviet Russia and Poland, Duzh-Dusheuski 
went into exile in Lithuania where he worked as archi-
tect. During the Nazi occupation of Lithuania, he was 
Protest in Minsk, August 2020. PHOTO: RADIO FREE EUROPE
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arrested by the Germans for helping local Jews and sent 
to prison. After the war he was arrested again, this time 
by Soviet secret police MGB, as “a Belarusian nationalist” 
and sent to prison. He died in Kaunas in 1959.6 
In 1918, Professor Mitrofan Dounar-Zapolski wrote a 
work on behalf of the government of the BNR, entitled 
The basis of Belarusian state individuality, which was pub-
lished in English, German and French.7 Dounar-Zapolski 
pointed out that a Belarusian state emblem (Pahonia) and 
a white-red-white flag have deep historical roots in the 
history of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania and Ruthenia.
In interwar Poland, the white-red-white flag was 
adopted by different political and non-governmental 
organizations of the Belarusian minority, apart from the 
Communist party. These include the Belarusian Student 
Union at Wilno University, the Association of Belaru-
sian-language schools, the social-democratic Hramada 
and the Christian-Democratic party. 
At that time, the flag was considered by all Belaru-
sians in Poland, Latvia and Lithuania to be “a national 
flag”. For example, in 1930, Maksim Tank (aka Maksim 
Skurko), a renowned poet and member of the Communist 
Youth League of Western Belarus, published a poem: “Do 
you hear my brother”. The poem described the white-
red-white flag as a powerful political symbol in the mobi-
lization of the Belarusian minority in Poland. 
Boldly face the future! 
The long-awaited time has arrived 
Under a white-red-white flag  
The glorious victory awaits us.8
However, in the early 1930s the Communist Party of 
Western Belarus in Poland received the directives of the 
Communist International (Comintern) general office in 
Moscow to combat a white-red-white flag as being “bour-
geois-nationalistic”.9
A s happened elsewhere in Nazi-occupied Europe, the national flag was used by civil collaborationist 
authorities in Belarus in 1941–1944. At that time, Soviet 
partisans used the red flag and the Polish underground 
resistance used the Polish national flag. During first 
years of occupation the Nazis moved several police and 
anti-partisan regiments recruited in the Baltic countries, 
Ukraine and Russia to Belarus. There is no evidence of 
the white-red-white flag being used by Belarusian auxil-
iary police. The national flag was used by the Belarusian 
Home Guard (Weißruthenische Heimwehr). However, 
this pro-Nazi police and military formation was estab-
lished only in April-June 1944, few weeks before the with-
drawal from Belarus and after the final stage of Holocaust. 
On this occasion, Vasyl Bykau, the prominent Bela-
rusian writer and Red Army veteran of World War II, 
ironically noted: “It is known that Belarusian collabora-
tors used the white-red-white flag; it is also well known 
that they wore pants – so what? We do not have any other 
national flag”.10 It should be noted that most pro-Nazi 
military and police forces recruited in the occupied 
republics of the Soviet Union and the Baltic states used 
their national flags. For example, the national flag of Rus-
sia (aka tricolor) was used by SS Sturmbrigade R.O.N.A, 
which acted in 1943–44 in Belarus, and by a paramilitary 
The national flag of Belarusian Demo-
cratic Republic and independent Belarus 
in 1991-1995. PHOTO: WIKIPEDIA COMMONS
The state flag of Belarusian SSR (1951). 
PHOTO: WIKIPEDIA COMMONS
The white-red-white flag on 
the cover of the pro-Nazi Be-
larusian police journal Belarus 
na Varcie in June, 1944. The 
author’s private collection.
The flag of Belarusian Democratic Republic on the 
balcony of the republican government (former office 
of the Russian governor). Minsk, February 1918. The 
unknown photographer. Originally published in the 
magazine Varta October 1918, 33. PHOTO: WIKIPEDIA COMMONS
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pro-Nazi Union of Russian Youth (Soiuz russkoi molo-
dezhi); the leaders of each moved to Minsk in 1943. For 
example, in June 1944, the Nazi press reported about the 
assembly of the Union of Russian Youth in Minsk that 
gathered in the House of the Russian National-Socialist 
Working Party. The delegates raised “a Russian national 
flag” and sent addresses to the soldiers of the Vlasov 
army, SS-brigade RONA; and the members of the Hitler-
jugend and the Union of Belarusian Youth.11 In post-war 
western countries, the white-red-white flag was promot-
ed by activists within the Belarusian diaspora as the flag 
of Belarusian Democratic Republic created in 1918. In the 
diaspora, the white-red-white flag was used by different 
political and non-governmental associations, from left 
to right, as well as the Belarusian veteran organizations 
that included both former pro-Nazi BKA soldiers and 
veterans of Belarusian origin who fought the Nazis in the 
Polish formations of the British army. This situation is 
typical for many East European diasporas. 
The present-day state flag of Belarus is a modification of the Soviet Belarusian flag designed under the rule 
of Stalin. The concept of the history of the Belarusian 
SSR as conceived by the Communist Party was adopted in 
1948, and in 1953 a collective monograph, History of the 
Belarusian Soviet Socialist Republic, was sent to print by 
the Institute of History at National Academy of Scienc-
es. According to this concept, Belarus’ political history 
began in 1919, when the Soviet government was estab-
lished in Minsk. In 1922 the Belarusian SSR became one 
of four founders of the Soviet Union. Under the Soviet 
flag Belarus doubled its territory after 1939 as a result of 
the Reunification of Western Belarus (the official term 
for what happened to Eastern Poland after the Molo-
tov-Ribbentrop pact). Under the red flag the Belaru-
sians, together with Russians and other Soviet nations, 
defeated Nazi Germany and successfully reconstructed 
the country after 1944. According to this concept, the in-
ternational recognition of Belarus as a sovereign republic 
resulted in UN membership.12 In fact, the membership 
of the Belarusian SSR (together with Ukraine) in the UN 
was a result of Stalin’s diplomacy, not an initiative of the 
regional government in Minsk. 
However, a new UN member state needed a flag. Until 
the end of the 1940s, the flag of Belarusian SSR was 
almost identical to the red flag of the Soviet Union. The 
only distinguishing feature was the abbreviated name of 
the republic in gold paint in the upper left corner. The 
decree of the Presidium of the Supreme Soviet On the 
The state flag of 
Belarus since 1995. 
PHOTO: WIKIPEDIA COMMONS
State Flags of the Union Republics from January 20, 1947 
allowed the use of other colors and additional symbols to 
reflect the national character of the republics. The flag 
of the Belarusian SSR, adopted in 1951, was designed as a 
compromise between communist and national symbols. 
The red-white-red stripes were placed on the green-
red background and a white and red folk ornament was 
placed on the vertical stripe at the hoist near the com-
munist symbols. The flag was designed by a group of 
scholars and artists led by Mikhail Karcer, a historian at 
the National Academy of Sciences, and Mikalai Huseu, 
a professional artist. According to the 1956 statute, the 
flag represented both Soviet and national traditions. The 
white and red ornament was named “Belarusian national 
ornament” in this document.13 The ornament was added 
to a golden hammer and sickle and a red five-pointed star 
on the red-green background. 
Two Flags, One Nation
The symbolic value of the white-red-white flag was kept 
through the post-war period by both the Belarusian intel-
ligentsia and the Belarusian diaspora in the West. After 
1984, this flag was promoted by members of the first un-
derground youth organization, Maistrounia, established 
in Minsk. In 1988, the white-red-white flag appeared in 
public for the first time after WWII at the first opposition 
rally in Kurapaty. This site is the largest single mass grave 
in Minsk, where from 1937 to 1941 the NKVD murdered 
between 10,000 and 30,000 residents of Belarus, as well 
as citizens of the Baltic states and Poland.14 The peaceful 
demonstration was brutally dispersed by Soviet militia 
that confiscated opposition flags. However, the discovery 
of the previously secret site of mass killings and selective 
exhumation of bodies in 1988 led to a rapid de-Sovietiza-
tion of Belarusian society. The exhumation team was led 
by archeologist Zianon Paźniak, the leader of the Chris-
tian-conservative party and anti-communist movement, 
the Belarusian Popular Front. Mr. Paźniak was the leader 
of opposition to Lukashenka until 1996 when he had to 
leave the country for exile in the USA. The collapse of the 
Soviet Union and growing public awareness of Stalin’s 
terror in Belarus led to the discreditation of Soviet polit-
ical symbols, including the red-green flag. In 1991, after 
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white-red-white flag over the 40-meter factory chimney 
in Liozno near Vitsebsk – hometown of Marc Chagall. 
A note was attached to the flag: “Return memory to the 
people! Miron.” That was the beginning. Between 1995 
and 2010 Miron placed dozens of white-red-white flags 
across the country. The political performance was sup-
ported by young followers. For over 15 years the police 
and KGB hunted Miron. He was arrested in 2010 after the 
installation of a white-red-white flag on top of the main 
Christmas tree in Vitsebsk. He was Siarhei Kavalenka, 
an ordinary construction worker. The court gave him a 
three-year suspended sentence for ‘illegal activity’. In 
2014 Mr. Kavalenka was arrested again and sentenced to 
prison.11 However, the appearance of white-red-white 
flags in public space continued and many resources with-
in the police and KGB were directed to hunting this flag. 
The current design of the Belarusian red-green state 
flag was introduced in 1995. The communist symbols 
the decision of Parliament and the expert report by the 
Institute of History at National Academy of Sciences, the 
white-red-white flag was proclaimed to be the national 
flag of Belarus. As Gabriella Elgenius pointed out, this is 
normal practice for many East European countries where 
changing the ideological regime led to the modification 
of an old flag or adoption of a new one.15
Aliaksandr Lukashenka became president of Belarus in 1994. This was the first presidential and demo-
cratic election held in Belarus after the collapse of the So-
viet Union. The result was a great victory for Lukashen-
ka, who received 80.6 per cent of votes in the second 
round. The inauguration of Lukashenka was held under 
the national white-red-white flag and the president took 
the oath under this flag. 
However, a year after taking office, Lukashenka won 
a controversial referendum that gave him the power to 
dissolve parliament. In 1996, he won another referendum 
that dramatically increased his authoritarian power and 
allowed him to rule the country in an authoritarian way 
for the next 25 years. In 1995 the white-red-white flag 
was replaced by a red-green flag with certain modifi-
cations. From this moment the white-red-white flag 
became a symbol of democratic opposition and was 
visible at all protest actions. The authorities started to 
term the white-red-white flag an “illegal symbol” and 
ordered police to arrest people who wore the flag or put it 
on their private balcony. The main headline in non-gov-
ernmental media in 1995 was news about Miron. This 
was the nickname of an unknown person who placed 
white-red-white flags on top of towers and high buildings 
across the country. In July 1995, Miron place the large 
Inauguration of President Lukashenka was held under the na-
tional white-red-white flag. 20 July 1994, Minsk. 
PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
White-red-white flag made of thousands of stripes on the 




were removed, as were the white-red-white stripes along 
the national ornament. 
The official propaganda promoted this flag as a symbol of a great Soviet history and an even greater 
life under Lukashenka. In fact, the red-green flag also 
has a dark history. Under this flag, the Stalinist regime 
implemented forced collectivization in Western Belarus 
(part of Poland before 1939). Thousands of people in the 
countryside were forced to leave their farms and resettle 
in newly established kolkhozes; some of them were sent 
to the Gulag. Under this flag, the security police destroyed 
the patriotic youth organizations in Western Belarus and 
the last detachments of anti-Soviet partisans. Therefore, 
for many Belarusians this flag was associated from the be-
ginning with mass violence and political repressions. It is 
little known that a designer of the 1951 flag, Mikalai Huseu, 
collaborated with the Nazis and was sent to prison in 1944. 
During the Nazi occupation, Huseu was one of the most 
sought-after artists in Belarus. In particular, it was he who 
painted the large portraits of Hitler that hung in Minsk 
streets.17 After prison, he returned to socialist realist art.
Nevertheless, for the young generation which grew up under the long-term rule of Lukashenka, a 
red-green flag became the national symbol. Under this 
flag, national teams won international competitions. 
Under this flag, official holidays and ceremonies were 
held in Belarus. Since the mid-1990s the state flag, coat 
of arms and a portrait of Lukashenka were hung in each 
classroom, military barracks and administrative office in 
Belarus. As a result, the red-green flag was normalized. 
The administrative persecution of people with a white-
red-white flag led to the next phenomena. Since the 
early 21st century the national flag began to be associated 
with the anti-Lukashenka democratic opposition only. 
Referring to the white-red-white flag, official propaganda 
described the leaders of the opposition as heirs of the 
pro-Nazi collaborators. The fact that Belarus proclaimed 
its independence under this flag in 1918 and in 1991 was 
suppressed. The propaganda’s use of the memory of 
World War II was not accidental. The Nazi occupation 
was the biggest disaster ever experienced by the civilian 
population of Belarus. According to Per Anders Rudling, 
World War II in particular became a foundation for the 
creation of a modern Belarusian identity. As a matter of 
fact, no historical event has had a greater influence on 
today’s Belarus.18 Lukashenka’s nation-building project is 
based in great measure on the memory of World War II. 
Exploiting the mythology of war and occupation certain-
ly has a practical political significance for the regime, not 
only by claiming a special place for Lukashenka as the 
last defender of Europe against Nazism, but also support-
ing the myth that the democratic opposition is ‘heir’ to 
the Nazis and ‘servant’ of the West. Speaking in 2010 at 
a ceremonial meeting dedicated to the victory in World 
War II, Lukashenka noted:
The Great Victory is sacrosanct for every Bela-
rusian. And even if a bunch of such rogues exist 
[the democratic opposition], who like the idea 
of ‘an independent Belarus in the new Europe 
of Adolf Hitler’, we know them. We know in 
whose service their idols were during the Great 
Patriotic War, and we fully understand whose 
lackeys they are now.19 
Collage made by Viktor Korbut, 
published with author’s permission. 
On the right is a portrait of Hitler 
in Minsk painted by Mikalai Huseu 
in 1943. The slogan above written 
in Belarusian and means “Long 
live 1st of May, Holiday of Labour 
and Spring!”. On the left is a poster 
with a state flag of Belarusian SSR 
designed by Mikalai Huseu in 1951. 
The slogan below is written in Bela-




Unlike many East European countries, the Lukashen-
ka regime politically marginalizes such ethnic referents 
of Belarusians like native language and national history, 
basing its nation building on the idealized past of Soviet 
unity.20 The country has had two official languages since 
1995: Belarusian and Russian. However, officials and the 
state-run media use mostly Russian and the opposition, 
independent newspapers, and digital resources use 
Belarusian. Therefore, describing the white-red-white 
flag as ‘anti-Soviet and nationalistic’ uses negative terms 
only and the narrative of the red-green flag avoids any 
references to the dark pages of its history.21 Therefore, 
the government promotes the red-green flag and use it as 
a tool for conservation of Homo Sovieticus. The orna-
ment of the state flag was designed in 1917 by Matrona 
Markevich (née Katser) a sister of Mikhail Karcer. Her 
husband Aliaksei was arrested by the NKVD during the 
Great Terror, murdered without trial and buried in an 
unmarked mass grave. The family found out about this 
only in 1986. Today the relatives of 
Ms. Markevich visit both a monu-
ment devoted to the red-green flag, 
which was erected in her hometown 
Sianno, and a mass grave of the vic-
tims of Soviet terror at Kabylitskaia 
Hara.22
The Flag Revolution
The political symbolism of the white-
red-white flag illustrates the rule 
of law that existed in independent 
Belarus in 1991–94 before Aliaksandr 
Lukashenka took office. 
The white-red-white flag also symbolizes the peaceful 
heritage of the BNR that was destroyed by the military 
forces of Soviet Russia and Poland that divided Belarus 
in 1921. The mass opposition celebration of the BNR 
centenary in Minsk in March 2018 was a strong showcas-
ing of the fundamental principles of democracy violated 
by Lukashenka’s regime. For decades, official media 
constructed an iconic image of the red-green flag as a 
symbol of stability and prosperity. August 2020 changed 
this picture dramatically and this flag became a symbol 
of state-run mass violence. At the same time, the regime 
played with existing contradictions around the flags in 
order to divide society and spark off the conflicts. On the 
day after the brutal police repressions against protesters, 
a red-green flag was placed on all police vans and prison 
trucks in Minsk.
The official mass media that monopolizes all TV chan-nels and dominates periodicals in Belarus began a 
massive propaganda campaign against the white-red-
white flag, blaming it on the Nazi connection. According 
to the propagandists: “Under this flag the Nazis and their 
collaborators burned the population of Khatyn and other 
Belarusian villages”.23 In fact, the population of Khatyn, 
a Catholic Belarusian village near Minsk, was almost 
entirely exterminated in 1943 by the German Dirlewanger 
SS special battalion and Schutzmannschaft Battalion 
118, comprising Ukrainian nationals and Soviet POWs of 
different ethnic origin.24 These detachments never used 
a Belarusian national flag. The national memorial was 
opened in Khatyn in 1969 and the former policemen of 
Schutzmannschaft Battalion 118 were tried in a Soviet 
court in Minsk and executed in 1975 and 1986. Khatyn is a 
symbol of mass killings of the Slavic civilian population by 
the Nazis and a site of memory known to every Belarusian. 
On August 20, 2020, the country’s main state TV 
channel showed a reportage with 
Viacheslau Danilovich, the director 
of the Institute of History at National 
Academy of Sciences. Dr. Danilovich 
stated that the use of the white-red-
white flag is absolutely unacceptable, 
since it is the flag of collaborators who 
sought to create a fascist state under 
Hitler’s protectorate.25 On August 21, 
dozens of professional historians, 
including those from the Institute of 
History, published an open letter to 
Mr. Danilovich under the remarkable 
title Danilovich is lying and this is an act of immorality. In 
the letter the historians once again tell readers about the 
origin of the national flag in the early 20th century and 
pointed out that the national flag of Belarus was used by 
different political forces, as national flags were every-
where.26 Despite these facts, official propaganda focuses 
on the World War II period only, trying to connect the flag 
with some individuals who collaborated with the Nazis. 
The authorities use this technique to blacken the nation-
al flag. At the same time, propaganda is silent on similar 
stories behind the red-green state flag.
On August 23, the Belarus Minister of Defense, Viktor 
Khrenin, made a statement on the history of the white-
red-white flag. According to General Khrenin: 
Today we cannot calmly watch the actions un-
der these [white-red-white] flags, under which 
Official propa-
ganda focuses 
on the World War II 
period only, trying 
to connect the flag 
with some individu-
als who collaborated 
with the Nazis. 
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the Nazis organized mass killings of Belaru-
sians, Russians and Jews, representatives of 
other nationalities. The mass actions are held 
near our sacred places, the memorials of Great 
Patriotic War. We cannot allow this to happen. I 
categorically warn you that in case of violation 
of order in these places, you will not deal with 
the police, but with the Army.27
In fact, there is no evidence of the white-red-white 
flag being used by pro-Nazi military and police col-
laborators during the Holocaust and the mass crimes 
against the civilian population in Belarus. Therefore, 
the speech of the Minister of Defense is a clear exam-
ple of what is called a “half-truth”, in which incor-
rect references to the white-red-white flag work as a 
propaganda tool to 
legitimize illegal ac-
tions of the Belarusian 
army against peaceful 
protesters. It is prac-
tically impossible to 
buy white-red-white 
flags in Belarus, and 
the Covid-19 pandemic 
stopped international 
shipping. In response 
to state-run propagan-
da against the national 
flag, people began en 
masse to sew white-
red-white flags at 
home. After that, the 
authorities forbade the 
sale of white and red 
fabric in Minsk.28 
People had to be more creative. Hundreds of flags were 
placed on high buildings in many cities of Belarus. 
When police and emergency services forcibly removed 
these flags, people started to design them from hun-
dreds of stripes that complicated “the work” for  
police. 
In the first weeks of the protests, a spontaneous ini-
tiative arose to create local flags based on the national 
white-red-white flag. Today the Virtual Museum of the 
White-Red-White Flag has collected more than 650 flags 
of Minsk quarters, various cities and villages of Belarus 
as well as the associations of the Belarusian diaspora 
around the world.29
Belarusian women, the most active group of protes-tors, developed the creative way of thinking further. 
Many of them began to dress in red and white dresses, 
and to use red and white jewelry and umbrellas. 
The reaction of police was aggressive, and many wom-
en was arrested just because of their clothes.30 The perse-
cution of people for wearing the white-red-white flag in 
Minsk reminds the older generation of the tragic events 
in interwar Poland. The Polish authorities in Western 
Belarus confiscated white-red-white flags as “corpus 
delicti of anti-state activity”. Just like today, hundreds 
of Belarusian flag bearers were arrested at that time and 
sentenced to short prison terms or fines.31
In December 2020, the Department of Heraldry, 
Genealogy and Numismatics at the Institute of History, 
National Academy of Sciences, led by Professor Aliaksei 
Shalanda, was closed. Professor Shalanda and many of 
his colleagues were fired by Vadzim Lakiza, the new di-
rector of the Institute. After that, some historians wrote 
a letter of resignation in solidarity with their dismissed 
colleagues. Many historians from the Institute of History 
took an active civic position during the peaceful protests. 
They participated in the peaceful rallies, and five of them 
were arrested. On the request of a Belarusian court, Pro-
fessor Shalanda gave a number of official expert opinions 
regarding the white-red-white flag. He pointed out that 
it is a historical political symbol of Belarus and not “an 
illegal symbol” as the police claimed. On November 24, 
Aliaksandr Lukashenka announced a new law against the 
glorification of Nazism. He stated in particular that:
In the near future, our parliament will consider 
a bill on the inadmissibility of the glorification 
of Nazism in Belarus. Many countries sin today 
with the so-called ‘heroization of Nazism’. Espe-
cially our neighbors.32 
What is most interesting is that a law against the glori-
fication of Nazism has already been adopted by the par-
liament of Belarus and has been in force since February 
1, 2020.33 In my opinion, Lukashenka’s new initiative is 
aimed solely at discrediting the national white-red-white 
flag as it was used by the collaborationist administration 
under the Nazis. Indeed, on December 6, 2020, SB-Be-
larus Segodnia, a propaganda flagship of Lukashenka’s 
government organized a round table titled “The brown 
shadows of white-red-white flags”. In the discussion  
participated: Sergei Klishevich, a member of the Parlia-
ment and Historian by education, Boris Lepeshko, a Pro-
Project of flags for Danish-Belaru-
sian Culture Society Beladania. De-




fessor in History at Brest State University, and, Vladimir 
Egorychev an Associate Professor in History, Hrodna 
state University. The discussion had a propagandistic 
approach and the scientific quality I regard as low. The 
participants concluded that:
The prohibition of Nazi and semi-Nazi symbols 
is actively discussed in the Belarusian society. 
Previously, the white-red-white flag was, in fact, 
in a grey zone. The flag was not registered, but 
at the same time it was not included in the list 
of extremist symbols. This may not be sustain-
able in the long term. The problem is clear and 
requires our solution.34
On December 10 2020, Viktor Morozov, the prosecutor of 
the Homel region declared that:
The white-red-white flag is a Nazi symbol, 
which must be equated with the swastika and 
other Nazi symbols and attributes, which are 
banned in Belarus today. The penalty must 
also be relevant, at a minimum administrative 
sanction.35
At the same day, the Minsk Police stated that the dis-
playing white-red-white flags in private windows and on 
balconies will be equated with illegal picketing, which 
will give 15 days of arrest.36 However, to pass a new law, 
the expert opinion of the Institute of History will be 
needed. This explains the liquidation of the Department 
of Heraldry, Genealogy and Numismatics led by Profes-
sor Shalanda. 
Conclusion 
The hunting of the white-red-white flag illustrates an 
ongoing collapse of the dialog between the state and 
civil society. Unlike the revolutionary events in Georgia 
and Ukraine, the demonstrators in Minsk hardly use the 
flag of the European Union and do not arrange actions 
against the political symbols of Russia. Moreover, the 
Russian flag is present at opposition marches. Some of 
protestors use both the white-red-white and red-green 
flags without any negative reaction from the opposition 
to Lukashenka. 
The regime’s attempt to divide society according to the 
colors of the flag is doomed. The symbolism and esthetic 
power of the white-red-white flag represent the beliefs of 
the Belarusian nation in Liberté, Egalité, Fraternité, just 
as at the time of the French revolution. As David Gaunt 
and Tora Lane point out in the introduction, today “we 
are thus dealing with an old phenomenon – the re-inter-
pretation of historical events for political reasons – in a 
new form – that of the political manipulation of memory 
and remembrance”. The academic community of histo-
rians is strongly divided in today’s Belarus. The part of 
historians that collaborates with the dictatorship act not 
as scholars but as propagandists. The part that had stood 
up to the impunity of Lukashenka’s rule have suffered in 
the political repression and lost their employments. Over 
and over again, historians are used to form and reform 
the perception of the main political symbols of Belarus. ●
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Institutes of Trauma 
Re-production in a 
Borderland: Poland, 
Ukraine, and Lithuania
by Per Anders Rudling
ver the past few decades, we have 
observed a new trend across Europe: 
“memory laws,” aimed at regulating 
the writing of history. In several coun-
tries these have been accompanied by gov-
ernmental organizations set up to shape, form and police 
what is referred to as “national memory.” This phenom-
enon is prevalent in those states of east-central Europe, 
where significant efforts have been vested in controlling 
the representation of Soviet and Nazi legacies. This essay 
focuses on one transnational space, the former eastern 
borderlands of interwar Poland, known as Kresy Wschod-
nie, a region exposed to some of the most brutal aspects 
of both National Socialist and communist rule. The area 
is now part of four independent states: Belarus, Lithu-
ania, Poland and Ukraine. This essay aims at discussing 
some of the problems associated with the legislated 
“national” memory in those countries.1 It is intended as 
a cursory overview2 of some of the institutions and some 
key issues, to be further explored in the hereafter follow-
ing contributions from each of those four countries.
Contrary to what one may surmise, the phenomenon of history legislation and setting up institutes of 
national memory is a recent one, which, in its current 
form, can be dated to the early 1990s. Moreover, the 
trend started in Western Europe. It was France that first 
criminalized denial of the Holocaust in 1990, a move that 
would be copied by many other countries across Europe. 
However, in regard to institutionalization of memory 
through government agencies, Poland and Lithuania 
were at the forefront. Poland established the precursor 
of the current Institute of National Remembrance in 
1991, Lithuania followed suit in 1992. Today, no less than 
fourteen countries have laws dedicated to the denial of 
the Holocaust, and the number of institutes of nation-
al memory continues to rise, in particular across the 
post-socialist space.3 The impetus of using state institu-
tions to enforce a particular interpretation of history has 
antecedents in the communist era, but the activities of 
these institutes of “national memory” straddle a number 
of activities, including popularizing scholarship, gate-
keeping of archives, and instrumentalization of history. 
While they are often led by trained historians, these do 
not always follow practices and standards of their profes-
sion. For one, they operate on the behalf of governments, 
using history to pursue ideological agendas. Their pre-
ferred venues are not academic, peer reviewed journals, 
but what they refer to as “popular-scientific” fora. They 
often do not adhere to standards of note apparatuses and 
accuracy, and do not, like academic historians, seek to 




for this curious phenomenon; they have been referred to 
as “memorians,”5 “dogmatic intellectuals,”6 “mnemonic 
warriors,”7 “memory managers,”8 and “information war-
riors.”9 John-Paul Himka (b. 1949) has described politics 
of history as a “disease” which affects all post-communist 
counties.10 As this volume illustrates, the phenomenon is 
wider, and not limited to post-communist Europe.
A lthough the budgets, mandates and institutional frameworks of the memory institutes differ, there 
are similarities. As to the institutes that are the main 
focus of this study, they share the total-
itarian interpretive framework and the 
heavy stress on victimization. Klas-
Göran Karlsson (b. 1955) argues that 
post-Soviet history writing tends to 
“place blame on a communist ideology 
which no longer enjoys any significant 
popular support, identifying Lenin 
and Stalin and their closest hench-
men as culprits, while Soviet society 
at large remains innocent, oppressed, 
subjugated and totally subjected to the 
arbitrary rule.”11
Use and Abuse of History
The literature distinguishes between 
use and abuse of history, though there is no consensus re-
garding the terms.12 In her essay in this volume, Florence 
Fröhlig argues that one such distinction is that of recog-
nition of wrong-doings and self-victimization. Memory, 
she notes, “remains captive to the symptom of obsession 
and makes memory waver continually between use (rec-
ognition of the victims) and abuse (victim status).” 
Genocide and Memory
Lithuania, Poland, and Ukraine not only share a common 
history, but also display similarities in terms of govern-
mental memory management. Not least the memory of 
the Holocaust, its representation and management, has 
been surrounded by controversy and generated signif-
icant international attention.13 A common trope in the 
memory discourse in all three states is the generous 
application of the term “genocide,” and the centrality 
it occupies in their memory discourses. The term itself 
is linked to the eastern borderlands. Raphael Lemkin 
(1900–1959) and his main critic, Hersch Lauterpacht 
(1897–1960) were both educated at the university in the 
city today known as L’viv.14 From the very beginning, the 
term and its use were fraught with problems. In 1948, as 
the United Nations Convention on Genocide (UNCG) 
was drafted, Stalin’s USSR and Chang Kai-Shek’s Repub-
lic of China were veto-wielding permanent members 
of the UN Security Council and thus had a decisive say 
over the definition of genocide. Unsurprisingly, Joseph 
Stalin “was among the most vocal opponents of extend-
ing Convention protection to political groups.”15 In May, 
1948, Platon Morozov (1906-1986), the Soviet represent-
ative in this process, argued that: “Crimes committed 
for political motives are not connected to propaganda of 
racial and national hatred and cannot 
therefore be included in the category 
covered in the notion of genocide.”16 
While the Soviet bloc were not the 
only ones to oppose the inclusion of 
political groups – they were accom-
panied by South Africa and a number 
of Muslim countries17 — the 1948 
Convention, as one observer notes, 
“breathes politics.”18 While the UNCG 
covers “acts committed with intent to 
destroy, in whole or in part, a national, 
ethnical, racial or religious group, as 
such,”19 it specifically and explicitly 
omits political groups, thus excluding 
mass killings by the Khmer Rouge 
in the 1970s and the Soviet Union during the 1930s and 
40s.20
The bitter irony of Stalin playing a decisive role in the 
drafting of the Genocide Convention was not lost on hun-
dreds of thousands of refugees who had fled his regime. 
Émigré groups picked up the term, applying it defiantly 
– and generously – against the Soviets.21 From the 1940s 
onwards, Lithuanian émigrés presented a tally of over 
700,000 genocide victims in Lithuania.22 In 1950, geno-
cide allegations were picked up by Mikola Abramchyk 
(1903-1970), leader of the émigré Rada of the Belarusian 
People’s Republic, who accused the Kremlin of “genocide 
of my nation.”23 Genocide claims similarly played a cen-
tral role in the memory culture of the Galician Ukrain-
ian émigrés from the 1940s, though, in the immediate 
postwar years, the focus was on the NKVD execution site 
in Vinnytsia, massacres of inmates in the NKVD prisons 
in West Ukraine in 1941, and post-war deportations from 
West Ukraine.24 Some collaborated in multi-nationalist 
networks, the most prominent being the anti-Bolshevik 
Bloc of Nations (ABN), bringing together the successors 
of the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists, the Lithu-
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anian Activist Front, and the Ustasha, who affirmed each 
other’s genocide claims in their publications.25
L emkin did not regard the Ukrainian famine of 1932–33 to be genocide in 1948 when he developed 
his concepts for the genocide convention. Rather, this 
came later, as the impoverished lawyer increasingly 
sustained himself by speaking on behalf of various groups 
of refugees and expellees. Over the 1950s he inflated 
his concept of genocide to include German policy in 
occupied Luxemburg, Alsace-Lorraine, and Slovenia, 
and all communist crimes, including the deportations of 
Lithuanians, Stalin’s anti-cosmopolitan campaign, and 
the 1956 Soviet suppression of the Hungarian uprising.26 
Lemkin’s approach does not lack critics; historian Anton 
Weiss-Wendt (b, 1973) points at one concern associated 
with the use of an ever-expanding definition of genocide: 
“when everything is genocide, nothing is genocide.”27 On 
his part, Lauterpacht was concerned that the UNCG’s 
focus on groups would undermine the protection of 
individuals.28 
Communities exposed to extreme violence handled 
their traumas differently. It may be worth recalling that 
in Israel, while society was keenly aware of the Holo-
caust,29 memory culture during the first decades of the 
state’s existence was centered was on resistance, with 
the Warsaw ghetto uprising constituting the key image 
in Israeli memory culture. The shift in focus towards 
the victim can rather be dated to the 
Eichmann Trial and the wars of 1967 
and 1973.30 In the case of Armenia, it 
was only with the 1965 semicenten-
nial that the 1915 massacres came to 
occupy the central position they hold 
today in the Armenian diaspora’s 
memory.31
For post-war émigré communities 
such as Ukrainian and Lithuani-
an Displaced Persons, a memory culture centered on 
genocide was also a liability. Among these groups there 
was a disproportionate number who had worked for the 
German occupation authorities in various capacities.32 
The émigrés were well aware of the Holocaust – yet 
deliberately omitted it from their memory culture.33 
From the late 1970s, as the Holocaust became an increas-
ingly important point of reference in Western historical 
culture, Ukrainian and Lithuanian émigré communities 
felt compelled to break their silence.34 Allegations of war 
criminality and collaboration in the Holocaust stung the 
communities, which, following the establishment of the 
Office for Special Investigation (OSI) in the 1980s, jointly 
rejected allegations of war criminality.35
Holodomor 
Similar to the case of the Armenian diaspora, the Galician 
Ukrainian diaspora elevated the 1932-1933 famine to the 
centerpiece of its modern history for the semicentennial 
anniversary. In 1983, the first “famine-genocide” memo-
rial was erected, in the city of Edmonton in Canada.36 
It was to be followed by several others in Winnipeg, 
Windsor, and other cities. From the mid-1980s, terms 
like “Ukrainian Holocaust,” “the Ukrainian genocide,” 
and “famine-genocide” were increasingly replaced by the 
neologism Holodomor and coupled with the figure seven 
million (or higher).37 The term is the preferred nomen-
clature of those who regard the famine as deliberate 
genocide, aimed at exterminating the Ukrainian nation, 
an interpretation which occupies a central position in 
the memory culture of the Ukrainian diaspora.38 Though 
this definition is legislated into law in Ukraine, consen-
sus remains as distant as ever, and the genocide thesis 
not endorsed by most scholars outside the Ukrainian 
community.39
The late Ukrainian diaspora historian Orest Subtelny 
(1941–2016) argued that the famine “was to be for the 
Ukrainians what the Holocaust was to the Jews and the 
massacres of 1915 for the Armenians.”40 His massive 
Ukraine: A History (1988), which ap-
peared in Ukrainian translation in 1991, 
came to have a tremendous impact on 
post-Soviet Ukrainian historiography. 
In the early 1990s, there was hardly 
a work on Ukrainian history which 
lacked a Subtelny reference: tongue-
in-cheek, historian David Marples (b. 
1952) refers to Subtelny as “the new 
Lenin.”41 Heavily centered on the his-
tory of ethnic Ukrainians, it allotted no more than five of 
nearly 700 pages to other ethnic groups who also called 
Ukraine home.42 
Poland: The Institute of National  
Remembrance
Poland, with its relatively more liberal cultural climate, 
already began addressing the Holocaust and popular 
anti-Semitism in the final years of communist rule. In 
1987 Jan Błoński’s (1931-2009) essay ”Poor Poles looking 
at the Ghetto” constituted an early attempt at addressing 
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the topic.43 Poland was at the forefront of dismantling the 
socialist system; it was also a pioneer in establishing an 
institute of national memory. In 1998, the Main Com-
mission for the Prosecution of Crimes against the Polish 
Nation was incorporated into the Institute of National 
Remembrance – Commission for the Prosecution of 
Crimes against the Polish Nation (Instytut Pamięci Nar-
odowej – Komisja Ścigania Zbrodni przeciwko Narodowi 
Polskiemu, IPN), established in 1991, a government in-
stitution straddling tasks such as prosecution, education 
and running archives. To a significant degree, the IPN 
has mirrored the government’s historical interpretations, 
to the point that critics have described it as a “ministry 
of memory.”44 Notably, a catalyst for these debates were 
Polish-born historians active abroad, who more or less 
forced these difficult discussions on Polish society. The 
discussions arguably started in earnest with Jan T. Gross’ 
(b. 1947) 2000 book Neighbors, on the 1941 Jedwabne 
massacre.45 The discussions on Polish co-perpetration in 
the Holocaust were polarizing. National-conservative 
voices reaffirmed their commitment to a narrative cen-
tered on Polish victimhood.
Poster about Holo-
domor, the man-
made famine in the 
Ukrainian SSR in 1932 




Lithuania: Genocide  
and Resistance Center
In October 1992, the Saema, the Lithuanian parliament, 
legislated that the entire Soviet period constituted 
“Soviet genocide.”46 The law radically expanded the 
definitions of the 1948 UN Genocide Convention to 
include persecution on social and political grounds.47 In 
the same month, the Genocide and Resistance Research 
Centre of Lithuania (Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir 
rezistencijos tyrimo centras, LGGRTC) and its affiliated 
Museum of Genocide Victims (Genocido aukų muziejus) 
were established in Vilnius, dedicated to “collect, keep 
and present historic documents about forms of physical 
and spiritual genocide against the Lithuanian people.”48 
The estimated number of genocide victims mentioned in 
public debates ranged widely from 350,000 to 800,000.49 
Debates in parliament listed 780,922 people between 
1940 and 1952.50 
The lumping together of population transfers of Poles from Wilno/Vilnius, Germans from Memel/
Klaipeda and deportations of Lithu-
anians into the Soviet interior under 
Stalin with the wholesale murder 
of the Jews blurs the distinction 
between deportation, expulsion and 
genocide. What ensues is a vague-
ly defined “politics of genocide,”51 
or “losses during the occupation,” 
centered on the suffering of ethnic 
Lithuanians.52 The absence of the 
Holocaust, in a genocide museum 
in a city once known as “the Jeru-
salem of the North,” where Jews constituted a pro-
portion of 41% at the turn of the century, was anything 
but uncontroversial.53 No less problematic is that the 
museum’s permanent exhibition glorifies Lithuanian 
nationalist groups, including some that took an active 
part in the Holocaust. Academically, this discourse is 
largely detached from the scholarly field of genocide 
studies. Sometimes referred to as the “double genocide” 
narrative, it has been criticized for appropriating the 
Holocaust discourse.54
International attention has necessitated changes to the 
center and the museum’s activities, including an exhibit 
addressing the Holocaust, though critics still regard the 
changes as insufficient, as described in this publication 
by Violeta Davoliūtė. After many years of sustained 
criticism, in April 2018 the museum was renamed the 
Museum of Occupations and Freedom Fights (Okupacijų 
ir laisvės kovų muziejus).55
An event similar in importance and impact to that of 
the publication of Gross’ Neighbors in Poland was the 
2016 publication of the book Our People (Mūsiškai). 
Written in a popular, semi-biographic format by journal-
ist Rūta Vanagaitė (b. 1955) and Efraim Zuroff (b. 1948) 
of the Simon Wiesenthal Center, relatives of perpetra-
tors and victims respectively, the book constituted the 
perhaps most serious challenge to the official narrative to 
date. It generated significant interest as well as emotional 
reactions. Indeed, many Lithuanians were deeply un-
comfortable as the combative Zuroff laid out the uncom-
fortable facts about the Holocaust in Lithuania: “Of the 
212,000 Lithuanian victims, about 5,000 were deported 
to death camps in Poland. The rest were rounded up in 
the cities, towns and villages. Some were shot on the spot, 
but most were marched out to a local forest or beauty 
spot, brutally shot, and buried in mass graves. Photo-
graphs and carefully recorded questioning reveal that in 
most cases the massacres were carried out by Lithuani-
ans. Sometimes no Germans were 
present.”56 
Vanagaitė describes Zuroff as 
“Lithuania’s bogeyman, the person 
who made Lithuanian schoolteach-
ers weep.”57 Our People nevertheless 
became a best-seller in Lithuania, 
but was withdrawn from circulation 
in 2018, officially due to a factual 
error in regards to an anti-Soviet 
insurgent venerated by Lithuanian 
nationalists.58  Zuroff brushed off 
the emotional reactions, musing that he took comfort in 
the knowledge “that each copy of the 19,000 that were 
sold has been read by as many as five people, and that 
people are waiting to borrow it.”59 Meanwhile, the book 
has appeared in translations into many languages, while 
Vanagaitė is currently finalizing a new popular history 
on the Holocaust in Lithuania, this time with Christoph 
Dieckmann (b. 1960), the most authoritative scholar of 
the subject.
The Ukrainian Institute  
of National Memory
In Ukraine, discussions on the Holocaust and local 
agency got underway later, but here, too, were largely 
triggered by outside inquiry. Half a decade after the Jed-
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Sofia Hrachova (b. 1977), pursuing her Ph.D. at Harvard 
University, played a key role in initiating the first earnest 
debates on the role of Ukrainian nationalists in the 
Holocaust. One impetus here was her work with Omer 
Bartov (b. 1954) as his research assistant during his work 
on his book Erased: Vanishing Traces of Jewish Galicia in 
Present-Day Ukraine, which spilled over into the pages 
of the journal Krytyka, a high-brow 
intellectual journal modelled on the 
New York Review of Books, in 2005.60 
In the debates that followed, local 
scholars with limited exposure to the 
field of Holocaust studies tended to 
take more conservative positions.61 
The discussions in Ukraine never ap-
proached anything like the intensity 
of the Jedwabne debates in Poland, 
and were eclipsed by the wave of 
civic protest referred to as the Orange Revolution. Swept 
to power by this peaceful protest, in May, 2006 the new 
“orange” government established a Ukrainian Institute 
of National Memory (Ukrains’kyi Instytut Natsional’noi 
Pamiaty, UINP), modelled on the Polish and Lithuanian 
examples, and launched a massive campaign to instru-
mentalize the recent Ukrainian past.
Under Viktor Yushchenko (b. 1954, president 2005–2010), the UINP placed a heavy stress on the 
Holodomor, which, together with a heroic representation 
of the ultranationalist Bandera wing of the Organization 
of Ukrainian Nationalists, OUN(b) and its armed forces, 
the Ukrainian Insurgent Army, UPA, became the center 
of the new “national memory.” On November 28, 2006, 
law 378-V, “On the Holodomor in Ukraine, 1932-1933” 
was narrowly passed by the Verkhovna Rada, formally 
recognizing the famine as Holodomor and “genocide of 
the Ukrainian people.” Parliament amended the wording 
of the presidential decree, changing “genocide of the 
Ukrainian nation” (natsiia) to “genocide of the Ukrainian 
people” (narid), switching the definition from ethnic to 
political.62 The following month another bill was floated 
in the Rada that sought to amend the Criminal Code 
of Ukraine to criminalize not the denial of the 1932–33 
famine as a fact but rejection the interpretation that it 
constituted a deliberate genocide.63
Yushchenko sought to persuade other governments to 
follow suit and follow his example of legislating history.64 
Most countries ignored his appeals; in Europe, other than 
Poland, only Lithuania, Estonia, and Hungary followed 
suit – though countries with significant Ukrainian 
diasporas, such as Canada and Australia, passed similar 
bills.65 In a gesture of solidarity, on December 6, 2006, 
Poland legislated history using near-identical termi-
nology.66 Despite several attempts, the criminalization 
of Holodomor denial has, to date, not been successful.67 
In March 2007, Yushchenko made a new, similarly 
unsuccessful effort, calling upon 
the Verkhovna Rada to pass a law 
prohibiting the denial of either 
the Holocaust or the Holodomor.68 
Though the attempts at criminaliza-
tion have been unsuccessful so far, 
the Ukrainian government, through 
the foreign ministry, has sought to 
restrict alternative interpretations 
of the famine other than the official 
one. A recent example of this is the 
intervention of the Ukrainian ambassador to Germany to 
pressure the German-Ukrainian history commission to 
disinvite the prominent historian Heorhii Kas’’ianov (b. 
1964), author of a number of critical studies of Ukrainian 
memory politics.69
The legislating of the in-group into the role of gen-ocide victims, paradoxically, went hand in hand 
with the rehabilitation of Ukrainian far right groups 
involved in systematic ethnic violence, not least against 
Poles and Jews. In particular, the designation of Roman 
Shukhevych (1907-1950), commander of the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army (UPA), and Stepan Bandera (1909-1959), 
the leader of the most radical wing of the far-right Organ-
ization of Ukrainian Nationalists (OUN-Bandera) in 2007 
and 2010, caused consternation in Poland.70 
De-Communizing Ukraine
Memory conflicts again came to the fore in connection 
with the second revolution against Yanukovych in 2014, 
followed by a Russian invasion and annexation of the 
Crimea. As part of the ideological mobilization of the 
home front, the Ukrainian government appointed the 
activist Volodymyr V’’iatrovych (b. 1977) director of the 
Ukrainian Institute of National Memory, which was 
tasked with the instrumentalization of history. V’’iatro-
vych, who up until then headed a front organization of 
the clandestine Bandera wing of the OUN, immediately 
set out to draft laws aimed as “decommunizing” Ukraine. 
The post-Yanukovych leadership has been ambivalent 
on the legacy of the OUN and UPA. While President Pet-
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ro Poroshenko (b. 1965, president 2014-2019) recognized 
the plight of the Jews in Babi Yar, he presented the OUN 
as co-victims of the Nazis, opening an oversized memori-
al to its martyrs on the grounds of Babi Yar. The OUN(b) 
greeting Slava Ukrainy! was adopted as a greeting for the 
Ukrainian armed forces and Ukrainian uniforms rede-
signed to resemble those of the UPA.71 During his July, 
2016 state visit to Poland, Poroshenko placed a wreath at 
the Warsaw monument to the victims of OUN and UPA, 
only to have the director of the Ukrainian Institute of 
National Memory deny this was genocide.72
In April 2015, the Verkhovna rada finally passed a 
legislation package drafted by V’’iatrovych and Iuryi 
Shukhevych (b. 1933), son of the late UPA commander. 
Of these laws, two stood out as particularly controver-
sial. Law 2538-1 outlawed “disrespect” for “fighters for 
Ukrainian statehood in the 20th century.”73 It was accom-
panied by law 2558, “Condemning the communist and 
national socialist (Nazi) totalitarian regimes in Ukraine 
and banning their propaganda and symbols.”74 
The UINP has largely stayed clear of glorifying the 14th Ukrainian Waffen-SS Division Galizien,75 but 
it is venerated by memorials, street names, and memo-
rial plaques in several localities in West Ukraine. The 
application of law 2558 has, however, been uneven. 
V’’iatrovych has publicly denied this Waffen-SS unit’s 
collaboration with the Nazis, and declared its emblem 
was not a Nazi symbol – thereby not subject to the ban on 
“symbols of the totalitarian regimes of the 20th century.”76 
Meanwhile, in May 2017, a Lviv court sentenced a young 
man to two and a half years in prison for posting Lenin 
quotes on Facebook.77 
Critics such as historian Tarik Cyril Amar (b. 1969) of 
Columbia University emphasize that the laws are applied 
unequally.78 “[T]he Laws are not, as claimed, targeting 
Nazism and Communism equally, in a spirit of ‘anti-total-
itarianism’ and ‘double genocide’ symmetry, problematic 
in itself. The purpose of condemning Nazism is largely 
rhetorical – to reinforce the attack on Communism: if it 
were not, the simultaneous idolization of nationalist Nazi 
sympathizers and collaborators would be impossible.”79
Ukrainian Nationalist Expertise
To the wealth of Ukrainian history laws was added No. 
1780-VIII, “On the introduction of changes to some 
Ukrainian laws regarding the limitation of access to 
the Ukrainian market of foreign printed productions of 
anti-Ukrainian content,”80 which came into force on Jan-
uary 1, 2017.81 Article 28 of that law subjected internation-
al media to “specialist reviews” to prevent “propaganda 
of war, violence, or cruelty; the incitement of racial, 
national, or religious hatred; dissemination of pornogra-
phy…; propaganda of communist and/or national socialist 
(Nazi) totalitarian regimes and their symbols.”82 
On July 7, 2017 a 15-member “expert council” led by 
Bohdan Chervak (b. 1964), banned the import of twen-
ty-five books for violating the new law.83 The decision 
The former KGB building that hosts The 
Museum of Occupations and Freedom 
Fights. PHOTO: ALGIRDAS /WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
Execution room where prisoners were 
killed and later buried in mass graves out-
side Vilnius. Objects found in these mass 
graves are now on display within the glass 
cases located across the floor of the room.
PHOTO: KRISTIAN FRISK, KGB MUSEUM
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was announced on January 10, 2018, by the Department 
for the Development of the Sphere of Information and 
European Integration of Ukraine’s State Television and 
Radio Broadcasting Committee (Upravlinnia rozvyt-
ky informatsiinoi sfery ta evropeiskoi intehratsii pry 
Derzhavnoho komitetu telebachennia i radiomovlennia 
Ukrainy).84 Among the books banned were the award 
winning book Stalingrad by British historian Anthony 
Beevor (b. 1946) and Swedish journalist Anders Rydell’s 
(b. 1982) The Book Thieves: The Hunt for the Lost Librar-
ies.85 Beevor’s book was banned for mentioning a massa-
cre of Jewish children by Ukrainian militia men in 1941, 
while Rydell’s book was banned for containing a short 
reference to the 1919 pogroms carried out by the follow-
ers of Symon Petliura (1879-1926), the head of the short-
lived Ukrainian People’s Republic.86 Bohdan Chervak is 
neither a trained historian nor a dispassionate expert. 
The head of the Expert Committee of the State Commit-
tee for Television and Radio Broadcasts of Ukraine is also 
leader of the right-wing Melnyk faction of the OUN.87
Poland – “an Effective Instrument  
to Defend its Good Name”
Official Poland, which had long kept a relatively low 
profile in regard to the difficult aspects of Polish-Ukrain-
ian relations, now started to object more openly. In 2013 
the Sejm characterized the events in Volhynia in 1943 as 
“ethnic cleansing with signs of genocide.”88 
In July 2016, after the return of the national conserva-
tive Law and Justice party (Prawo i Sprawedliwość, PiS) to 
power, Poland officially recognized the Volhynian massa-
cres as genocide.89 In January 2018 the Sejm banned the 
propagating of “Banderism,” and declared V’’iatrovych 
persona non grata in Poland. Polish foreign minister Wi-
told Waszczkowycz (b. 1957, foreign minister 2015-2018) 
announced that Ukraine would not be “joining Europe” 
with Bandera and pledged that Poland would use its 
veto against a membership in EU or NATO.90 The two 
countries have thus legislated two antagonistic, mutually 
exclusive narratives of history; whereas “disrespect” for 
the OUN and Bandera is a criminal offense in Ukraine, 
promotion of the same is a criminal offense in Poland.
In Poland, discussions on memory have increasingly 
focused on terminology. In particular, the ahistorical 
term “Polish concentration camps” has caused great ire 
and consternation. The Polish Foreign Ministry keeps 
detailed track on how often the term “Polish Concentra-
tion Camps” is used in foreign media (“as many as 103” 
in 2009)91 The working assumption of some of IPN-affil-
“The Gate of Death” in Auschwitz-Birkenau. Trains with victims 
arrived through that gate. PHOTO: LUKE / CREATIVE COMMONS
iated historians, such as Joanna Lubecka (b.1969) is that 
Germans are ignorant of Nazi atrocities in the east, that 
“knowledge about the Holocaust, despite an objectively 
considerable educational effort and imposing financial 
outlay, is on the whole rudimentary and limited” and that 
“crimes committed against other nations, and the Slavic 
in particular, are still consigned to a ‘black hole.’”92 
On February 1, 2018, a new law banning the use of the 
term “Polish death camps”93 was approved by the Polish 
senate. Officials from the governing PiS declared the 
purpose of the law was to prevent “insulting and slander-
ing the good name of Poland,”94 while the speaker of the 
senate stated that Poland had now “obtained an effective 
instrument to defend its good name.”95 The law is not 
limited to Poland, but can be applied beyond its borders.96 
In the scholarly community, voices were raised that the new law could be invoked to stifle research on 
Polish collaboration and co-perpetration.97 Yad Vashem 
expressed its concerns that “restrictions on statements 
by scholars and others regarding the Polish people’s 
direct or indirect complicity with the crimes committed 
on their land during the Holocaust are a serious distor-
tion”98 and warned that “the law passed last night in the 
Polish Senate jeopardizes free and open discussion of 
the part of the Polish people in the persecution of the 
Jews at the time.”99 Havi Dreifuss (b. 1972), professor 
of Jewish history at Tel Aviv University, cautioned that 
though the legislation is supposed to except academics 
and artists, “this law is creating an atmosphere of fear in 
Poland to talk about these issues…. Poland has wonderful 
scholars who really changed our understanding of many 
aspects of the Holocaust, and the fact that they and their 
students – especially the students, who won’t be part of 
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the exemption – will have to think twice before working 
on these issues is something that is very very problemat-
ic.”100 Yehuda Bauer (b. 1926), Honorary Chairman of the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance, wrote: 
“The legislation is designed to make research of a diffi-
cult and complicated subject [Polish participation in the 
Holocaust] impossible: it supposedly protects scientific 
or artistic works from criminalization. But who deter-
mines what such works are? What about an investigative 
journalist? An aspiring but not (yet?) recognized artist? 
Or a tourist guide explaining how the local population 
gleefully robbed the property of the Jews as they were 
being herded to be murdered? Or a simple B.A. student 
writing a seminar paper and asking for material at an 
archive – when they submit the paper, will they then 
serve three years in jail because they found that a group 
of villagers murdered their Jewish neighbors? I guess 
they will prefer not to write the paper. In such an atmos-
phere there can be no free research or publication. It is an 
authoritarian, illiberal, climate.”101 
Indeed, allegations of anti-Semitism and collaboration 
in the Holocaust touch upon the rawest of nerves. The 
suggestion by Jan T. Gross  that Poles probably killed 
more Jews than Germans during World War II prompted 
president Andrzej Duda (b. 1972) to launch an “offensive” 
against Gross, calling for the retraction of one of Poland’s 
highest honors.102 Another target of ire is historian Jan 
Grabowski (b. 1962) at the University of Ottawa, who has 
similarly raised difficult and sensitive issues, unpopular 
with the authorities and much of popular opinion.103 
Memory laws and instrumentalizing government agen-
cies increase the pressure on dissenting historians: not 
least by means of ostracizing and shaming, in media old 
and new. Right-wing nationalist media venues have pre-
sented them as a team, accusing them of making “careers 
in anti-Polonism.”104 Jan Grabowski’s 2018 two-volume 
book Night without an End: The Fate of Jews in Selected 
Counties in Occupied Poland (Dalej jest noc: Losy Żydów 
w wybranych powiatach okupowanej Polski), co-written 
with Barbara Engelking (b. 1962), director of the Polish 
Center for Holocaust Research in Warsaw, prompted the 
IPN to publish a counter-publication in response to what 
the government agency called “numerous polemics and 
manipulations.”105 
The politization of history, Grabowski maintains, has 
an adverse impact on scholarly research. One aspect, he 
cautions, is that German academia has become reluctant 
to address the issue of local co-perpetration in the Holo-
caust. In an article in Haaretz Grabowski argued that  
“[T]he well-intentioned determination of German pol-
iticians and academics to take exclusive responsibility 
for the Nazi genocide is now aiding other perpetrators 
to whitewash their participation.”106 The near-exclusive 
fixation on German perpetrators at the expense of other 
groups, including the Polish Blue Police and the OUN, 
Grabowski argues, plays into the hands of the instru-
mentalizing narratives of PiS, FIDESZ, and other such 
groups.107
T he centrality of the German responsibility for the Holocaust ought not discourage research into 
local agency of non-German perpetrators in the murder, 
argues Polish-born historian Grzegorz Rossoliński-Liebe 
(b. 1979) at the Freie Universität Berlin. This Ger-
man-centered approach, he argues, has an adverse effect 
on the understanding of the mechanisms of the Holo-
caust on the local level, but also plays into the hands of 
nationalist activists.108 This “reductionist interpretation 
of the Holocaust,” he argues, “meets considerable inter-
est among national politicians and historians in countries 
such as Ukraine, Poland, or Lithuania, as it aids them to 
dislodge the guilt of local perpetrators on the German oc-
cupiers and to present the Holocaust as a German-Jewish 
matter without participation of local actors.”109 
A Call for Freedom of Interpretation,  
for the Abolition of Memory Laws
Under the slogan “Ukraine remembers, the world 
acknowledges,” the UINP sought international affirma-
tion of its claim that the 1932-33 famine was “genocide 
of the Ukrainian people,” in which seven, or ten, million 
Ukrainians perished in the republic. At the same time, its 
director angrily rejected Poland’s claim that the OUN(b) 
and UPA’s Volhynian massacres constituted genocide, ex-
pressing concerns over inflated victims tolls, denouncing 
it as a tasteless “hunt for victims.”110 In regard to Armenia, 
the Ukrainian foreign department issued instructions 
that what transpired in 1915 was not genocide, instructing 
Ukrainians to desist from participating in any commemo-
rative events, and to place the term “Armenian genocide” 
within citation marks.111 Some of the largest atrocities of 
modern history are reduced to political rhetoric used for 
political mobilization. Whether this has contributed to 
understanding, reflection, and education is debatable. 
As it enforced its program of decommunization, the 
activists of the UINP insisted that it was based “primar-
ily on the ‘European experience’.”112 This is a factually 
correct statement; the memory laws are based upon 
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precedents from western Europe. Laws that explicitly 
criminalize Holocaust denial were first introduced in 
France in 1990. In 1994, Germany followed suit. Since 
then, similar Holocaust or broader genocide denial laws 
have been introduced in at least fourteen EU member 
states.113 Laws to deny the historicity of the Holocaust 
has been expanded to include the Armenian genocide, 
Stalinist crimes, and other atrocities. Their consequenc-
es are paradoxical. Some appear to underwrite division 
rather than reconciliation; while disrespect of the OUN 
and UPA is outlawed in Ukraine, their glorification is 
illegal in Poland. If it in France it is a criminal offense to 
deny the Armenian genocide, in Turkey its affirmation 
is forbidden. If the German practises of Aufarbeitung 
and Vergangenheitsbewältigung are often regarded as 
a success,114 the assessments of the parallel, post-Cold 
War trend of relying on legislation and courts to settle 
historical arguments or to prevent misrepresentation are 
more divided. 
Today, micro-studies, including dynamics of local collaboration, are at the forefront of Holocaust 
research – not least in the areas of the eastern border-
lands. These difficult issues would benefit from being 
researched and debated openly, without laws to defend 
the good name of contemporary polities or criminal-
izing disrespect of groups involved in mass ethnic 
violence.
Academic historians have organized themselves in order 
to speak up against memory laws and the legislation of 
history. One such project is Liberté pour l’historie, led by 
Pierre Nora (b. 1931).115 Another such initiative is Histo-
rians Without Borders, in which former Finnish Foreign 
Minister Erkki Tuomioja (b. 1946) – a historian in his own 
right – has played a central role. Tuomioja argues that “his-
torical truths and interpretations should not be made into 
legislative issues.”116 One of its members, Timothy Garton 
Ash (b. 1955), calls upon academic historians to “work 
within the European Union to…reverse all … memory laws, 
to return to the good spirit of John Stuart Mill.”117
While the former eastern borderlands provide some of 
the more heavy-handed examples of instrumentalization 
and memory legislation, the discussion should not be 
limited to these three countries. It is not difficult to con-
cur with Liberté pour l’histoire and Historians Without 
Borders about the desirability of keeping legislation away 
from the discipline of history; a similar call can be made 
in regard to government opinion making agencies in the 
field of history. ●
Note: The author wishes to acknowledge the very helpful 
comments and suggestions by David Gaunt, John-Paul 
Himka, Tora Lane, Ninna Mörner, Grzegorz Rossoliński-
Liebe and Irina Sandomirskaja.
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emory politics have been 
a crucial field of policy 
action for the Federal 
Republic and the German 
Democratic Republic since their respective cre-
ation in 1949, helping to bolster the legitimacy 
of each state to its citizens and in foreign affairs 
during the Cold War. Since the fall of the Berlin 
Wall and unification, the confrontation with the 
past, particularly with the Second World War, 
the Holocaust, and the “two dictatorships” on 
German soil, has become absolutely central to 
the Federal Republic’s collective identity and 
raison d’état. “No future without the past” has 
become the official motto of federal cultural 
policy.1 
The centrality of memory is evident in 
political rhetoric, as well as in the ubiqui-
tous presence of commemorative symbols in 
public space. Germany is widely lauded for 
its decentralized landscape of remembrance, 
which suggests an in-depth but also pluralistic 
confrontation with history. The core principle 
of official memory policy since 1989 has been 
that the state, especially at the federal level, 
is regarded as “one among many actors” that 
cannot insist on “sovereignty of interpretation” 
(what Germans call Deutungshoheit) in matters 
of public memory.2 In other words, despite a 
significant increase in engagement with and 
funding for commemoration on the part of the 
state, its representatives consistently empha-
size that they are not “in control.” The expan-
sion of memory policy and of the landscape of 
remembrance has been accompanied by the 
development and growing sophistication of a 
multi-level system of governance of memory as 
a policy field, in which federal-level actors have 
become increasingly (albeit cautiously) more 
powerful. The most potent sign of this shift is 
the creation in 1998 of the Commissioner of the 
Federal Government for Culture and the Media 
(BKM) under the auspices of the Chancellery. 
At the same time, civil society has continuously 
been a dynamic force in the politics of memory, 
driving forward critical and controversial topics 
and keeping the state “on its toes.” 
T his article begins by providing a short overview of the main phases of German 
memory politics, with special attention paid to 
the key debates that have taken place since 1989 
and that have done much to shape the charac-
ter of memory governance into the present. A 
key point here is that the interaction between 
different “pasts” and those groups who advo-
cate for various ways of remembering these 
pasts has fundamentally impacted the policy 
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instruments and structures of state memory 
management. 
Moreover, aside from state agencies, civil so-
ciety as well as what I call “hybrid institutions,” 
play a crucial role in memory governance. I 
then discuss the processes by which memory 
politics (building on existing regulations) were 
institutionalized after 1989 and outline the most 
important agencies and policy instruments in 
this field. My main goal here is to illuminate 
the complex interplay between actors that 
represent local, state, and federal levels, and 
state, hybrid, and civic organizations, as well 
as different “pasts” in memory politics. Finally, 
I examine some of the challenges that current 
memory managers are faced with.
Managing Different Pasts
Though not the top priority for the two newly 
founded and war-ravaged German states after 
1949, public memory was nevertheless an 
important field of action as each sought to legit-
imize its government to its citizenry and in the 
context of Cold War competition. In the Federal 
Republic (FRG), federal and local governments 
mostly supported a commemorative agenda of 
remembering the victims of “war and dictator-
ship” indiscriminately and without referring 
to the perpetrators of the Holocaust and the 
German war of aggression against its neighbors 
and the world. This was buttressed by a whole 
host of emerging civic and interest groups, in-
cluding veterans’ associations, prisoners of war, 
expellees (those ethnic Germans who left East 
Central Europe in the wake of WWII), and vic-
tims of Stalinist repression in the Soviet zone of 
occupation, the USSR, and the German Demo-
cratic Republic. Key organizations to name here 
are the Volksbund Deutsche Kriegsgräberfür-
sorge (founded after WWI to take care of the 
graves of fallen soldiers and instrumentalized 
by the Nazis), the Verband der Heimkehrer, 
Kriegsgefangenen und Vermisstenangehörigen 
Deutschlands e. V. (an umbrella organization of 
German POWs), and the Bund der Vertriebenen 
(Federation of Expellees). While Holocaust sur-
vivors (such as the Vereinigung der Verfolgten 
des Naziregimes/Bund der Antifaschisten and 
the Arbeitsgemeinschaft ehemals verfolgter So-
zialdemokraten) and a few emerging initiatives 
for German-Jewish reconciliation were not 
entirely silenced, they certainly did not receive 
much publicity or state funding. Support for 
the memory of victims of war and communism 
fit squarely into Cold War rhetoric and the 
Adenauer administration’s desire to be firmly 
ensconced in the Western camp. 
At the same time, Adenauer recognized the 
need to acknowledge Germans’ responsibility 
for the Holocaust, pay reparations, and make at 
least some gestures towards commemorating 
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the selected marking of key sites of Nazi crimes, 
including the concentration camps at Bergen 
Belsen and Dachau, as well as a site in the 
center of Berlin symbolizing the most high-pro-
file act of resistance in 1944. These places were 
then used for strategic speeches by German 
leaders to signal their contrition. However, 
into the 1960s, “German-centered” memori-
als received much more support, including 
through the Ministry of Pan-German Questions 
(Ministerium für gesamtdeutsche Fragen), as 
well as local policies such as city partnerships. 
With the rise of a liberal intellectual critique 
of the lack of reckoning with the past, as well 
as growing student mobilization in the 1960s, 
memory politics were clearly organized along 
partisan lines.
 While the left became an advocate against 
remembering German suffering and for ac-
knowledging Germans’ crimes (though often via 
a relatively simplistic Marxist framework), the 
right continued to be staunch allies of expellee, 
veteran, and anti-communist organizations. 
At the same time, the West German left tended 
to be relatively unconcerned with the human 
rights violations happening after 1945 in the So-
viet bloc and the GDR (German Democratic Re- 
public). This division essentially held until 1989 
and remnants of these loyalties remain today.
In East Germany, the regime harnessed mem-ory politics from the beginning to bolster its 
legitimacy as an anti-fascist state. The memory 
of communist resistance was elevated to state 
ideology while negative experiences of war, 
flight, incarceration, and of Jewish suffering 
were largely silenced. For example, former 
concentration camps in East Germany (some of 
which had also been NKVD special camps after 
the war) – Sachsenhausen, Buchenwald, and 
Ravensbrück – were turned into national me-
morials (Nationale Mahn- und Gedenkstätten) 
where communist resistance was celebrated 
above all. Nevertheless, there were also efforts 
at more nuanced remembering in the GDR, for 
example by the Action Reconciliation/Service 
for Peace (ASF), a Christian reconciliation group 
founded in 1959 in West Germany and 1962 in 
East Germany. Moreover, elements of the op-
position movement that gained strength in the 
early 1980s regarded an honest confrontation 
with the Nazi past as essential to their chal-
lenge against dictatorship. Meanwhile, some of 
those who had fled or emigrated from the GDR 
became active in commemorating the victims of 
communism, especially in the aftermath of the 
crushed East German uprising in 1953.
F rom the outset, civil society was a crucial participant in the politics of memory in 
Germany (though it was largely silenced in 
the GDR). Advocates of “German centered 
memory” (expellees, veterans, victims of 
communism) did much to shape the character 
of public memory. Associations of Holocaust 
survivors did their best to safeguard and mark 
sites of Nazi terror. This situation began to shift 
in the 1960s with an official transformation of 
memory policy, which included the creation 
of the Ludwigsburg Central Office of the State 
Justice Administrations for the Investigation 
of National Socialist Crimes in 1958 and of the 
state and federal offices for political education 
(Landesstellen und Bundeszentrale für politische 
Bildung – LpB and BpB), which increasingly 
viewed the past as an important field of civic 
education. The LpB and BpB continue to be 
important players in shaping public memory 
and providing publicity and funding to memo-
rial projects. 
In the early 1980s, a development began that 
has strongly determined the nature of memory 
management in the Federal Republic to this 
day. As I have shown in detail,3 myriad citizens’ 
initiatives and “history workshops” emerged 
and sought to practice historical research “from 
the bottom up”, thereby investigating the Nazi 
past at the local level and demanding recogni-
tion of society’s historical responsibility. They 
made up two separate but closely allied social 
movements, the Memorial Site Movement 
(Gedenkstättenbewegung) and the History 
Movement (Geschichtsbewegung). In the course 
of their efforts to expose the traces of Nazi rule 
and to understand what made the Holocaust 
possible, they insisted that a novel approach to 
the past was needed. This approach meant a 
































German society, on the diversity of the victims 
(Jews, Sinti and Roma, deserters, communists, 
gay men, the disabled, among others), and on 
the democratic principles that could prevent a 
repetition of the past. Memory work was explic-
itly regarded as crucial to democracy. Moreover, 
these “memory activists” saw in-depth histori-
cal research as an activity that was not to be left 
to professional historians, nor instrumentalized 
by politicians. 
Through the work of these two movements, 
and at least initially largely against the will of 
state institutions, the FRG gradually acquired a 
decentralized landscape of commemoration of 
the Nazi past, made up of thousands of memo-
rials – from small markers to large, publicly 
funded Gedenkstätten (what David Clarke 
refers to as “commemorative museums that are 
site-specific”4). Particularly the Gedenkstät-
tenbewegung also laid the groundwork for an 
institutionalization of memorial sites. In 1981, 
a network of Nazi memorial sites was founded, 
which was coordinated initially by the ASF, as 
well as through a regular newsletter (Gedenk-
stättenrundbrief) and an annual meeting. In 
1993, the coordination (Gedenkstättenreferat) 
was placed under the auspices of the Founda-
tion Topography of Terror in Berlin, though it 
was still (and is to this day) headed by Thomas 
Lutz, who has had an outsize role in shaping 
memorial work in Germany. 
The Foundation, founded in 1992 to run what 
has become one of the most important sites 
dedicated to remembering Nazi terror, has ac-
quired a crucial role in the governance of com-
memoration generally, as it has become an um-
brella organization for numerous Berlin sites 
and is routinely consulted in commemorative 
processes (for example on how to remember 
the victims of Nazi euthanasia or Lebensraum 
policies). The Foundation that runs the Topog-
raphy of Terror is independent, but 50% of its 
financing comes from the federal budget. It was 
the site of Berlin’s central Gestapo headquar-
ters, as well as key ministries of the Nazi state. A 
symbolic excavation was held on the site in 1985 
by the association Active Museum Resistance 
and Fascism in Berlin, which demanded that it 
be turned into a memorial. For this reason, civil 
society engagement is built into the fibers of 
the Topography, which is the most important 
instance of the key role played by activists in the 
formation of memorial institutions. In 2018, it 
saw 1.3 million visitors.5
A ctivists demanded not only that these sites of Nazi terror be marked and 
acknowledged, but that they be funded by the 
state as places for civic education. As these 
demands were increasingly successful, the 
activists were the most obvious new staff and 
even leaders for these new institutions: they 
had both the historical expertise and the neces-
sary experience of undertaking memory work 
(organizing guided tours, devising exhibitions, 
interviewing survivors etc.). As they began 
working in salaried positions, the activists made 
sure that civil society continued to have signifi-
cant influence in the commemorative museums 
and that the specific character of history work 
was perpetuated there. Again, this included 
unemotional historical representation, nam-
ing of perpetrators, depiction of differentiated 
experiences and victim groups of National 
Socialism, and anti-monumental design prin-
ciples. Because these new institutions were an 
outcome of the pressure of civil society initia-
tives and they continued to be shaped by them, 
I call them “hybrid institutions” – entities with 
characteristics of both civil society and state. 
They play a central role in how memory policy 
writ-large is determined today. Moreover, the 
negotiations and compromises over what to do 
with the Gedenkstätten in East and West Ger-
many after 1989 did much to shape what I refer 
to as multi-level memory governance.
The activists involved in memorial sites 
all over West Germany may have networked 
since the early 1980s, but their cooperation 
only acquired formal status in the 1990s and 
2000s. During these two decades, almost all 
German states founded state-level memorial 
foundations, which fund and coordinate sites 
commemorating the Nazi (and in Eastern 
Germany also the GDR) past (see Table 1).These 
organizations and their member memorials are 
connected through ongoing bi-annual meetings 













































Camp Memorials, which have their origins in 
the civic memorial site movement. Within these 
organizational structures, the large concentra-
tion camp memorials have particular weight: 
Sometimes they have foundations of their own 
or are host to the larger state-level foundation, 
and they have significant staffing and funding 
levels. Most of the smaller memorials operate 
either under the auspices of local cultural or 
educational administrations (including the 
LpB) or they are run by volunteers.6 These are 
instances of “hybrid institutions” in that they 
combine state funding and some structural 
elements with considerable civic input and a 
decentralized modus operandi. These govern-
ing arrangements at the local and state level are 
also in line with the traditional and constitu-
tionally mandated principle that cultural and 
educational matters are the prerogative of the 
states, not the federal government, although 
this principle was considerably undermined 
through the creation of the BKM in 1998.
Table 1: State Memorial Institutions
 Name Year 
foun- 
ded
Website Memorial sites and 
initiatives
Stiftung Brandenburgische Gedenkstätten 1993 http://www.stiftung-bg.de/ 6 (including Sachsen-
hausen, Ravensbrück)
Stiftung Sächsische Gedenkstätten 1994 https://www.stsg.de/cms/herzlich-
willkommen
6 directly run,  
10 supported/funded





Der Arbeitskreis der NS-Gedenkstätten und 
-Erinnerungsorte in NRW e.V.
1995 http://www.ns-gedenkstaetten.de/ 29
Landesarbeitsgemeinschaft der Gedenkstätten und 





Stiftung Bayrische Gedenkstätten 2003 https://www.stiftung-bayerische-gedenk-
staetten.de/
Dachau, Flossenbürg, 
satellite camps, and 
concentration camp 
cemeteries
Stiftung Gedenkstätten Buchenwald und Mittel-
bau-Dora
2003 https://www.buchenwald.de/nc/de/896/ 2 concentration camp 
memorials
Stiftung Niedersächsische Gedenkstätten 2004 https://www.stiftung-ng.de/de/ 8 (including Bergen-
Belsen)
Stiftung Gedenkstätten Sachsen-Anhalt 2006 https://stgs.sachsen-anhalt.de/stiftung-
gedenkstaetten-sachsen-anhalt/
7 (both Nazi and GDR 
past)
Arbeitsgemeinschaft der Gedenkstätten in  
Mecklenburg-Vorpommern




schaft zur Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur
2009 https://geschichtsverbund-thueringen.
de/
18 sites related to the 
GDR past




Regular meeting of 
memorial sites on the 
Nazi past in Berlin 
(funded by BKM)
Die Stiftung Hamburger Gedenkstätten und 



























Institutionalization and  
Multi-level Governance
Throughout the 1980s and 1990s, the Federal 
Republic saw an expansion of the landscape of 
commemoration as more and more sites related 
to the Nazi past were researched and marked, 
alongside the growing scope and sophistication 
of Holocaust historiography and the emergence 
of memory studies as an interdisciplinary field. 
These developments went hand in hand with 
the consolidation of a memorial culture driven 
by the two movements I have mentioned and 
then institutionalized in the sites they helped 
created. This culture is built on the notion that 
critical democratic remembrance had to be 
pushed through against the reluctance of state 
elites, that these achievements must now be 
safeguarded, and that remembrance of the Nazi 
past is a duty for a democratic society that must 
therefore be publicly funded. In other words, 
this memorial culture was founded on the 
paradox of a fundamental suspicion of the state 
(for long refusing to confront its responsibility) 
combined with the belief that remembrance 
must be supported und funded by the state. Out 
of this paradox emerges what German officials 
often refer to as Staatsferne (or remoteness 
from the state) of memorial policy7 – which, 
again, may at first glance appear to be a contra-
diction in terms. Andrew Beattie has distin-
guished between “official memory” – memory 
produced by state organs or representatives 
– and “state-mandated memory” – memory 
promoted by other actors, which is subsidized 
or endorsed by state. He argues that while 
during the first phase after unification, the state 
intervened directly, over time the approach has 
shifted to one of providing funding to non-gov-
ernmental memory work.8 Indeed, as the 
then-President of the German Bundestag, Nor-
bert Lammert, stated, while memorialization 
was a crucial responsibility for the government, 
“in a democratic and pluralistic society, national 
memory can neither be formulated officially nor 
regulated through a bureaucracy.”9
T he actors, policy instruments and rules that are operative today have developed 
through the coming together of the memorial 
cultures emerging from the struggle to force a 
reckoning with the Nazi past on the one hand 
and the post-1989 need to address the GDR 
past on the other. The unification treaty in 1990 
already laid down the need to support memorial 
institutions in principle.10 
Another measure taken by the unification 
agreement was the creation of the Federal 
Commissioner for the Records of the State 
Security Service of the GDR (for short: Stasi file 
authority; German: BStU) and its state-level 
equivalents (Landesbeauftragte zur Aufarbe-
itung der SED-Diktatur). The first BStU was 
the well-known GDR dissident Joachim Gauck 
(who later became president of the FRG) and 
subsequent commissioners have also been 
prominent leaders in the opposition movement. 
This has provided them with significant legiti-
macy as they have had to maneuver contentious 
debates about how long to keep the Stasi files – 
of which there are 111 kilometers of documents, 
in addition to film footage and more – and how 
to make them accessible. The task of the BStU is 
“the safekeeping and securing of archival hold-
ings” as well as providing “people access to files 
that concern them. They can then clarify what 
influence the Stasi had on their destiny.” More-
over, “the Stasi records are also made available 
to scholars and journalists who want to engage 
in a historical and political reappraisal of the 
GDR dictatorship.”11 The legal basis for this 
agency was created in November 1991 through 
the “Stasi File Law.”12 
Between 1991 and the end of 2019, there have 
been 7.3 million requests to view Stasi files, 
with most coming from citizens seeking to view 
files about themselves. This continues to be 
possible through filling out an application form. 
Researchers and the media can gain access 
through a separate application process.13 There 
are also fourteen regional and advisory offices, 
which together employ over 1300 staff (down 
from 1600 at its peak in 2015).14 The BStU runs a 
museum in the former headquarters of the Stasi 
in Berlin, as well as providing temporary and 
traveling exhibits, and educational materials. 
In November 2020, the Bundestag sealed the 
decision to move all Stasi files to the Federal 













































remain accessible. In sum, the BStU has been an 
important actor in memory politics, as well as 
a key archive and pioneer in the reconstruction 
and processing of archival sources. Each East 
German state has an equivalent commission-
er (LStU), which is essentially a local agency 
tasked with supporting the working through of 
the communist past through providing advice 
and organizing dedicated events. All are headed 
by former dissidents. Their budgets and exact 
range of activities vary.
I n addition to rapidly addressing the issue of secret police files – a measure that emerged 
directly out of the occupation of Stasi buildings 
by the opposition movements in 1989/90 – the 
post-wall period witnessed some other imme-
diate measures of transitional justice. These 
included judicial procedures, of which the most 
high-profile were the Mauerschützenprozesse 
(trials against regime leaders and border guards 
for the shoot-to-kill order). Most important 
for the future direction of memorial govern-
ance were the establishment of two Enquete 
Kommissionen (parliamentary commissions of 
inquiry), which heard hundreds of testimonies 
about the SED-regime and its legacies, from 
1992 to 1994 and from 1995 to 1998, respective-
ly.15 According to several observers, the com-
missions’ composition in terms of proportional 
representation of members and speakers heard 
gave them a great deal of democratic legitimacy. 
They also explicitly recognized the important 
role of memory in the transition period: “In 
democratic memory culture, the memorial sites 
in remembrance of the Nazi and communist 
dictatorships are of central importance. They 
give an irreplaceable testimony to the memory 
of terror, repression and resistance. They are 
signs of the acknowledgement and moral reha-
bilitation for the victims of the dictatorship by 
the democratic state.”16
T wo developments emerged from the Second Enquete Commission that 
fundamentally shaped memory governance in 
conjunction with the increasingly pro-active 
intervention of federal actors. First was the cre-
ation of the Bundesstiftung zur Aufarbeitung der 
SED-Diktatur (Federal Foundation for Reap-
praising the SED-Dictatorship, short: Stiftung 
Aufarbeitung) in 1998 on direct recommenda-
tion of the Enquete. The motto of the Foun-
dation is “Memory as Mandate” and its main 
tasks are to support the “working through” of 
the causes, history, and legacies of dictator-
ship in the Soviet occupied zone and the GDR. 
Together with domestic and international 
partners, it seeks to raise public awareness of 
communist repression and of the revolutions of 
An exhibition room  
























1989 as key events in the history of democracy.17 
The Foundation supports memorial projects, 
exchange programs with international partners, 
and research projects, as well as hosting events 
(including the annual history fair or Geschichts-
messe in Suhl), offering training to memorial 
staff, and being engaged in consultative pro-
cesses in various memorials related to the GDR. 
It also offers a range of exhibitions that can 
be shown at flexible locations. For 2020, the 
Stiftung Aufarbeitung had a budget of €8.03 
million, of which almost €6 million came from 
the BKM (though this budget is expected to 
decline somewhat in the future).18 With the 
Stiftung Aufarbeitung, in short, the federal 
government created a central agency to advo-
cate for the memory of the SED-dictatorship. 
As Beattie has argued, though this does not 
translate into the establishment of a unitary 
memory regime, the federal government has 
clearly supported the central role of memory of 
repression (as opposed to approaches focused 
on everyday life).19 There is no equivalent to this 
Foundation for the Nazi past, though several 
specific memorial institutions take on roles that 
reach beyond their immediate remit, including 
the Foundation Memorial to the Murdered 
Jews of Europe20 and the aforementioned Foun-
dation Topography of Terror. The Foundation 
Erinnerung, Verantwortung und Zukunft (EVZ – 
Remembrance, Responsibility and Future) was 
established in 2000 in order to make restitution 
payments to former forced laborers under the 
Nazi regime. After those payments were com-
pleted in 2007, the EVZ has continued funding 
remembrance, educational and research pro-
jects,21 but it does not have a role that is equiva-
lently central to memorial policy as the Stiftung 
Aufarbeitung.22
T he second outcome of the Enquete Com-missions was the gradual creation of an 
informal but widely accepted modus operandi 
for dealing with Germany’s dictatorial pasts 
and the ongoing competition for recognition 
and resources. Simultaneously, the federal state 
significantly increased its intervention capacity 
and developed key policy instruments with the 
creation of the BKM in 1998 and the passing of 
the first Gedenkstättenkonzeption (memorial 
concept law) by the Bundestag (federal par-
liament) in 1999,23 which built directly on the 
Enquete’s work and was renewed and expanded 
in 2008.24
W ith unification, it was clear that the large GDR memorial sites had to be 
revised and funded, as the GDR regime had 
instrumentalized the Nazi past in a highly 
problematic manner, as well as silencing any 
commemoration of repression in the GDR. His-
torical research was needed on those sites, in-
cluding on their usage as Soviet Special Camps 
by the NKVD. Buchenwald and Sachsenhausen, 
in particular, became focal points for disputes 
between the two dictatorial pasts and over 
their respective meaning for collective identity 
in unified Germany. Representatives of both 
pre- and post-1945 victims clashed directly at 
these sites. In order to decrease the emotional 
intensity of these debates, the historian Bernd 
Faulenbach proposed a “formula” for address-
ing the dual past, which was subsequently 
picked up by the Second Enquete Commission 
and (in slightly altered form) found its way into 
the Gedenkstättenkonzeption: “Nazi crimes 
may not be relativized through the reckoning 
with Stalinist crimes. Stalinist crimes may not 
be minimized through the reference to Nazi 
crimes.”25 
The Faulenbach formula did not prevent 
continued struggles and competition between 
various memory actors, but it did offer a useful 
guide for practitioners. According to Thomas 
Lindenberger, “it did not prevail because it was 
accepted as an articulation of objective truth, 
but because it offered a tailor-made rationality 
to the necessity of devising and inventing an 
integrative and non-divisive policy of dealing 
with the past. Although originally invented to 
suit specific, locally defined needs, it proved 
to be an indispensable guideline for national 
politics of history.”26
Thus, the immediate challenges of dealing 
with the GDR sites were clear, but it was just as 
important to drive forward large-scale me-
morial projects that served to underline the 













































past in a unified state to Germany’s interna-
tional partners. This necessitated more direct 
involvement of the federal level in cultural 
affairs. Breaking with the tradition of dealing 
with culture and memory at the local and state 
level, the BKM 
comes with its own bureaucratic appa-
ratus, complete with an undersecre-
tary of state, a respectable budget and 
control competences (sic) over several 
federal institutions of vital importance 
for a modern society’s dealing with the 
past. Institutions such as the Federal 
Archives (Bundesarchiv) and the above 
Commissioner for the Stasi Files, both 
formerly integrated into the Ministry 
of the Interior, or the coordination of 
Germany’s policy of restitution and 
repatriation of cultural assets (‘loot-
ed art’) are essential to its portfolio. 
Among the manifold tasks of this min-
istry dealing with state sponsorship of 
culture in a more general sense we also 
find the supervision and administra-
tive control of the foundation dealing 
with the SED dictatorship (Stiftung 
Aufarbeitung der SED-Diktatur), the 
Foundation for the Memorial for the 
Murdered Jews of Europe (the so-
called Holocaust memorial in down-
town Berlin) and the federal state’s 
activities in maintaining memorials 
(Gedenkstätten) of national relevance, 
such as the concentration camp me-
morials Buchenwald, Sachsenhausen, 
Dachau, Bergen-Belsen and Neu-
engamme, to name but a few.27
Despite its powerful position, the BKM also 
adheres to the principle of “remoteness from 
the state” – mostly by providing funding and 
facilitating networking among the civic, hybrid 
and state actors involved in memorial man-
agement. When it comes to figuring out the 
future direction of federal memorial policy, 
expert commissions have often been instated. 
The most prominent instance was this was 
the Sabrow Commission on working through 
the SED dictatorship, led by historian Martin 
Sabrow in 2005/6, whose recommendations 
were not directly implemented due to a change 
in government, but which were nevertheless 
influential. Similarly, an expert commission 
came up with a “wall concept” for Berlin, which 
shapes the memory of the separation in the cap-
ital. The BKM’s activities and funding decisions 
are overseen by a parliamentary committee 
(Bundestagsausschuss für Kultur und Medien), 
which was created at the same time. They are 
guided by the Gedenkstättenkonzeptionen, 
which Erik Meyer has called “the central in-
strument of memory-political regulation.”28 
These laws lay out the principles for me-
morial funding (including authenticity of the 
site, its national and historical significance, a 
well-founded educational and didactic concep-
tualization, the engagement of victims and civic 
representatives, and matching funding by the 
respective states). The laws also name specific 
sites of the Nazi past with their specific profiles 
that are to be supported and provides a detailed 
structure for reckoning with the GDR past, 
including through archives, educational insti-
tutions and memorial sites (which are again 
divided up into four categories).29 
Detlef Garbe has explained in detail how the 
Gedenkstättenkonzeption translates into fed-
eral funding mechanisms, including permanent 
institutional financing, project support, and 
one-off investment in memorial sites. Over-
all, federal funding in the memory field has 
increased significantly since 2008.30
T hese policy structures have emerged primarily from the interaction between 
the need to commemorate the Nazi past in a 
differentiated and decentralized manner and 
the need to address the communist past. Other 
aspects of German history are also represented 
in public life, but have not had the same weight 
in terms of the politics of memory management. 
Thus, such topics as the loss of German lives 
during the First World War, the “expulsion” 
from East-Central Europe in 1944-46, and the 
bombing of cities are remembered through 
memorials and heritage activities. The most 
recent transformation of the politics of memory 
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has emerged with calls to remember the atroc-
ities of German colonialism and to repatriate 
artifacts and human remains to their places of 
origin. The fact that the memory of colonialism 
is beginning to change – some streets have been 
renamed, for example – is partly a reaction to 
global calls to address colonial and racist lega-
cies, but also to long-standing activist demands 
(by such groups as Berlin or Hamburg Postkolo-
nial).31 The grand project of rebuilding the Ber-
lin Palace in the center of the city and making it 
host to “ethnological collections”32 has moved 
the question of restitution and colonial heritage 
squarely into the spotlight. 
Officials in Germany so far seem to view the 
issue primarily through the lens of provenance 
research and returning stolen artifacts, rather 
than acknowledging the need for a fundamental 
rethinking of German history.33 Thus, in Janu-
ary 2019, a new Department for Cultural Goods 
and Collections from Colonial Contexts was 
created with in the German Lost Art Founda-
tion, with the mandate to support research and 
raise awareness about the colonial past.34
In addition to colonial memory, there have been efforts to commemorate Germany’s 
history of migration, with major museum pro-
jects in Friedland, Hamburg, Bremerhaven, and 
Cologne,35 and the history of social democracy 
and labor movements.36 With each memo-
ry-political issue arising, various actors seek 
to receive public funding and to lobby for their 
issue to be integrated into important historical 
institutions, above all the German Historical 
Museum in Berlin and the House of the History 
of the Federal Republic in Bonn. In sum, the 
German memory landscape and the institutions 
that govern it have been shaped strongly by the 
struggle over how to commemorate the two 
German dictatorships of the 20th century, but 
they must also contend with a growing plural-
ism of what is represented in public space.
Conclusion
The number of memorial sites has multiplied 
in Germany since 1989 and they attract millions 
of visitors every year. Accordingly, the manage-
ment of these sites, of related educational and 
research facilities, and of archives has become a 
policy field of crucial importance. It is charac-
terized by a complex web of policy instruments 
and responsible agencies and actors (federal, 
state and local, as well as governmental, civic 
and hybrid) that shape and fund public com-
memoration in a framework of written and 
unwritten rules. The governmental agencies 
that engage in memory management are careful 
to stress the principle of “remoteness from the 
state,” while memorial institutions and founda-
tions maintain their autonomy and the impor-
tance of civil society involvement in their work, 
leading to what I have termed “hybrid institu-
tional” arrangements. 
However, the state nevertheless intervenes 
through funding decisions that are based on cri-
teria such as “professionalism” and “historical 
groundedness,” that may exclude some advo-
cates for remembrance and shape how new-
comers (including those who demand reckoning 
with colonialism) can acquire state support. 
Leaders of German memorials have pointed 
out that they must continuously guard against 
increasing intervention from politics and bu-
reaucracy in order to maintain their decentral-
ized structure, their independence, and their 
creativity.37
A fundamental point about memory man-agement in the Federal Republic has been 
and continues to be the important role played by 
civil society and the basic openness of institu-
tions to its involvement. The strong reliance on 
civic associations and volunteers, however, also 
presents a challenge: the current generation 
of staff and volunteers is aging38 (along with 
survivors of both Holocaust and the communist 
repression). Despite funding increases, memori-
als are faced with insufficient and often precar-
ious employment structures, which cannot be 
compensated by activist enthusiasm. Funding 
needs are likely to increase: Archival collections 
are waiting to be digitized,39 testimony must be 
collected and archived, and the diversification 
of German society demands new educational 
programs. In the wake of the Covid-19 pandem-
ic, memorials will be faced with the dilemmas 













































development new modes for dissemination and 
outreach. Thus, while the memorial sectors is 
strongly supported in Germany, its future will 
certainly not be devoid of challenges. ● 
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and Contested  
Memory Regimes
Lithuania
ike other countries in the region and indeed 
throughout Europe, the past is used in Lithu-
ania as a critical resource in the on-
going task of nation building, and 
as a proxy sphere of contestation 
among various political interests. There is little 
that is new in this approach, which dates to 
the historicism of the nationalist movement of 
the late 19th century and continued throughout 
the various national and foreign occupational 
regimes that have been established on this ter-
ritory up to the present day.1
In order to characterize the structure and 
agency behind the production of memory in to-
day’s Lithuania, it is useful to draw on Bernhard 
and Kubik’s typology of ‘memory actors’ and 
the three ideal types of memory regimes: uni-
fied, pillarized and fractured. In a unified mem-
ory regime, there is one dominant interpreta-
tion that is not contested. In a pillarized regime, 
several contrasting interpretations co-exist; 
memory actors may debate but they accept that 
there can be different points of view.2
In Lithuania today, the memory regime is 
arguably fractured due to the prominence of 
‘memory warriors’ who cannot accept the dis-
crete validity of certain other interpretations of 
the past. The main point of contention concerns 
interpretations of WWII and the accent placed 
on the traumatic events that took place at the 
time, including the Holocaust under German 
occupation and the mass repression, deporta-
tions and collectivization that took place under 
the Soviet occupation.
The ongoing significance of these traumatic 
events is entangled with the loss of national 
sovereignty to the USSR during WWII (1940), 
followed by three years of German occupation 
from 1941 to 1944, and the Soviet re-conquest 
in 1945. Since the restoration of national 
sovereignty in 1991, the memory of WWII has 
evolved in tandem with various projects of 
nation building and identity politics.
F or example, in the spring of 2019, an aspir-ing politician demonstratively hammered 
down a commemorative plaque to the side of 
a building in the center of Vilnius. The plaque 
was dedicated to the anti-Soviet partisan 
fighter, Jonas Noreika (1910–1947), drawing 
attention to his role in the Holocaust. Revered 
by many for his defense of Lithuanian statehood 
during and after WWII, Noreika had indeed 
collaborated with the German occupation as 
the head of a local administration. A few hours 
later, several competing politicians appeared at 
the same spot, calling on Lithuanians to stand 
by heroes like Noreika who sacrificed his life 
for the sake of national independence. Since 


















































jects of nation 
building  
and identity  
politics.
never-ending saga of public manifestations and 
quarrels among groups with different perspec-
tives on the history of WWII and the future of 
the region.3 In addition, the motto of the Na-
tional Union party that ran for the Parliamenta-
ry elections this fall, Raise Your Head, Lithu-
anian! is the title of an anti-Semitic pamphlet 
published in 1933 by the same Noreika, in which 
he urged Lithuanians to ‘liberate themselves 
from economic slavery to the Jews.’
Since Lithuania regained its independence 
in 1991, national efforts to address the abuses 
of past occupational regimes have been largely 
centered on the Soviet period, with compar-
atively little attention given to the short, but 
brutal German occupation, and the murder 
of over 90% of Lithuania’s Jewish popula-
tion during the Holocaust. While transitional 
justice measures in post-Soviet Lithuania had 
to initially focus on the crimes of the outgoing 
and long-lasting Soviet regime, the German 
occupation of Lithuania from 1941–1944 makes 
it difficult to disentangle the legacy of Soviet 
and Nazi rule. 
The difficult task of balancing the relative 
attention given to one or the other period of 
foreign rule is the key challenge facing the two 
state-sponsored agents of memory: the Geno-
cide and Resistance Research Centre of Lithua-
nia (Lietuvos gyventojų genocido ir rezistencijos 
tyrimo centras, LGGRTC) and a supplementary 
platform that was established later – and largely 
under international pressure – in the frame-
work of Lithuania’s accession to the EU, the 
International Commission for the Evaluation 
of Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet Occupation 
Regimes in Lithuania. One could assert that the 
history of these two institutions – the LGGRTC 
and the Commission – mark two different 
periods of coming to terms with this difficult 
historical legacy. 
Two State Memory Institutions
The initial process of coming to terms with the 
past in the late 1980s was dominated by various 
non-state actors that coalesced under the wing 
of Sąjūdis, including the Freedom League of 
Lithuania and the Union of Political Prisoners 
and Deportees of Lithuania. These non-state 
groups publicized Soviet crimes through mass 
rallies, cultural events and independent press 
outlets such as Sąjūdžio žinios and Atgimimas, 
among others. 
They contributed to the creation of a power-
ful narrative about the “fighting and suffering” 
Lithuanian nation, with a focus on the mass 
deportations and repressions under Stalin and 
on the anti-Soviet resistance. Adopting the 
vocabulary used by the politically active Lith-
uanian diaspora in the West, mostly composed 
of the elites who had escaped from Lithuania 
before the arrival of Soviet troops, these non-
state actors started to use the term “genocide” 
to condemn Stalinist deportations and repres-
sions. This term later became part of a name 
used by a state-supported memory institution, 
the Genocide and Resistance Research Centre 
of Lithuania.
T he history education programs created by the LGGRTC have primarily targeted high 
school students. Since the 1990s, in cooperation 
with the Ministries of Defence and Education, 
the LGGRTC has organized a popular student 
contest called Lietuvos kovų už laisvę ir netekčių 
istorija (History of Lithuania’s struggles for 
freedom, armed forces and losses) during 
which students were invited to use writing 
and other creative talents to depict historical 
themes related to “national traumas” (that is, 
the Stalinist deportations and repression cam-
paigns) and the anti-Soviet war of resistance.
The LGGRTC has cooperated with several 
non-governmental organizations on memory 
issues and has worked with community groups 
such as Lemtis (Fate) on organizing joint edu-
cational events. Since the times of Sąjūdis (the 
late 1980s), groups interested in preserving the 
memories of Stalin-era deportations organized 
“expeditions” to the sites, took care of aban-
doned graveyards in Siberia and returned the 
remains of deportees to Lithuania. 
The LGGRTC has actively collaborated with 
the Union of Political Prisoners and Deportees 
of Lithuania to build monuments for anti-Sovi-
et resistance fighters, collect witness memoirs, 
and organize public commemorations. Some-






















the Union has embraced a dogmatic, almost re-
ligious, sense of history related to deportations 
and anti-Soviet resistance, while the LGGRTC 
has attempted to publish critically-oriented 
research on similar topics. 
Since around 2000 the LGGRTC has in-
creased its attention to the Holocaust, show-
ing a more active promotion of this traumatic 
memory. For example, the Museum of Genocide 
Victims, an annex to the LGGRTC, incorporat-
ed two sections devoted to the Holocaust and 
World War II. The LGGRTC sponsored the 
translation and publication of several Holocaust 
testimonies, such as Kazimierz Sakowicz’s Pon-
ary Diary (1941–1943), which documented the 
brutal killing of the Jews in Paneriai (Ponar), a 
town close to Vilnius. Genocidas ir rezistencija, 
an academic journal published by the LGGRTC, 
has also devoted more attention to the Holo-
caust, especially in the Lithuanian provinces, 
and Lithuanian participation in it (as perpetra-
tors, not only savers of the victims). 
The LGGRTC also integrated Holocaust-re-lated materials into teacher education 
programs focused on the anti-Soviet partisan 
war of resistance and related themes, such as 
partisan publications and everyday life dur-
ing the struggle. However, many aspects of 
the anti-Soviet resistance have been omitted, 
particularly certain repressive measures against 
those Lithuanians who were termed collabo-
rators with the Soviet regime, the fate of the 
guerrilla members who survived the battle, the 
involvement of some of the anti-Soviet fighters 
in the Holocaust, or the fate of the guerrillas 
who survived deportation and returned to Lith-
uania. These omissions seem to perpetuate a 
rather simplified and de-contextualized picture 
of resistance as a timeless, heroic struggle, “for-
getting” about the moral dilemmas it entailed, 
the perspective of non-combatants and the in-
tra-communal tensions that are part and parcel 
of the war of resistance and its aftermath.
Still, the LGGRTC has arguably become more 
active in addressing the Holocaust and the 
multiple historical traumas that occurred in 
Lithuania during WWII, rather than maintain-
ing a selective focus on the Soviet past, thereby 
contributing to the historical truth-finding as-
sociated with transitional justice. Nevertheless, 
the LGGRTC comes under frequent criticism 
by parties who feel that it is biased and that the 
balance has not yet been restored.
The International Commission for the 
Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and Soviet 
Occupation Regimes in Lithuania was formed 
by President Valdas Adamkus on September 7, 
1998. Whereas the LGGRTC emerged in the 
context of the movement against Soviet rule, 
the Commission emerged in the context of Lith-
uania’s attempts at political, social and cultural 
integration with Europe. 
The Lithuanian Commission was formed at 
the same time as analogous presidential com-
The International Commission for the Evaluation of the Crimes of the Nazi and 
Soviet Occupation Regimes in Lithuania initiates the commemoration of the 













































missions in Latvia and Estonia – part of a joint 
Baltic strategy of pursuing memory politics 
and attempts to establish transitional justice. 
Towards the end of the 1990s, recurrent contro-
versies and intense criticism by Western state 
actors and organizations over issues of histor-
ical accountability with respect to the Holo-
caust were perceived as obstacles to further 
integration into the European Union and the 
broader international community. As such, the 
establishment of the presidential commissions 
was “a conscious effort by the states to mediate 
in this conflict and to facilitate a reconciliation 
of interpretive and mnemonic divisions within 
and beyond their borders.”4 
While the aims of the International Histori-
cal Commission are similar to those of the LG-
GRTC (establishing the truth about the crimes 
of totalitarian regimes, commemorating the vic-
tims, educating the population), the structure of 
the Commission ensures that the Holocaust in 
Lithuania receives as much attention as Soviet 
crimes. The first members of the Commission 
were equally divided between Lithuanian and 
international scholars, including Jewish histo-
rians from Israel, the United Kingdom and the 
United States.
The Commission is divided into two 
sub-commissions – one for the Soviet occupa-
tions and one for the Nazi occupation – intend-
ed “to clearly distinguish between the crimes 
committed by the two occupational regimes and 
to avoid superficial analogies during their anal-
ysis and evaluation.”5 The sub-commission on 
the Nazi occupation published three volumes 
and several studies, and the sub-commission on 
the Soviet occupation published six volumes. 
At the April 2005 meeting of the Commission, 
its members agreed to continue research on the 
Holocaust and the Stalinist phase of the second 
Soviet occupation (1945–1953). However, the 
Commission’s work was quickly enveloped in 
controversy resulting from an investigation 
launched by Lithuania’s Prosecutor’s Office into 
crimes against humanity allegedly committed 
by a Jewish Soviet partisan unit on Lithuanian 
territory in January 1944. Given Lithuania’s 
perceived reluctance to prosecute collabora-
tors with the Nazi regime, the Prosecutor’s 
activism in questioning Itzhak Arad, an Israeli 
historian of Lithuanian origin and a Holocaust 
survivor who was also a member of the Com-
mission, caused an international furore. The 
investigation was dropped in 2008 due to lack 
of evidence, but the scandal resulted in a long 
hiatus in the truth-finding work of the Commis-
sion, even as established educational programs 
(described below) continued unabated.
The Commission was formally reinstated 
in August 2012 by a presidential decree that 
appointed new researchers to the two sub-com-
missions. The first sub-commission includes 
two representatives of the Israel-based Yad 
Vashem organization (Dina Porat and Arkadiy 
Zeltser), Andrew Baker of the American Jewish 
Committee, Saulius Sužiedėlis of Millersville 
University and Kęstutis Girnius of Vilnius Uni-
versity. The second sub-commission on Soviet 
crimes includes Alexander Daniel of the Rus-
sia-based Memorial organization, Nicolas Lane 
of the American Jewish Committee, Timothy 
Snyder from Yale University, Françoise Thomas 
from Sorbonne University, Hungarian histori-
an Janos M. Rainer and Arvydas Anušauskas, 
chairman of the Seimas Committee on National 
Security and Defense.
T he Commission is yet to resume a sig-nificant level of historical investigation. 
According to Lithuanian Holocaust histori-
an, Arūnas Bubnys, who was commissioned 
to conduct research on the Holocaust in the 
Lithuanian provinces, the Commission lacks 
funding and perhaps even the administra-
tive will to embark on an ambitious research, 
publication and publicity program. Instead, the 
Vilnius State Gaon Jewish Museum has gained 
recognition for its publications and discus-
sions on the Holocaust. Ronaldas Račinskas, 
the Commission’s executive director, admitted 
that the state-funded organization “works like 
a non-government organization,” with project 
funding coming almost exclusively from the 
European Union and other grants.6
Perhaps the Commission’s most palpable 
contribution are educational programs that are 
administratively separate from its historical 






















albeit rather humble, funding from external 
sources and have continued without interrup-
tion. In 2002, the Commission was tasked with 
implementing broad-based programs designed 
to inform young people about the crimes of 
the totalitarian regimes, as part of Lithuania’s 
membership of the Task Force for International 
Cooperation on Holocaust Education, Remem-
brance and Research, recently renamed the 
International Holocaust Remembrance Alliance. 
In 2003, the Commission established a 
special program on tolerance education called 
Teaching about the Crimes of Totalitarian Re-
gimes, Prevention of Crimes against Humanity 
and Tolerance Education. The program, imple-
mented in schools across the country, includes 
a) developing a tolerance education network; b) 
training secondary school teachers; c) pre-
paring a comprehensive national curriculum; 
and d) initiating and coordinating secondary 
school project activities. Thus far, the Tolerance 
Education Network has established 46 Toler-
ance Education Centers (TECs) at secondary 
schools, non-governmental organizations 
and museums in eight administrative units of 
Lithuania.
The Commission is currently developing a 
Comprehensive National Curriculum compris-
ing an educational program, pedagogical and 
methodological publications, a list of recom-
mended historical and fictional literature, and 
visual materials (posters, maps, documentary 
and feature films). It also provides some sup-
port to schools, non-governmental organiza-
tions, museums and other groups seeking to 
initiate their own tolerance education projects 
with information and consultations on the 
preparation, fundraising and implementation of 
projects. To date, the Commission has assist-
ed over 1,500 teachers at secondary schools 
involved in tolerance-oriented education 
activities.
The TECs provide educational modules for 
use in various school subjects, organize sem-
inars on human rights and historical themes, 
and commemorate the victims of totalitarian 
regimes. This includes field trips for students to 
maintain and visit local monuments and graves. 
Teacher training activities aim to create expe-
rienced and trained professionals. Translations 
of foreign language works, including classical 
texts such as The Diary of Anne Frank, were 
also made available to pre-university students 
through TEC outreach. 
Criticism, Debates and other  
Viewpoints
The operations of the LGGRTC and the Com-
mission and their influence on the production 
of memory in Lithuania have come under 
frequent criticism and debate.
With regard to their impact on education, 
Christine Beresniova’s study of six common-
ly used textbooks published from 1998–2009 
highlighted several key themes: resistance and 
the fight for independence; victimization of the 
nation; and the culpability of (primarily) the Na-
zis in carrying out the Holocaust on Lithuanian 
soil. She revealed a highly simplified, glorified 
and romantic portrayal of Lithuanian resistance 
movements, particularly the Lithuanian Activist 
Front (LAF). The texts ignored the anti-Semitic 
rhetoric of the LAF leadership and the collabo-
ration with the Nazi powers, creating the false 
impression that all Lithuanians had resisted the 
Nazi occupation. The suffering of the Lithua-
nian nation, defined in historical, linguistic and 
ethnic terms, received the most detailed and 
emotional coverage, while the Holocaust was 
described in a distant and abstract manner. Most 
but not all textbooks discussed the participation 
of Lithuanians in the Holocaust, but only par-
tially addressed issues of personal responsibility, 
empathy, tolerance and human rights.7
In the years before the LGGRTC increased 
its focus on the Holocaust, the use of the term 
‘genocide’ to refer exclusively to Soviet crimes 
caused a great deal of confusion and consterna-
tion, particularly among visitors to the muse-
um. However, even after the LGGRTC brought 
some balance to its focus, critics allege that it is 
reluctant to confront the legacy of Nazi collab-
oration and the participation of Lithuanians in 
the Holocaust.
Efraim Zuroff, of the Simon Wiesenthal 
Centre, has long criticized the LGGRTC and 
the Lithuanian government for failing to 
prosecute Holocaust perpetrators. He and 
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other like-minded critics such as Dovid Katz 
(defendinghistory.com) argue that the attempt 
of the LGGRTC and the Commission to develop 
a balanced approach to the crimes of the Nazi 
and Soviet totalitarian regimes are little more 
than a state-sanctioned effort to whitewash the 
role of Lithuanians in the Holocaust.8 A similar 
argument is presented in a recent book written 
by the political scientist, Jelena Subotić.9
O n a more personal and grassroots activist level, Grant Gnochin, an American of 
South African origin, who lost many relatives 
to the Holocaust in Lithuania, launched a court 
case against the LGGRTC, challenging a report 
made by the centre in 2015 which concluded that 
the above-mentioned anti-Soviet partisan Jonas 
Noreika was not involved in the mass murder of 
Jews. Gnochin has teamed up with Sylvia Foti, 
the American granddaughter of Noreika, to pub-
licly denounce his heroization and raise aware-
ness of his involvement in the Holocaust.10
While it is recognized that Noreika, as the 
German-appointed chief of the Šiauliai district, 
signed orders establishing a ghetto for the local 
Jewish population and expropriating their 
property, the report of the LGGRTC phrased its 
conclusions in a manner that appears intended 
to relieve Noreika of any responsibility for his 
action, as he was acting on the orders of the 
German authorities. Specifically, it states that 
while the Nazis “succeeded in involving him in 
handling the affairs connected to the isolation 
of Jews, he “did not take part in mass extermi-
nation operations against Jews in the districts 
of Telšiai and Šiauliai during the German 
occupation.”11
Gnochin’s lawsuit was rejected on adminis-
trative grounds and the court refused to order 
the LGGRTC to conduct more research and 
revise its conclusions. Although the LGGRTC 
was sharply criticized by professional Lithu-
anian historians for its sophistry on Noreika’s 
wartime record, and while some mainstream 
Lithuanian politicians have taken measures 
to remove monuments honoring Nazi collab-
orators, the political and administrative elites 
appear reluctant to take any decisive action that 
would challenge the status of any anti-Soviet 
activists. The plaque to Noreika was restored 
and stands to this day.12
Significant popular polemics were ignited 
by the publication of a book called Our People 
(Mūsiškiai) by Lithuanian author, Rūta Van-
agaitė. Vanagaitė’s book featured testimonies 
from Soviet trials of Holocaust perpetrators 
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and she wrote her account from the perspec-
tive of a descendant of Nazi collaborators. Her 
polemical style and scathing critique of official 
and social indifference to the legacy of the 
Holocaust had a strong impact on the public. 
Her books were scandalously withdrawn from 
public circulation in 2018 by her publisher 
after she made (by her own admission) a false 
comment about a famous anti-Soviet partisan 
that many found offensive. In 2020, Vanagaitė 
returned to the public stage in Lithuania with 
the publication of a new book on the Holocaust, 
together with German historian, Christopher 
Dieckmann.13
Despite the controversies swirling around 
controversial figures like Noreika and the 
uncomfortable legacy of collaboration, academ-
ic research and debate over the most difficult 
moments of Lithuania’s past continue. The 
archives are freely accessible and the ‘special 
collections’ libraries have many files that were 
classified under the Soviet regime. Moreover, 
they are increasingly digitized and easy to find 
remotely. Files can be requested from abroad 
and, for a small fee, copies will be made and 
delivered. Hopefully, this accessibility and the 
continuous, albeit not always easy, debate will 
help Lithuanians fill in the blank spots of this  
still painful and complicated historical legacy. ● 
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to a ‘struggle 
for historical 
truth.’
distinctive feature of the Belaru-
sian case is the exceptional sta-
bility of the political situation 
in post-communist transfor-
mations (events August 2020, however, casts 
doubt on this thesis). Since the relatively short 
transition period from 1991–1994, the country’s 
presidential office still belongs to Aliaksandr 
Lukashenka. This has resulted in an excessive 
and even exaggerated level of state control over 
the politics of memory. The main institutions 
for the production of historical knowledge 
are subordinate to the state, which appoints 
loyal rectors and directors who implement the 
occasional ideological cleansing of ordinary 
employees.
In 1991, the independent Republic of Belarus 
inherited the main institutions of science and 
education from the Soviet Union. The research 
work was organized through the centralized 
system of the Academy of Sciences of the BSSR 
(which later became the National Academy of 
Sciences of Belarus) divided into specialized 
institutes with the Institute of History being 
responsible for historical knowledge. The Min-
istry of Education controls secondary and high-
er education. In the 1990s, private universities 
(though subject to state licensing) were created 
as an alternative, and many state universities 
also achieved a certain degree of autonomy. 
However, along with the centralization of pow-
er driven by Lukashenka, this sphere was also 
regulated, primarily through the establishment 
of a procedure for rectors’ appointments by the 
president, which significantly narrowed the 
possibilities for the universities’ autonomy.
T he introduction of administrative control was largely attributable to a ‘struggle for 
historical truth.’ In the early 1990s Belarusian 
historical science was defined by a national 
narrative that was distinctive to Central and 
Eastern Europe and which glorified the heroic 






















Duchy of Lithuania), followed by a long period 
of national oppression. The national concept 
of history was largely based on the Soviet 
Marxist historiographical tradition, only this 
time, the priority shifted towards the search for 
Belarusian statehood and ethnicity in history, 
the creation of a long genealogical line of the 
national state as a foundation for the formation 
of national identity. The emphasis on the Euro-
pean character of Belarusian history also meant 
the ultimate distancing from Russia (which was 
implicitly given the status of an Asian state). In 
fact, an anti-colonial revision of the past took 
place. However, after being elected in 1994, the 
country’s President Aliaksandr Lukashenka 
(who remains president to this day) set the 
priorities of historical policy as follows: ori-
entation towards integration with Russia and 
a positive image of the Soviet past as a tool for 
mobilizing political support among the masses. 
The national narrative highlighted the con-
stant wars with the Russian state, which were 
associated with barbarism and slavery, while 
the Grand Duchy of Lithuania was seen as a 
tolerant state governed by the rule of law, a part 
of the European cultural and political space. At 
the same time, in the state’s version of history, 
the cultural unity of the Russian Orthodox 
civilization that had been subjected to oppres-
sion and the forced Polonization in the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania and the Polish-Lithuanian 
Commonwealth, were more important. For the 
national narrative, the rebirth of national state-
hood resulted from the activities of national 
revival representatives who created the Bela-
rusian People’s Republic in 1918, which ceased 
to exist after a short period while it was under 
pressure from the Soviet and Polish states. 
The BNR was not recognized by other states 
but the attempt to create its own state was of 
great symbolic significance. The Soviet period 
is initially associated with mass repression 
against virtually the entire national democratic 
intelligentsia. The state narrative, however, 
exclusively views the Soviet period in a positive 
vein, with the greatest importance attributed to 
the Great Patriotic War as an exceptional event 
in which Belarusians suffered heavy losses but 
demonstrated supreme heroism. In this para-
digm, the independent Belarusian state is to be 
Museum of the 















































declared the legal successor of the Soviet peri-
od, the heritor of the traditions of social justice 
and military heroism. The Belarusian people’s 
act of bravery in the Great Patriotic War is 
becoming the main source of legitimacy for the 
president as the main keeper of the memory, 
while his political opponents are consistently 
associated with collaborators and adherents of 
Nazism.
A s already noted, the most important fea-ture of the entire period of Lukashenka’s 
rule is the establishment of ideological control 
over the sphere of historical knowledge produc-
tion. The rewriting of school history textbooks 
was initially carried out in 1996, followed by the 
revision of university textbooks. The next wave 
was ‘cleansing’ state institutions of politically 
unreliable teachers and researchers. Histori-
ans who dared to publicly criticize the ruling 
regime were dismissed with a ‘ban from the 
profession,’ meaning they would be unable to 
find employment in public research institutes 
and universities. Most of them were forced to 
emigrate or leave the scientific and research 
field.
 ‘Inconvenient’ research topics which – in 
the opinion of the officials dealing with history 
– should not be addressed, have also been 
outlined. These comprise the Stalinist repres-
sion and aspects of the Great Patriotic War that 
do not fit into the heroic and sacrificial pattern 
(any criticism of the partisan movement is 
taken extremely painfully). For example, the 
Higher Attestation Commission did not allow 
Iryna Kashtalian to defend her dissertation on 
everyday life in the era of late Stalinism. The 
regulation of these zones also affects access to 
the archives. Thus, even though archive files 
are to be declassified after 75 years according to 
the law, an important archive like the archive 
of the State Security Committee (KGB) remains 
closed to outside researchers. The only way to 
gain access to the cases of former political pris-
oners is by being one of their direct descend-
ants. However, for historians, this virtually 
denies them the opportunity to fully investigate 
such topics as Stalinist repression. Some schol-
ars have started turning to the archives of other 
countries, primarily Ukraine, in which the Sovi-
et service archives are available to researchers.
A set of restrictive and repressive measures 
have led to the establishment of an ideological 
division in the historical environment into 
‘national and court historians,’ according to 
Rainer Lindner’s apt definition. In fact, in many 
respects this division remains, although the 
situation was not and is not black and white. 
Despite all the cleansing and disciplinary 
measures, the creation of historical institutions 
that were ideologically loyal to Lukashenka was 
a failure. The authorities are forced to rely on 
loyal officials, while most of the time, ordinary 
historians openly support the national narra-
tive.
However, leaving state institutions is a 
heavy blow for historians since resources in 
the independent field are extremely limited. 
External support (through Western funds and 
scholarship programs) has become one of the 
major sources of historical knowledge renewal 
after a long period of control by the Communist 
Party. In the 1990s, the Soros Foundation and 
its Polish branch, the Stefan Batory Founda-
tion, ACLS and some other institutions were 
actively working in Belarus. While authoritari-
an trends strengthened in the late 1990s, many 
independent historical institutions (initially 
journals) began receiving external aid through 
civil society support in Belarus. The turn of 
the 2000s represented the peak of external 
infusions, which made it possible to support the 
publication of magazines and the arrangement 
of various conferences. A significant trend that 
greatly influenced the reformation of the entire 
field of independent history was the sharp 
reduction in funds allocated to support civil so-
ciety in Belarus after 2010. In fact, this resulted 
in a sharp decline in research and publication 
activity, during which time independent histor-
ical journals either disappeared or drastically 
reduced their periodicity.
N evertheless, there has been an important exception in terms of external support. 
This refers to the long-term and purposeful 
humanitarian policy of Poland, which organizes 






















professional historians and other humanities 
scholars (the program of the Polish Govern-
ment for young scientists, the Mianowski Fund, 
etc.). Unlike the scholarship programs in other 
countries, historians have always enjoyed 
unconditional priority here. This resulted in a 
situation in which most of the active Belaru-
sian historians participated in one of the Polish 
scholarship programs (the virtual absence of a 
language barrier further facilitates this). This 
was one of the important factors that promoted 
a positive change in the Belarusian national 
narrative towards the period of the Polish-Lith-
uanian Commonwealth. In the early 1920s, 
Poles, along with Russians, were perceived as 
being the main enemies of Belarusian state-
hood, and the reaction to the Polonization 
of local elites from the sixteenth to the 18th 
centuries was particularly sharp. However, the 
established contacts with Polish historians and 
the acquaintance with Polish historiography 
significantly softened these hostile intonations. 
F or a certain period, the European Human-ities University became one of the main 
centers for independent historians. During the 
first period of the university’s existence, history 
was not one of the priorities of this education-
al institution. However, after the university’s 
closure in Belarus for political reasons and its 
forced migration to Lithuania in 2005, a depart-
ment of history was opened. The EHU succeed-
ed in bringing together prominent Belarusian 
historians who had been dismissed from state 
institutions, and two important journals were 
published (the Belarusian Historical Review 
and Homo Historicus). However, the university 
gradually started being torn apart by internal 
conflicts between staff and administration, as 
well as problems arising from the recruitment 
of students to the department of history. As a 
result, this center of independent historical life 
is gradually fading away.
The ‘Historical Workshop,’ a small institu-
tion created jointly by Germany and Belarus, 
remains the only island of relative prosperity in 
terms of external funding. Its range of topics is 
limited to the Second World War, with forced 
labor and the Holocaust being the priori-
ties. The ‘Historical Workshop’ was actively 
involved in the creation of the Trastianets 
Memorial (the location where many Belarusian 
Jews and Jews interned from Europe were 
executed) and is focused on various educational 
projects, again highlighting the prevalence of 
public history.
Another important attempt to create in-
stitutional support for Belarusian historians 
is the formation of the Center for Belarusian 
Studies at the University of Warsaw. Most of the 
Center’s employees are also Belarusian histori-
ans who were dismissed from state institutions. 
The Center holds conferences, publishes its 
own magazine, but has unfortunately dropped 
out of Belarusian intellectual life.
In general, Belarusian historical science 
remains extremely isolated from the interna-
tional academy. This has been influenced by 
a combination of factors: a deliberately isola-
tionist policy by the institution’s administra-
tion, a lack of international exchange, as well 
as poor knowledge of foreign languages (with 
the exception of Polish). In most cases, Belaru-
sian historians only attend conferences in the 
neighboring countries and their publications 
are hardly known outside the region.
Thus, the resources for an independent 
historical field are extremely limited. When it 
comes to academic research, it virtually doesn’t 
exist.
At the same time, a transition has taken place 
towards working with a mass audience. A 
change in the publishing policy of the ARCHE 
magazine which, at the beginning of the 2000s, 
was primarily of a politological nature, became 
a certain kind of marker. The reduction in grant 
support for democratization programs resulted 
in the magazine being forced to increase its fo-
cus on public demands, which virtually trans-
formed it into a history magazine in the second 
half of the 2000s. The themes of the books 
published by ARCHE also shifted to the field of 
history, which, according to the editor Valer Bul-
hakau, was due to the readers’ demands. At the 
same time, the magazine retained a high-quality 
professional level in its publications.
The creation of the Our History magazine, 





















































evidenced the beginning of a new era. It was a 
completely new format for Belarus, a monthly 
magazine published on glossy paper, well-de-
signed and aimed at a wide audience (with 
a circulation of around 5000). Professional 
historians like working with the publication 
and while articles are written in a popular 
style, the principles of scientificity have been 
preserved. The magazine remains commit-
ted to the national historical narrative with a 
notable shift to the history of the 20th century, 
which is of greater interest to the audience. At 
the same time, the harsh anti-Soviet rhetoric 
distinctive of the early 1990s has been rejected. 
The unconditional success of this publication 
resulted in the ARCHE magazine beginning to 
focus on the same popular format, meaning that 
another resource for historical publications of 
an academic nature disappeared.
In the early 2000s, a thesis on two alternative cultural spaces existing in Belarus became 
popular. Indeed, the sphere of non-govern-
mental organizations had lined up and the 
independent media had gained popularity. 
However, in the historical sphere, the initiative 
to build alternative institutions virtually failed 
as the few centers and institutions that existed 
were closed every now and again running a 
fever from the lack of funding. Informal courses 
with a historical component (the Belarusian 
Collegium, the Flying University) also failed to 
provide a high-quality alternative to traditional 
universities and faced the same problems of 
funding shortage and difficulty in transitioning 
to self-financing. With external grant support 
gradually diminishing, civil society in Belarus 
made the painful switch to internal support 
resources, of which crowdfunding became the 
basic mechanism. However, this significantly 
impacted historical knowledge production: an 
orientation towards mass readership began to 
dominate, long-term research projects virtually 
ceased, and public history replaced academic 
history.
Meanwhile, important changes were also 
taking place in the state’s historical policy. In 
the early 2000s, Lukashenka switched from 
unconditional loyalty to Russia to an attempt to 
create a Belarusian state ideology committed 
to sovereignty and internal legitimacy building. 
This culminated in an important change in the 
state’s historical narrative which by inertia was 
not noticed by all experts. Prior to this change, 
the eras of Kievan Rus and the Grand Duchy of 
Lithuania were considered through the para-
digm of the unity of East Slavic peoples. How-
ever, this approach has been replaced by a ‘long-
term genealogy’ that views the past through the 
consistent formation of Belarusian statehood. 
Within such a model, the Principality of Polatsk 
acquires the features of an independent state, 
emphasizing the predominance of the ethnic 
Belarusian element in the history of the Grand 
Duchy of Lithuania.
I t cannot be said that the Belarusian au-thorities have simply adapted the national 
narrative of the early 1990s, although the appeal 
to medieval statehood is its most important 
element. The fundamental difference is that the 
national narrative is built around the concept of 
nation, which drastically increases the signif-
icance of such components as a revival of the 
native language, the cult of national leaders 
(prominent enlightenment figures), a sharp 
contrast to and separation from hostile neigh-
bors, in opposition to whom the national iden-
tity is built. The official Belarusian historical 
narrative is based on the statist version in which 
territory and the continuity of state institutions 
is of the greatest importance. The question of 
language then becomes secondary, enlighteners 
are replaced by public officials (from princes 
to the leadership of the Belarusian Communist 
Party), and the desire to erase and retouch the 
conflicting pages of historical relations with 
neighbors becomes greatly noticeable.
This narrative shift took place due to the 
combination of two groups of factors. Firstly, af-
ter the ‘Crimean spring’ of 2014, tensions in Be-
larus-Russian relations have been growing and 
the authorities have started paying significantly 
more attention to the symbolic space and the 
humanitarian sphere. Thus, the ‘ribbon of Saint 
George’ was virtually banned, the ‘Immortal 
Regiment’ initiative was marginalized – i.e. the 






























Patriotic War initiated in Russia are negatively 
perceived by the Belarusian authorities as a 
means of soft power to create a common cultur-
al and political space. What was once perceived 
as appropriate is now becoming suspicious. At 
the same time, there appears to be a need for a 
stronger version of national identity compared 
to the one constructed before, and this requires 
an integrative historical narrative. The previous 
version of historical memory based exclusively 
on the victory in the Great Patriotic War no 
longer meets the new requirements since it 
anchors Belarus in the post-Soviet space, in the 
zone of immediate Russian influence. Referenc-
es to the Early Middle Ages borrowed from the 
national narrative resemble a fair compromise 
that would not irritate Russia and at the same 
time have the potential for building a historical 
memory that would distinguish Belarusians 
from their eastern neighbors.
The government’s request for an update of 
the national narrative revealed certain contra-
dictions among existing historical institutions. 
This time, the conflict was not ideological like 
it was in the 1990s but lay in the struggle for 
symbolic capital and resources. A question was 
raised regarding who should build a new ver-
sion of Belarusian history, i.e. publicly present 
it, and influence the main channels of histori-
cal knowledge translation, primarily through 
school and university education. In fact, a 
struggle regarding who would be responsible 
for determining the curricula of educational 
courses and the content of textbooks – the 
Academy of Sciences’ Institute of History or 
university teachers (primarily from the Belaru-
sian State University) – had been there before. 
Since universities are directly subordinate to 
the Ministry of Education, which is responsible 
for school curricula, it is quite predictable that 
academic scientists were virtually pushed out of 
the resource of school and university education.
T he interest group for the Institute of His-tory is headed by Aliaksandr Kavalenya. 
Having served as the Director of the Institute 
from 2004–2010, he is currently the Academi-
cian-Secretary of the humanitarian section at 
the Academy of Sciences. Back in 2011, under 
his auspices, the concept of Belarusian state-
hood was created. According to the concept, 
the centuries-old history of statehood leans on 
two inextricably linked forms: historical and 
national. Historical forms of statehood refer to 
the territory of Belarus, but in the 20th centu-
ry, were transformed into a national form of 
statehood incorporating the national content of 
the title ethnic group. It is difficult to find any 
theoretical and methodological meaningfulness 
in this concept. Of greater importance is the 
fact that a public appeal was made to create a 
unitary and integrative concept of the country’s 
history with an emphasis on statehood. And, in 
line with Hegel’s dialectic of spirit, the entire 
history acquires significance as an evolution-
ary development with the modern Republic of 
Belarus at its peak. The first revision of the His-
tory of Belarusian Statehood was published in 
2011–2012 and covered the period from the end 
of the 18th century to the present day. In 2018, 
this project gained a much wider scope and the 
first volumes of the planned five-volume edition 
began to appear. The history of Belarusian 
statehood became millennial, though judging by 
the content of the first volume, it actually starts 
in the Stone Age. Essentially, it was a claim 
to power and control over all the historical 
resources available to the state which, naturally, 
sparked a response from the university campus.
This campus also acquired its vibrant leader, 
Ihar Marzalyuk, a historian from the University 
of Mahiliou (it is important to highlight that 
this is Alexander Lukashenka’s alma mater). 
Marzalyuk, who began his career as one of 
the leaders of the national democratic move-
ment in Mahiliou in the early 1990s, gradually 
became the main apologist for Lukashenka in 
the historical environment, which earned him 
a senatorial seat. He managed to surround him-
self with associates who gradually took rector 
positions in the leading Belarusian universities 
(Belarusian State University, the universities 
of Hrodna and Mahiliou). It may seem para-
doxical, but nothing better than the History of 
Belarusian Statehood (sic!) was proposed as an 
alternative to the project at the Institute of His-
tory. However, in this particular case, the stake 
was immediately placed on the control over 
One way 
or another, 




















































education. Thus, at the end of 2018, a task force 
for developing an appropriate university course 
was created under the Ministry of Education. 
It has been planned that the new course will 
be lectured at all universities in the country. At 
this point, a textbook on the history of Belaru-
sian statehood has only been announced. At the 
same time, it is difficult to find any conceptual 
differences between the two projects. Instead, 
there is a clan struggle for the distribution of re-
sources. After the degradation of state ideology, 
there was a new request from Lukashenka for 
a version of history that would revolve around 
the overarching values of the Belarusian state. 
And, as in the case of Belarusian ideology, the 
state demand has triggered a struggle for dis-
tribution and control, primarily in the field of 
education.
W hile Belarusian historical science is being isolated from the international 
academy (as previously mentioned), the trends 
in historical policy are different. Possibilities of 
transferring institutions for the regulation of 
historical knowledge that exist in neighboring 
countries are regularly discussed in the Belaru-
sian context. The topic of the fight against the 
falsification of history, which is routinely men-
tioned in official sources and in the speeches of 
Lukashenka, was borrowed from the Russian 
environment. However, it never came to the 
initiative of creating a commission to combat 
falsification, as per the Russian example. Natu-
rally, the Institute of Historical Memory, which 
is well known in Belarus for its Polish and 
Ukrainian examples, appears to be a convenient 
model for regulating history in the public space. 
In 2018, the aforementioned Igor Marzalyuk 
also advanced the idea of creating a similar 
institution in Belarus in order to track the 
historical policy of neighbors and opponents, 
as well as to promptly respond to attempts to 
falsify and distort the history of Belarus. Pre-
dictably, the Academy of Sciences’ Institute of 
History opposed this initiative, rightly believing 
that the creation of such an institution would 
further weaken its public position and lead to 
the strengthening of Marzalyuk’s camp. 
One way or another, there are no centralized 
institutions for the implementation of his-
torical policy in Belarus. The main reason for 
this is not about keeping a balance but is about 
the extraordinary degree of regulation of the 
academic (and public) space in Belarus. In such 
situations, special institutions seem excessive.
Conclusion
Among the countries in the region, a distinctive 
feature of Belarus is the enormous degree of 
state control over the production of histori-
cal knowledge. This is achieved through the 
preservation of Soviet institutional forms (the 
Institute of History, state universities). This en-
ables the easy production and dissemination of 
the type of historical knowledge that is tailored 
to Lukashenka’s political interests. Critical 
voices are being pushed out of the state-con-
trolled field into a space in which resources are 
extremely limited. An important trend in recent 
years is the growth of self-organization in Bela-
rusian society, which makes it possible to create 
new forms of  historical knowledge production 
in which the national narrative is reborn as new 
commercial and popular forms. ●
Note: This study has been conducted as part of 
the Research project “Religion in post-Soviet 
Nation-building: Official Mediations and Grass-
roots’ Accounts in Belarus” (61/2017), supported 
























Memory Nodes  








n Ukraine, several topics have become 
the focus of memory politics since the 
end of the 1980s and have remained the 
focal points of memory until now. These 
topics have become memory nodes that have 
triggered discussions, disputes and tensions in 
Ukrainian society. At the same time, they have 
united masses of people into a group that finds 
meaning in these memories and builds national 
identity around them. To put it briefly, these 
memory nodes have a great potential to mobi-
lize people who are both for and against certain 
ideas and political agendas. These memory 
nodes include Holodomor (which means delib-
erate death by hunger in Ukrainian and refers to 
the famine of 1932–1933 in Ukraine), the Second 
World War, the attempts at state building in 
1917–1921, as well as the Soviet repressions 
(especially in connection with the Great Purge 
of 1937). Since 2014, two new memory nodes 
have been formed: the memory of the Euro-
maidan protests (which are referred to as the 
Revolution of Dignity in memory space) and the 
memory of the fallen soldiers of the ongoing 
military conflict in Donbas. 
T here are common characteristics to all the topics of memory politics that developed 
between 1991 and 2014. They all function as 
“chosen traumas”1 and most of them are ad-
dressed because they were tabooed or disfig-
ured by the official Soviet historical narrative.2 
This approach to memory that was silenced by 
the Soviet regime largely defines the post-colo-
nial character of memory work, i.e. memory is 
framed as a liberation project by a society that 
claims its right to tell its own history.3 Another 
important common feature of these memo-
ries is the fact that the forms of remembrance 
of these historical events were shaped by the 
diaspora of politically- active émigrés who very 
often had direct memories of the events and 
transmitted them as communicative memories 













































Memory Nodes  
Loaded with Potential  
to Mobilize People
memories developed in the diaspora functioned 
as molds into which the cultural memory of 
the nation had been fused when they entered  
Ukrainian terrain in the late 1980s/beginning 
of the 1990s.4 All these memories also share the 
fact that the active memory work directed at 
them was initiated in the public space by non-
state agents. Most often, it was non-governmen-
tal organizations, intellectuals, groups of former 
political prisoners, local activists and amateur 
historians who took up the historical narratives 
that had been silenced during the Soviet regime 
and promoted them as memory events. In the 
beginning, they initiated the building of monu-
ments and organized regular commemorations 
on a grassroots level. Later, the state authorities 
joined these initiatives and supported them 
through legislative provisions, which strength-
ened the status of these memories nationally. In 
this report, I will present some of the “hottest” 
topics in the memory politics of Ukraine and 
discuss the main approaches taken by memory 
actors to deal with these topics. 
Holodomor as an Historical  
Event and Memory 
The famine of 1932–1933 can be regarded as 
the main memory node in Ukrainian memory 
politics.5 Thematically it is connected to the 
memory of Soviet repression but because of 
the distinguished features of this memory and 
because it is one of the main building blocks of 
national identity, Holodomor should be dis-
cussed separately. 
In 1932–1933 the famine claimed around 
four million lives in the Ukrainian Republic.6 
The famine was the result of state-led policies 
that included increased grain requisitions, the 
confiscation of grain reserves, restrictions on 
people’s movement to other parts of the coun-
try, as well as the refusal to provide state aid. 
Researchers explain these policies in line with 
the state’s politics of collectivization and as de-
liberate actions against the Ukrainian peasantry 
who unsettled a series of rebellions against 
the state in the decades preceding the fam-
ine.7 During the Soviet regime the famine was 
mainly silenced. If it was mentioned, it was only 
regarded as the outcome of the unlucky play of 
natural forces. At the end of the 1980s, when, 
as a result of the Soviet politics of glasnost, it 
became possible to address historical issues 
that had previously been taboo, the theme of 
the famine resurfaced in the public space. The 
main memory agents interested in the topic 
were intellectuals who became politically active 
when Ukraine became independent (they had 
also often been political prisoners and dissi-
dents during the Soviet regime, such as Levko 
Lukyanenko or Vyacheslav Chornovil).
T he mere possibility of mentioning the famine in the context of Soviet repres-
sions was regarded by intellectuals as an act of 
liberation. In the 1990s, the topic of Holodomor 
was included in the school curricula. Often, 
books written by historians abroad were used as 
textbooks before new textbooks were pub-
lished. This was the case for Ukrainian-Canadi-
an historian Orest Subtelny’s book “Ukraine: A 
History”. 
A Ukrainian translation was published in 1991 
and widely used in schools and universities. 
Books of fiction which depicted the years of 
the famine were introduced to the literature 
courses in schools and universities (such as 
Ulas Samchuk’s novel “Maria”, first published 
in 1934). In this way, education became one of 
the main channels of disseminating knowledge 
and the formation of the memory of Holodomor 
institutionally. At the same time, a film about 
Holodomor “Harvest of Despair” was shown to 
a Ukrainian audience on the main TV channel. 
The film was made in 1984 by Sviatoslav Novyt-
sky and Yuri Luhovy and was supported by the 
Committee of the Studies of Ukrainian Holo-
domor in Toronto. Thus, we can see in practice 
all the transnational entanglements in memory 
work mentioned above. 
In 1993, the Ukrainian government, under 
the first President of Ukraine, Leonid Kravchuk 
(president from 1991–1994), issued the state 
order “On Honoring the Memory of the Victims 
of Holodomor in Ukraine in 1932–1933.”8 It was 
the first state-sanctioned commemoration of 
Holodomor. This state order was amended sev-
eral times up to the 2000s. In 2000, the special 






















and Political Repressions was introduced by the 
government to the national calendar (in 2004 
it was renamed the Day of Holodomors and 
Political Repressions and included the memory 
node of the Holodomor famines of 1921–1923 
and 1946–1947). 
T he memory of Holodomor has become the only topic to be promoted under the rule 
of every president since 1991 (a slightly differ-
ent approach was taken by Viktor Yanukovych, 
2010–2014). In 2006, under the presidency of 
Viktor Yushchenko, the Ukrainian Parliament 
recognized Holodomor as an act of genocide. In 
the same year, the Institute of National Remem-
brance of Ukraine was established following the 
example of Poland. The institute had the status 
of an executive government body tasked with 
managing and controlling the memory work in 
the country. One of the main aims of the newly 
established institute was to organize the com-
memoration of Holodomor on a national level. 
In 2008, under the auspices of the institute, 
the Museum of the Victims of Holodomor was 
opened in Kyiv on the hills of the River Dnieper 
(in 2010, it was renamed the National Museum 
of the Holodomor-Genocide). Located in the 
center of the Ukrainian capital, close to other 
important national heritage sites, the museum 
was listed by the state protocol orders as a  
site of interest to official foreign delegations. 
Holodomor became a symbol of Soviet repres-
sions in Ukraine. In 2010, the Court of Appeal 
of Ukraine closed the case on Holodomor by 
declaring the Soviet regime guilty of the act of 
genocide against the people of Ukraine (seven 
individuals were named as being personally 
guilty in the genocidal politics, including Josef 
Stalin, Vyacheslav Molotov who, at the time of 
the famine was the Chairman of the Council of 
People’s Commissars, and Lazar Kaganovich, 
who was a Secretary of the Central Committee 
of the Communist Party).9 It should be stressed 
that the main narrative theme of the memory 
of Holodomor is victimhood and the sacrifice 
of the Ukrainian nation. The memory carries 
strong religious undertones expressed in differ-
ent forms of commemoration through crosses, 
special prayers, books of victims (that remind 
martyrologues and hagiographies – lists of mar-
tyrs and saints respectively – of the Orthodox 
tradition). The topic of the local perpetrators 
only started being discussed recently and is 
primarily addressed by scholars.10
The Second World War and  
the Wartime Nationalist Movement
The narrative of the Great Patriotic War played 
the role of a foundational myth in the Soviet 
Union as it was the biggest historical experi-
The National Museum 
of the Holodomor- 
Genocide in Kyiv. 














































ence shared by all the nations of the Union.11 In 
the glorifying and triumphal narrative of war, 
many histories were silenced. The latter in-
cluded the experiences of the war in the Baltic 
States or in Western Ukraine where their fight 
against the Soviet army was one of the most 
distinguished features of the war. However, in 
the Soviet Union, the non-Russian nationalists 
who fought against the Soviets were framed as 
Nazi collaborators and, until today, this image 
is effectively used in attempts to denigrate the 
Baltics or Ukraine.12
B ecause of its central role in Soviet identi-ty, the narrative of war became the main 
topic to be addressed by historians and other 
memory actors after the disintegration of the 
Soviet Union. The new narrative included ex-
periences that had been excluded by the Soviet 
regime. In Ukraine, these experiences related to 
the wartime nationalist movement (represent-
ed by the Organization of Ukrainian National-
ists (OUN) and its military arm the Ukrainian 
Insurgent Army – UPA). At the beginning of 
the 1990s, education became the main channel 
through which the new narrative of history 
was introduced. The Second World War was no 
longer called the Great Patriotic War. Through-
out the 1990s, two parallel names were often 
used: the Second World War, indicating the 
period from 1939–1945 and the Great Patriotic 
War from 1941–1945. 
The OUN and UPA began to be glorified as a 
“resistance movement” and “freedom fighters” 
because of their anti-Soviet struggle. The mem-
ory of the OUN and UPA was initially activated 
on a grassroots level, in small villages and towns 
in Western Ukraine which had a direct con-
nection with the wartime nationalists. Local 
non-governmental organizations such as Pros-
vita and unions of veterans of the UPA became 
the main memory agents who took care of the 
memory projects related to the OUN and UPA 
(mainly building monuments in a rather simple 
form using crosses or grave tombs funded by 
private individuals or with the help of local 
villages/town councils). Similar to the memory 
of Holodomor, the forms of commemoration 
saturated by national and religious symbols, as 
well as anti-Soviet narratives that focused on 
the victimhood of the Ukrainian nation, were 
borrowed from an already existing repertoire of 
memory developed and preserved in the dias-
pora.13 This glorious and sacral form of memory 
has been broadly criticized by scholars engaged 
in the history of the OUN and UPA because 
this memory neglects the most difficult aspects 
of the OUN and UPA: the ideology of OUN, 
which has many traces of the fascist movements 
of that time, the massacre of Poles in 1943 in 
Volhynia14, the question of collaboration with 
the Nazi regime, and the participation in the 
Holocaust.
The problem is that historical knowledge 
grounded in academic studies came long after 
the memory forms had been established. The 
archives that permitted robust research to be 
conducted were only opened after the collapse 
of the Soviet Union (a lot of important materials 
were only opened in the 2000s). The thorough 
studies about the most problematic episodes in 
the history of the OUN and UPA were pub-
lished even later, because quality research and 
publishing take time. Thus, the formation of a 
communicative memory of the diaspora and in 
Ukraine in the 1990s preceded the formation 
of knowledge that was used as the basis for the 
critique of memory work. This gap between a 
communicative memory and the possibility of 
conducting research and producing historical 
knowledge is seldom approached by memory 
scholars. 
However, this discrepancy is an important 
factor because it reveals incongruities between 
memory and history as a scholarly discipline. 
In a concrete Ukrainian situation, this gap 
indicates that memory work took place in a 
context in which practically no other form of 
knowledge – except the Soviet narrative about 
Nazi collaborators – was accessible to mem-
ory actors. Consequently, they heavily relied 
on glorifying the memory of the anti-Soviet 
fight (imported from abroad). Orest Subtelny’s 
history, which has previously been mentioned 
and which was used for educating about the 
war in Ukraine, dedicated several paragraphs to 
the OUN and UPA in which the  narrative of the 
anti-Soviet struggle prevailed. The role of the 
The problem 
































OUN and UPA in the Volhynian massacre was 
described in several paragraphs of this book but 
it was not enough to build a more nuanced un-
derstanding of the nationalist movement which 
would combine both the anti-Soviet struggle 
of the nationalists with the difficult aspects of 
their past. 
In 1990s, Leonid Kuchma commissioned a spe-cial group of historians to evaluate the war-
time nationalist movement. The group reached 
the conclusion that it was too hard to propose 
a single narrative on the movement, as it is was 
neither exclusively glorious nor exclusively 
villainous.15 However, it was not only the state’s 
commission that was involved in research about 
the movement. The main institution to propa-
gate the glorifying approach to the movement 
was the Center of Research of the Liberation 
Movement in L’viv, which was founded in 2002. 
It was led by young historian Volodymyr Vy-
atrovych who, in 2014, became the Director of 
the Institute of National Remembrance (which 
will be discussed later). 
Institutionalization of Memory and 
History in the Hands of Politicians 
On the national level, all discussions about the 
Second World War and the wartime nationalist 
movement were highly politicized, culminating 
in the contestation in 2003 between the two 
presidential candidates Viktor Yanukovych and 
Viktor Yushchenko. At the time, the glorifica-
tion of the OUN and UPA was taken up by Yush-
chenko. As his entire presidential campaign was 
framed as a pro-European and pro-democracy 
vector for development of the country, the 
memory he propagated became associated with 
his democratic ideals. As promptly noted by Per 
Anders Rudling, a paradoxical situation could 
be witnessed: the democratic forces used the 
memory of undemocratic organizations in their 
power games.16 Yushchenko’s association with 
the OUN and UPA was used by his opponents 
who tried to depict him as a fascist, referring 
to a well-known Soviet narrative. However, 
these attempts failed and Yushchenko won the 
elections. 
Viktor Yushchenko tried to institutionalize 
the normative approach to history using the 
main directive of decommunization when he 
sanctioned the opening of the Institute of Na-
tional Remembrance in 2006, mentioned above. 
Between 2007 and 2014, the main topics of 
interest outlined on the website of the Institute 
of National Remembrance were Holodomor, 
the national liberation struggle (1917–1920) 
and the Second World War. In 2007, Yushchen-
ko granted the posthumous title of “Hero of 
Ukraine” to Roman Shukhevych, the command-
er of the UPA. Before leaving his presidential 
post in January 2010, Yushchenko also awarded 
the posthumous title of ‘Hero of Ukraine’ to 
Stepan Bandera, the leader of the OUN. This 
decision was broadly discussed and vehemently 
disputed in both Ukraine and abroad.17 Those 
who approached the presidential decision with 
understanding primarily argued for the anti-So-
viet meaning of Bandera’s figure.18
When Viktor Yanukovych, Yushchenko’s 
main opponent in the 2003 campaign, was 
elected as President of Ukraine in 2010, the pol-
itics of memory regarding the WWII changed. 
The first illustrative step in this direction was 
a common Ukrainian-Russian-Belarusian 
celebration of the victory in the Second World 
War and the return to the name ‘Great Patriotic 
War’ in the public statements of politicians. 
Yanukovych also appointed a new director of 
the Institute of National Memory, the historian 
Valeriy Soldatenko, who was also a member of 
the Communist Party of Ukraine. He hesitated 
to refer to the famine of 1932–1933 as Holodo-
mor and had a ‘negative attitude’ towards the 
UPA leaders – Shukhevych and Bandera, who 
had received honorary orders from Yushchen-
ko.
T he dissatisfaction with Yanukovych’s deci-sion to suspend the signing of the associa-
tion agreement with the EU culminated in mass 
protests in November 2013 that lasted until the 
end of February 2014 and were called the Euro-
maidan. It is noteworthy that the memories of 
the OUN and UPA were actively used in these 
mass protests, both in 2004 (during the Orange 
Revolution) and in 2013–2014 (the Euromaidan 













































the topic of WWII was broadly used by Russian 
propaganda, describing Ukrainians as fascists, 
a junta and banderovtsi (the term refers to the 
Soviet depiction of the OUN and UPA referring 
to the OUN’s leader, Stepan Bandera).20 
The symbolic expression of the demand for 
regime change on the part of the protestors was 
the so- called Leninopad – the falling down of 
Lenin’s statues – which started during the pro-
tests in Kyiv and spread throughout the country. 
Directly after the protests, when Yanukovych 
had fled and Russia had annexed Crimea, the 
interim government appointed a new director 
of the Institute of National Remembrance – 
Volodymyr Vyatrovych (previously mentioned). 
The final institutionalization of the glorification 
of the OUN and UPA took place in 2015, when 
the “Decommunization Laws” were adopted by 
the Parliament of Ukraine.
Decommunization Laws and 
 Memory Work in Times of War
The Memory politics in Ukraine, starting with 
2014, should be considered in the context of a 
military conflict in the eastern part of the coun-
try and in the shadow of the Russian annexation 
of Crimea. Taking into consideration the fact 
that information plays one of the central roles 
in the Russia-Ukraine conflict, often called the 
“hybrid war”, it is difficult to overestimate the 
role of historical narratives.21 
Many scholars regard these politics in terms 
of the securitization of the past in which history 
is framed as a matter of national security.22 
“The Decommunization Laws” can be regard-
ed as part of the securitizing process by which 
questions of history are presented as a matter of 
national security. 
T he laws on decommunization were adopt-ed in May 2015.23 They were presented 
by the authorities as a necessity in a society in 
which the Soviet past was seen as a threat to the 
present and future existence of the nation. The 
sympathies with the Soviet past were present-
ed in these laws as sympathies with Russia 
and with the pro-Russian rebels in the eastern 
part of the country. The ‘Laws on Decommu-
nization’ comprise four separate laws that are 
quite different in the themes, motivations and 
subjects with which they deal. The laws include 
the law on the commemoration of the victory 
Holdomor Rembrance 
Day in Lviv, 2013.























over Nazism in the Second World War from 
1939–1945, the law on the condemnation of 
the Communist and National-Socialist (Nazi) 
totalitarian regimes in Ukraine and a ban on 
the propaganda of their symbols, the law on the 
status and commemoration of the fighters for 
the independence of Ukraine in the 20th century 
and, last but not least, the law on granting 
access to the archives of the repressive insti-
tutions of the Communist totalitarian regime 
from 1918–1991. Before they were signed, these 
laws were criticized by many historians in 
Ukraine and abroad as they were considered to 
limit freedom of speech.24 
Volodymyr Vyatrovych replied to this critique 
by stating that these laws were directly associ-
ated with national security issues and, had they 
been adopted earlier, there would probably not 
have been any conflicts in the eastern part of 
the country.25 Five years after the adoption of 
these laws, we can state that the most tangible 
changes to result from the laws is the celebra-
tion of the Day of Reconciliation marking the 
end of the Second World War on the 8 May, 
which is synchronized with the commemora-
tions in most European countries. The law that 
guarantees access to the archives has generally 
been positively received not only by scholars 
in the country but also by scholars from abroad 
who can work on documents that had previous-
ly been classified. 
I t should be added that in the context of war, new memory initiatives appeared. 
For example, historians from the Institute of 
History of the Ukrainian Academy of Sciences 
organized the group “Likbez. Historical Front”, 
which states that its purpose is to fight the 
historical myths propagated by Russia.26 This 
group has collectively published ten volumes 
of history of Ukraine under the title “History 
without Censorship”, as well as many volumes of 
individual books devoted to different questions 
about Ukrainian history. In the introductions to 
many volumes of Likbez history, as well as in the 
interviews I conducted with Likbez historians 
from 2016 to 201827, it is explicitly stated that 
these historians see history as a weapon in the 
ongoing war in Ukraine.
The most Recent Changes in the 
Ukrainian Memory Scene 
In spring 2019, Volodymyr Zelens’kyi was elect-
ed President. As he positioned himself as being 
radically opposed to Poroshenko’s politics in all 
issues, a radical change of Ukrainian memory 
policies could be expected. However, after one 
year of his presidency, there is no evidence of 
any radical change in practice, although there 
are changes in the official discourse of the presi-
dent. For example, in his New Year Eve’s speech 
on December 31, 2019, Zelens’kyi declared that 
“the name of the street is not important if it is 
illuminated and paved.”28 This could mean that 
the glorious memory of the wartime nationalist 
movement promoted by the previous regime 
would no longer be the focus of state memory 
policies but would most likely be the focus of 
regional memory politics.29
In December 2019, a new director, Anton 
Drobovych, was appointed to the Ukrainian In-
stitute of National Remembrance. At the time of 
his appointment he was only 33 years old and, 
prior to his appointment, had worked at the 
National Pedagogical Drahomanov University 
in Kyiv and at the Holocaust Memorial Center 
“Babyn Yar”. Drobovych stated that “the Insti-
tute of National Remembrance will continue its 
search for heroic personalities but with an em-
phasis on personalities who will unite Ukraini-
an society and who will finally help us come to 
terms with who these personalities are.”30 As 
an example of such personalities, Drobovych 
named avant-garde artist Kazimir Malevich, 
as well as famous football player and coach, 
Valeriy Lobanovskyi. He also stated that the 
UINP would continue to work on decommu-
nization and on such topics as Holodomor, the 
Holocaust as well as the Chornobyl catastrophe, 
as well as fight against historical myths.31 
Zelens’kyi’s history policies do not appear to 
be returning to the approaches once promoted 
under Viktor Yanukovych from 2010–2014. 
Instead, Ukraine’s new leadership apparently 
wants to preserve some earlier established fun-
damentals while distancing its approach from 
the hagiographic approach to the OUN and 
UPA propagated by Vyatrovych under Poro-
shenko’s rule. 
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The Holocaust Memorial  
Center “Babyn Yar”
The most recent dispute over memory in 
Ukraine – which reached the scale of a memory 
war – started in spring 2020, when Ukraine, like 
most other countries in the world, was locked 
into quarantine because of the Covid-19 
pandemic. The dispute started when Ivan 
Kozlenko, the Ukrainian film director and 
the (then) Head of the Dovzhenko Cinema 
Art Center, wrote a debate article about the 
Holocaust Memorial Center “Babyn Yar”, 
stating that its newly appointed art director, the 
Russian film director, Ilya Khrzhanovskiy, in 
his program of development of the museum of 
Babyn Yar applied methods which are ethically 
unacceptable in the 21st century.32 Parallel to 
this, it became known that the main histori-
an who had worked on the project since its 
creation in 2016, the prominent expert on the 
Holocaust in Ukraine, Dutch historian Karel 
Berkhoff, left the project accusing the new lead-
ership of the center of unethical approaches to 
memory.33 Throughout April and May, intellec-
tual discussions in the country never stopped. 
Two public letters were signed by hundreds of 
intellectuals in Ukraine and abroad demanding 
that a project that goes against all ethical and 
moral norms be stopped.34 
T he project in question cited the Stanford Prison Experiment and the Milgram 
Shock Experiment as the inspirational sources 
that influenced the main approach to the organ-
ization of a new museum. The main idea was to 
immerse visitors in “the real life” of Kyiv in 1941 
when the city was occupied by the Nazis and 
the mass extermination of the Jewish popula-
tion started. In the beginning, the visitors had to 
take a special psychological test that would in-
dicate the group to which the respective visitor 
belonged: perpetrators, witnesses or victims. 
Although most of the critics focused on the 
unacceptability of such methods, whereby gam-
ification and immergence practices trivialized 
the meaning of the tragedy of the Holocaust and 
negated the dignity of the visitors, they were 
attacked by their opponents for their alleged 
narrow-minded nationalism which did not 
allow them to accept a Russian director (this 
sounds particularly problematic because many 
of the people, including the former head histo-
rian of the project, Karel Berkhoff, demonstrat-
ed a solid and unbiased approach to history in 
their works).
B ecause of the limits of this report, it is not possible to go into the details of the 
controversy. Suffice to say, it still has not been 
resolved and two parallel projects are being 
conducted in the memorial space of Babyn Yar: 
one of them managed by the Institute of History 
and commissioned by the state – National 
Historical Memorial Preserve Babyn Yar, and 
the other – Holocaust Memorial Center “Babyn 
Yar”, a private initiative funded by three oli-
garchs of Ukrainian-Jewish origin who live in 
Russia (although the latter is a private initiative, 
these two projects are supported by the state). 
The “Babyn Yar” memory controversy should 
be positioned in a broader context of discus-
sions about the limits of representation and 
ethics of memory work. 
In the Ukrainian situation, this controversy 
can be zoomed down to the discussion of the 
concept of dignity, which became actualized by 
the Euromaidan protests (in memory space, the 
protests are called “the Revolution of Digni-
ty”). While Ilya Khrzhanovskiy tries to show 
in his methods that every human being can be 
stripped off dignity (a statement that he repeats 
again and again in his interviews), the oppo-
nents of these methods speak about the need to 
protect human dignity. Interestingly, the new 
director of the UINP, Anton Drobovych, who 
worked with the previous team at the center, 
also mentions dignity as the main trope in the 
critique of the new Center’s project.35 
The Heavenly Hundred  
and ATO veterans 
During the Euromaidan protests, more than 100 
protestors were killed by the police and special 
security forces. Their deaths formed the distin-
guished memory node of the Heroes of Heavenly 
Hundred, which draws on the martyrological 
and hagiographical mnemonic narratives devel-
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monuments to the protestors who fell in the 
Euromaidan were erected throughout Ukraine 
directly after the events. The part of the 
street in which the main shootings took place, 
Instytuts’ka Street in Kyiv, was renamed the 
Alley of the Heavenly Hundred. The Institute of 
National Remembrance is currently working on 
the project of the Museum of the Revolution of 
Dignity (officially called the National Memorial 
Complex of Heroes of Heavenly Hundred – Mu-
seum of the Revolution of Dignity).37 It is worth 
noting that symbolically the memory node of 
the Heroes of Heavenly Hundred is often closely 
related to the memory node of the heroes of the 
OUN-UPA, in which all the fallen and the dead 
are presented as “Defenders of the Motherland” 
who sacrificed their lives for the nation.38 
T he soldiers who fell in the war in Donbas (which was officially called an “anti-ter-
rorist operation” – ATO by the government) 
are honored national heroes. Monuments to 
their memory have been erected in the villages, 
towns and cities where these soldiers were born 
or lived. Many schools and universities that 
the soldiers attended have memorial plaques 
acknowledging their sacrifice. They are usually 
funded by local initiatives (families, local coun-
cils, schools, universities). 
Many museums in the country have special 
expositions devoted to the ongoing war, as well 
as to the Heavenly Hundred (like the Museum 
of the Second World War in Kyiv, the Museum 
of ATO in Dnipro). War experiences are trans-
mitted through the special genre of literature 
– war literature, written by established writers, 
journalists and veterans of war (sometimes 
these roles coincide, as in the case of Artem 
Chekh, a prominent Ukrainian writer and war 
veteran). Veteran literature is the most numer-
ous in this genre; thousands of books have been 
written.39 Many documentaries and fictional 
films also deal with both the Euromaidan and 
the ATO. All of these cultural products are 
important channels in the formation of the 
memory of these historical events that allow 
us to witness how communicative memories 
of recent events find their way into a broader 
cultural memory. ● 
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Moral Remembrance  
in National  
Memory Politics
Czech Republic
ver since the 1989 Velvet Revo-
lution, official Czech institutions 
have endeavored to shape a collec-
tive memory that has depicted the 
communist past as illegitimate and criminal. 
After its 2004 accession to the EU, the country 
also lobbied to raise European awareness of 
“communist crimes.” One institutional actor 
has been particularly active: the parliament of 
Czechoslovakia, after 1993 of the Czech Re-
public. Lawmakers swiftly enforced a memory 
politics predicated on the unlawfulness of the 
communist regime. In doing so they attempt-
ed to symbolically externalize the communist 
period as alien to the nation’s history and 
traditions. 
Legal Milestones Aimed at  
Criminalizing the Communist Past
In 1991 and 1992 the parliament passed two 
laws dubbed “big lustration”1 and “small 
lustration”2 that disqualified any citizen who 
had been an officer or collaborator of the secret 
police before 1989 from holding a senior post in 
the administration, army and police, as well as 
any head of a section of the Czechoslovak Com-
munist Party section from the district level up. 
In 1991, the Ministry of the Interior created 
a department called Office for the Documenta-
tion and the Investigation of the Activity of the 
State Security. Four years later, it was renamed 
Office of Documentation and Investigation of 
the Crimes of Communism (ÚDV.) Since 2002 
this office has constituted a unit for criminal 
investigation within the police force.3
In 1993 the parliament passed law 198/1993 
“On the Illegality of the Communist Regime and 
Resistance to It.”4 The wording of this law is re-
markably strong. It affirms that the communist 
regime was “criminal, illegitimate and worthy 
of contempt.” The Communist Party of Czech-
oslovakia was a “criminal and contemptible 
organization; this also applies to other organ-
izations which carried out an activity based 
on its ideology with the aim to repress human 
rights and the democratic system.” 
Communist Party members, i.e. 1.7 million 
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fulness of the 
communist 
regime.
of a population of 15 million, were declared col-
lectively responsible: “… the Communist Party 
of Czechoslovakia, its leadership and members 
are responsible for the way of governance in 
our country in 1948–1989.” The list of damages 
attributed to the previous regime includes the 
“purposeful destruction of traditional princi-
ples of European civilization”, the “deliberate 
violations of human rights and freedoms”, the 
“moral and economic decline accompanied by 
judicial crimes and terror carried out against 
those with different opinions”, the “replace-
ment of a functional market economy by a 
directly controlled economy”, the “destruction 
of traditional principles of property rights”, 
the “abuse of education, science and culture 
for political and ideological purposes”, and the 
“inconsiderate destruction of nature.” 
Howewer, the 1993 law simultaneously af-firmed the legal continuity with the previ-
ous regime, i.e. laws adopted under communism 
would remain valid unless or until explicitly 
abrogated. The Constitutional Court estab-
lished that the continuity of “old laws” did not 
hinder a “discontinuity in values” nor signify 
the “recognition of the legitimacy of the com-
munist regime.” Legality could not “become a 
convenient substitute for an absent legitimacy.”5 
That this legal stance was quite contradictory 
was underlined by almost no one in the Czech 
Republic, apart from former dissident Petr Uhl. 
The Issue of Hatred and Genocide
The parliament additionally voted in 2000 to 
add several new articles to the Czech Criminal 
Code (§400 to 405 in the updated criminal law 
40/2009)6 in order to further criminalize the 
support and/or propaganda for movements 
oppressing human rights and freedom. Anyone 
supporting national, race, religious, class, or 
group hatred could now be imprisoned for one 
to five years, or for three to eight years if they 
advertized this crime or committed it as a mem-
ber of a group. “Class hatred” as a new crime 
category testifies to the continual concern of the 
lawmaker with criminalizing the communist 
past. Moreover, a person who expresses sympa-






















thy with such movements could be punished by 
imprisonment from six months to three years. 
Ironically, despite the 1993 law and these new 
Criminal Code articles, the Communist Party of 
Bohemia and Moravia (KSČM), while perhaps 
not actively promoting “class hatred”, was still 
allowed to exist and actually continued polling 
15% to 20% of the vote. Thus, these legal norms 
appear to be mainly symbolic.  
Finally, the criminal code states: “Anyone who publicly denies, disputes, approves or 
attempts to justify a Nazi, Communist or other 
genocide or Nazi, Communist or other crimes 
against humanity or war crimes or crimes 
against peace will be punished by imprison-
ment from six months to three years.” 
If it is clear that the “Nazi genocide” refers 
to the Holocaust against European Jews and 
Roma during the Second World War, the notion 
of “communist genocide” is more problemat-
ic. Since the Czech political sphere has never 
displayed any interest in the Khmer Rouge 
activities in Cambodia, this article must have in-
tended to punish denial of the Holodomor – the 
famine in Ukraine organized by Stalin’s regime 
from 1932 to 1933, which resulted in several 
million victims. However, the Holodomor is not 
recognized as “genocide” by any international 
organization. The Parliamentary Assembly of 
the Council of Europe and the Organization 
for Security and Cooperation in Europe only 
acknowledge it as a “crime against humanity.” 
Moreover, there is no public “denial of the 
Holodomor” to speak of in the Czech Republic. 
As to a potential communist genocide in 
Czechoslovakia itself, a hint to which might 
have been another aim of this law, the number 
of victims of the communist regime from 1948 
to 1989 is currently estimated to be around 
4,500. However, it cannot be conceptualized as 
genocide as the repression did not target any 
particular group but was widespread through-
out society. Thus, the introduction of the term 
“communist genocide” as a punishable offense 
appears to be an ideological act that participat-
ed in the criminalization of the communist past.
The Creation of a National  
Memory Institute
The culmination point in the memory laws was 
law 181/2007, which created the Institute for 
the Study of Totalitarian Regimes and its twin 
organization, the Security Services Archives, 
situated in Prague.8 This institute was express-
ly devised to shape Czech collective memory. 
Indeed, it functions as a national memory 
institute on the German and Polish models. The 
law originated in the initiative of 19 lawmakers, 
of whom 17 were from the conservative party 
(ODS.) It was not the first attempt. For instance, 
in the wake of the 9/11 attacks, an earlier draft 
had drawn an explicit parallel between “com-
munism” and “Islamism” as two comparable 
versions of “terrorism.”9
According to the preamble of this law as finally adopted, the institute’s mission is 
multifold: 
–  Pay tribute to the victims by implementing 
various commemorative and honorific ac-
tions, laying wreaths, honoring victims, etc. 
(“preserve memory”)
–  Promote a historical narrative of resistance 
(“reflect the citizens’ struggle”)
–  Assist the state in vetting its personnel and 
the recipients of its victims’ compensation 
laws, as well as assisting the justice system 
in the case of trials, by checking individual 
records in the security services archives 
(“assist in indemnifying and convicting”)
–  Curate the archives of the former security 
Detail of the Monu-
ment to the student 
manifestations of 
November 17th in 
Prague, that led to the 















































services and place them at the disposal of 
the public (in order to “not to forget unlaw-
ful acts of any totalitarian or authoritative 
regime”)
–  Digitize the archival records and make 
them available online to an even wider 
public
–  Educate the public, in particular school chil-
dren, on the communist and Nazi periods.
The lawmaker signaled once again its objec-
tives in terms of historical agenda and mem-
ory politics, systematically emphasizing the 
“criminal” character of the communist and Nazi 
rule while keeping silent on collaboration as a 
social practice under either regime or even on 
popular accommodation to the Nazi or com-
munist rule. Believing that full transparency 
would contribute to demonstrating the criminal 
character of the communist regime, the secret 
police archives have been open with virtually 
no restrictions since 2008, including no an-
onymization of either “collaborators”, “victims” 
or third parties.
Several directives of this law, however, are new in the Czech context.
The first element of notice is that the institute 
is supposed to cover the period from 1938 to 
1989, however the period from May 4, 1945 to 
February 25, 1948 has been explicitly excluded 
from this historical research with the exception 
of the “acts relating to the preparation of the to-
talitarian takeover of power by the Communist 
Party of Czechoslovakia.” 
This convoluted definition conveys the 
appreciation on the part of the lawmaker that 
historical research on the 1945-48 period is 
acceptable as far as it is related to the prepa-
ration of the communist takeover. However, 
research on the 1945-48 historical development 
is deemed unsuitable when linked to the trans-
fer/expulsion/ethnic cleansing of the Sudeten 
German minority from Czechoslovakia. The 
memory shaping of the pre-1948 period has 
thus taken the form of an imposed silence about 
these events, at least on the part of this par-
ticular state memorial institution that is most 
intimately related to the Czech state (other 
historical institutes of the Academy of Sciences 
can and do study it.) 
The reason for this taboo is that the expul-
sion was initiated by President Beneš and the 
postwar democratic political elites, yet was 
extremely brutal. Given the individual acts 
of cruelty and torture that were perpetrated 
by Czechs against Germans in the immediate 
postwar period in retaliation for the ghastly 
exactions committed by the Germans troops on 
Czechs during the Nazi occupation, even local 
Czech authorities were occasionally appalled.10 
By the time order had been restored in fall 1945 
and the expulsion was fully carried out in 1947, 
30,000 to 40,000 Germans had perished. Even 
if the legitimacy and legality of this Sudet-
en German expulsion were internationally 
affirmed at the 1945 Potsdam Conference, this 
historical episode can hardly be raised as an 
ideal type of the irreproachable behavior that 
the Czech state would like to associate with the 
democrats as opposed to the “criminal charac-
ter” expected of the “communist totalitarian 
regime.” 
The second element promoting a specific vi-
sion of communism in law 181/2007 is one that 
explicitly criminalized the communist regime 
in the historiography being produced by this 
institute. Taken to the letter, article 4, points 
a), b) and e) of the law indicates that historical 
research should be pursued in order to: “Study 
and objectively evaluate the time of non-free-
dom and the time of communist totalitarian 
power, investigate the antidemocratic and 
criminal activity of state bodies, and its security 
services in particular, and the criminal activity 
of the Communist Party of Czechoslovakia and 
other organizations based on its ideology”; 
“Analyze the causes and way of the democratic 
regime liquidation at the time of communist 
totalitarian power, document the involvement 
of Czech and foreign persons in supporting the 
communist regime and in resistance against it”; 
and “Document Nazi and communist crimes.” 
Equivalence between  
Nazism and Communism
The third striking element of law 181/2007 is 
the implied sign of equality placed between 
The archives  




























Nazism and communism. Since the Czech 
Republic and its Central European neighbors 
acceded to the EU in 2004, the criminalization 
of the communist past has indeed been comple-
mented by the growing affirmation of a specific 
Central European identity: memory entrepre-
neurs from the four Visegrád countries have 
endeavored to lead the European Parliament to 
affirm the equivalence of Nazi and communist 
crimes.11 
I t is in 1996 that the volume The Black Book of Communism: Crimes, Terror, Repression, 
authored by several anticommunist French 
and Central European intellectuals12, had 
introduced a victimhood competition between 
Nazism and communism by proclaiming on 
its cover “One hundred million victims [of 
communism].” The volume lent superficial ac-
ademic credibility to the thesis of the superior 
criminogenic character of communism. Despite 
the strong methodological doubts raised by 
the French and international scholarly com-
munity, and notwithstanding that the figure 
of 100 million victims was revised down to 80 
by the French publisher before the book even 
appeared, the volume was validated with little 
or no epistemological scrutiny by historians 
and the wider public in the former communist 
countries, including the “one hundred million” 
figure.13 Indeed, the volume gave an expression 
to the frustration of many intellectual elites 
and/or unacknowledged victims. It validated 
their conviction that the suffering inflicted by 
the communist regimes was not sufficiently 
recognized by Western countries. 
In June 2008, the Czech government and 
parliament jointly initiated a conference and a 
formal written statement entitled Prague Decla-
ration on European Conscience and Communism, 
signed by such personalities as Václav Havel, 
the former Czech president, and Joachim 
Gauck, the first director of the German national 
memory institute (BStU), who would later be-
come the President of Germany.14 The declara-
tion called for a “Europe-wide condemnation 
of, and education about, the crimes of com-
munism.” It placed an explicit sign of equality 
between Nazism and communism: “Many 
crimes committed in the name of Communism 
should be assessed as crimes against humanity 
serving as a warning for future generations, in 
the same way Nazi crimes were assessed by the 
Nuremberg Tribunal.” It also called for August 
23, “the day of signing of the Hitler-Stalin Pact, 
known as the Molotov-Ribbentrop Pact” in 
1939, to be recognized as a “day of remembrance 
of the victims of both Nazi and Communist 
totalitarian regimes, in the same way Europe 
remembers the victims of the Holocaust on 
January 27.” As opposed to the Czech Criminal 
Code, however, this declaration refrained from 
mentioning the term “genocide.”
As a result of this and other lobbying efforts, the European Parliament indeed adopted 
the date of August 23 as a “Europe-Wide Day of 
Remembrance for the Victims of All Totalitarian 
and Authoritarian Regimes.” It also passed a res-
olution in 2009 on “European Conscience and 
Totalitarianism” that recognized “Communism, 
Nazism, and fascism as a shared legacy” and 
appealed to strengthen public awareness about 
these crimes.15
In December 2010 finally, six formerly com-
munist countries of the EU called upon the lat-
ter to turn the “approval, denial, or belittling of 
communist crimes” into an EU criminal offense. 
Czech Foreign Minister Karel Schwarzenberg 
compared the denial of communist crimes to 
the denial of Nazi crimes. However, thus far, the 
EU has not taken any further steps to recognize 
or punish the “denial of communist crimes.”
Capital and Division
The Institute for the Study of Totalitarian 
Regimes is covered by an independent state 
budget chapter (chapter 355). Thus, its funding 
is directly related to the government and it ne-
gotiates its budget with the Ministry of Financ-
es. For 2020, this budget was approximately 
171 million crowns, and that of the archives of 
approximately 87 million crowns, i.e. a total of 
approximately 258 million crowns or 10 million 
euros. The institute has around 140 employees, 
including 66 researchers. The archives have 
152 employees. While the budget of this twin 













































it is unusually high for the Czech Republic, 
and the ratio of administrative personnel to 
researchers is also unusually high. This has 
prompted public criticism that the institute is 
squandering public funds that would have been 
better allocated to institutes of the Academy of 
Sciences or university research institutions. 
But the capital of the the institute is at least as, and perhaps even more, symbol-
ic (political, institutional, professional) than 
financial. Due to the inflamed political atmos-
phere surrounding the creation and running 
of the institute, there has been considerable 
turnover in personnel. The respective directors, 
deputy directors and prominent researchers, as 
well as their allies and friends, have regularly 
run for office, and occasionally been elected, in 
particular to the more conservative chamber 
of parliament, i.e. the Senate. Their campaigns 
have intensely drawn on this criminalizing 
of communism in memory politics and the 
candidates’ vigorously proclaimed “anti-com-
munism” has served as their main argument for 
discrediting left-wing adversaries. 
Since 2014 the institute has endeavored to 
depoliticize itself and to step up to international 
research standards by hiring new academic 
researchers. This has led to the entrenchment 
of two opposed camps within its ranks – to the 
point that there are now two parallel research 
departments on communism. 
Mandating Memory  
is not a Neutral Act
In this fierce political, institutional, and memo-
rial battle, the Czech official memory politics 
concerning the communist past is a textbook 
example of contemporary policies of dealing 
with the painful pasts described by sociolo-
gist Lea David in her 2020 volume. Its title is 
self-explanatory: The Past Can’t Heal Us: The 
Dangers of Mandating Memory in the Name of 
Human Rights. It is based on her analysis of the 
conflicts in former Yugoslavia and in Israel/
Palestine.
The international human rights turn of the 
1990s developed as a follow-up of the memory 
turn of the 1980s. Inspired by the bloody con-
flicts in former Yugoslavia and by the genocide 
in Rwanda, it centered on what Lea David has 
dubbed the policy of “moral remembrance.” As 
it progressively became an ideology of its own, 
she argues, “moral remembrance” has served to 
conceptualize memorialization processes. It is 
itself predicated on a triple agenda: “facing the 
past”, “duty to remember”, and “victims.”16 
The victim-centered agenda has led to a 
standardized memorialization practice based 
on “simplified and purified categories of vic-
tims/perpetrators/bystanders.” In the Czech 
Republic, where communism did not translate 
into mass violence comparable to that of a gen-
ocide, the figure of the “bystander” is replaced 
in these symbolic politics by that of the “secret 
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police collaborator”, i.e. any civilian convinced 
or coerced into writing reports for the se-
cret police about their neighbors, colleagues, 
friends, and even family. 
But as in all other national cases, this tri-angle victims/perpetrators/collaborators 
became an “ultimate prison.” Indeed, in this 
vision of the past dictatorship, the ideological 
imperative of purity and normativity mandates 
to consider all three types as homogenous cate-
gories. Victims can no longer be held responsi-
ble for anything, nor can they be criticized; but 
they can also no longer express any dissenting 
views anymore from the prescribed narrative. 
They lose all individuality: apart from being all 
innocent and apolitical, they are also all equal. 
The victims are not remembered anymore for 
who they are, but for what happened to them. 
They are, in fact, forced to redefine their past 
lives to frame their individual story within the 
prescribed narrative. Seeing themselves now 
exclusively through the lens of victimhood 
specifically prevents them from remembering 
happy moments in their lives. 
Victimhood is the ultimate status that indi-
viduals and nations aspire to achieve, one that 
confers moral and material privileges. It there-
fore creates rivalry and jealousies. For instance, 
the restitution of the property nationalized 
by the communist regime was granted only 
to Czechs residing in the country. When the 
Czechs who had fled the regime protested, the 
Constitutional Court abolished the residency 
requirement. However, the deadline for submit-
ting restitution claims had already passed and 
the Court refused to review the deadline.17
W hat Nigerian writer Chimamanda Ngozi Adichie has referred to as “op-
pression Olympics”, i.e. victimhood compe-
tition, either between countries or between 
groups of victims within a single country, 
creates according to Lea David an emotional 
energy geared to identifying certain groups as 
“sacred”, while “polluting others as profane.” 
Hence, she concludes, human rights have be-
come an ideology that has contributed in fact 
to a binary vision of the world. The ideal-types 
of victims, perpetrators, and collaborators 
leave no space for nuance and thereby for 
the understanding of human behavior and of 
history. This type of memory politics does not 
lead to reconciliation, but to an ever-greater 
division of society. It also denies the very pos-
sibility for humans to change.18 
Most importantly, it is a form of continuation 
of past practices. In 1992, a Czech citizen who 
had participated in a resistance movement in 
the 1950s at his life’s peril found himself on the 
list of secret police collaborators – he had been 
coerced into collaboration precisely because of 
his resistance activity. He wrote to Petr Cibulka, 
who published this list, obtained illegally, in 
the name of a virulent anticommunist ideol-
ogy: “You became in my eyes … an extended 
hand of Bolshevism, which persecuted me for 
41 years.”19
Conclusion
“One thing is clear”, write Sandrine Lefranc 
and Sarah Gensburger: “The development of 
memory policy has not been associated with the 
development of a more tolerant or peaceful so-
ciety.”20 The memory politics of the Czech state, 
like that of nearly all post-communist countries, 
has seized on an international trend concerning 
memory and human rights that developed from 
the 1990s onwards. Czech memory activists 
have appropriated this vocabulary and trans-
formed it into an “anticommunist grammar” 
Museum of com-
munism in Prague.














































(Laure Neumayer.) Seen from the outside, 
it appears as a legitimate narrative aimed at 
promoting democracy and reconciliation in 
the Czech Republic. However, when analyzed 
in more detail, it appears as a form of political 
instrumentalization primarily aimed at appro-
priating victimhood for political capital. 
Nearly all aspects of the Czech measures aimed at dealing with the communist 
past fit to Lea David’s description. First, we can 
underline their collective character: rehabil-
itations were issued collectively to all those 
condemned on the basis of repressive law 
231/1948 without the need for any individual 
application (victims considered as a group); 
communist party members were denounced as 
contemptible and criminal on the basis of law 
198/1993 (perpetrators considered as a group); 
“collaborators”, finally, were also denounced as 
such on the Cibulka list without any details or 
circumstances (collaborators considered as a 
group.) 
Second, victims have indeed become trapped 
in the anticommunist narrative. It has become 
politically incorrect to remember anything 
positive that might have characterized com-
munism, for instance the relative generosity 
of the communist welfare state, but also such 
trivia as trade-union sponsored vacations to 
the seaside. This is why “nostalgia” is a taboo 
word in Czech memory politics concerning 
communism. Society at large is considered a 
“victim” of communism. Thus, a longing for the 
past has no place in the official narrative. Con-
sequently, nostalgia could only find an outlet 
under the codename “retro” and in alternative 
narratives almost exclusively promoted by the 
arts and popular culture, particularly cinema 
and television.21
Third, different victim groups were led to compete against each other. We have 
seen the difference concerning restitutions 
between resident Czechs and exiled Czechs; 
but we could also mention the Jewish vic-
tims of the Second World War, who seldom 
received any compensation, as opposed to the 
Czech victims of communism. We could also 
mention law 262/201122 that aimed to reward 
the “participants to anticommunist opposition 
and resistance”, i.e. to create heroes out of 
anti-communist resistance. As the applicants 
who signed an act of collaboration with the 
secret police are excluded by principle, even 
though such resisters were the prime target of 
the secret police, 60% of the applicants have 
been turned down. This selection has proven 
to be to the advantage of the promoters of this 
law, i.e. the former dissidents from the 1970s 
and 1980s, who could more easily document 
their activities against the regime and who had 
been in a better position to refuse to collab-
orate with the secret police insofar as labor 
camps and political executions had disap-
peared by this time.
And finally, the ideological imperative of pu-
rity and normativity has mandated to consider 
victims, perpetrators, and collaborators as ho-
mogenous categories. The mission of historians, 
it is understood in this frame, is to document 
this prescribed narrative of pre-ordained guilt 
and victimhood. It is not about complexifying 
the historical picture, or even worse, attempt-
ing to understand the behavior of social actors 
by contextualizing it. As a result, the work of 
socio-political historians has been regularly de-
nounced as “revisionist” by anticommunist ac-
tivists and the mainstream media, which mirror 
their conservative views, with an increased in-
tensity before each election. As a consequence, 
not a single historical work has been dedicated 
to the phenomenon of collaboration as a social 
practice, be it with the Nazi occupational forces 
or with the communist regime.
To sum up, in the framework of its EU inte-
gration process the Czech Republic (like its 
Central European neighbors) has learned to 
weaponize the Western “human rights gram-
mar.” Learning this new language gave their 
pre-existing efforts to criminalize communism 
a new international legitimacy. However, in 
so doing, anti-communist state actors skipped 
the revisionist stage that had preceded the 
memory and human rights turn in the West. 
France and Germany had experienced a painful, 
soul-searching exercise when confronted in 






















during the Second World War. Born under such 
premises, the “duty of memory” had situated 
the Holocaust as a unique phenomenon. In 
contrast, the Central European revised “duty of 
memory” has served to relativize the Holocaust 
by equating it with the “crimes of communism.” 
It has not been inspired by the will to critical-
ly examine the past so much as by a desire to 
attain purification. ●
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němu, https://www.ustrcr.cz/data/pdf/normy/sb198-
1993.pdf.
5   1993/12/21 – PI ÚS 19/93: Lawlessness. Headnotes, 
“Czech Republic Constitutional Court judgment 
concerning the petition submitted by a group of 
Deputies to the Parliament of the Czech Republic 
seeking the annulment of Act No. 198/1993 Coll, 
regarding the Lawlessness of the Communist Regime 
and Resistance to It”, https://www.usoud.cz/en/
decisions/19931221-pl-us-1993-lawlessness-1/.
6   Zákon č. 40/2009 Sb., Zákon trestní zákoník, https://
www.zakonyprolidi.cz/cs/2009-40?text=genocidium.
7   Tomek Prokop, “Oběti komunistického režimu”, 
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by Joanna Beata Michlic
History “Wars” and  
the Battle for Truth  
and National Memory
Poland
n the last thirty years of post-communist 
Poland, we can differentiate between two 
major phases of shaping the historical 
memory of the national past.1 The first two 
decades of the post-communist era from 1989 to 
2010 saw the crystallization and development 
of a pluralistic and liberal restorative memory 
phase. 
During this phase, a multitude of “frozen 
memories” of the pre-communist and com-
munist past had entered the public sphere for 
the first time since 1945, and different memo-
ry agents, representing a variety of scholarly 
and ideological perspectives concerning the 
national past, began to be active without being 
subjected to political and social pressure or 
legal constraints by the state. Since the late 
1990s, this phase became preoccupied with the 
most purged, neglected and shameful memo-
ries of the national past, namely, the memories 
of the dark past concerning the attitudes and 
treatment of Polish Jews and other ethnic and 
religious minorities such as the Lemkos by the 
majority – the ethnic Polish and Catholic pop-
ulation. And it is these memories which, since 
they were uncovered, have begun to be the topic 
of heated public debates, poignant commem-
orative practices, new artistic productions, 
as well as careful new studies by professional 
historians. 
T he latter has borne many salient fruits such as the first school of critical history 
writing about Polish society in the 20th century.2 
The pluralistic restorative phase of historical 
memories reached its peak in the first half of the 
first decade of the third millennium, 2000–






















the main model of mnemonic practices in the 
state, although it has still been bearing impor-
tant new fruits in scholarly works, historical 
education, remembrance sites and grassroots 
public history and commemorative projects. 
The best examples of its achievements during 
the latter period are the Museum of the Second 
World War (Muzeum II Wojny Światowej) 
under the directorship of Paweł Machcewicz, 
(May 2008–April 2017), the POLIN Museum 
of the History of Polish Jews (Muzeum Historii 
Żydów Polskich), (2013 until the present) and 
the European Solidarity Centre (Europejskie 
Centrum Solidarności) (2014 until the present), 
devoted to the history of the first Solidarity 
movement and anti-communist opposition in 
Eastern Europe. 
B y late 2015, the pluralistic memory phase had been abruptly replaced by the current 
restorative phase of historical memory which, 
in fact, constitutes an assault on the former. 
The latter can be defined as a radical counter 
revolution driven by a narrow, ethno-national-
ist vision of mono-cultural and mono-religious 
Poland and its values, symbols and traditions, 
manifested in a variety of forms ranging from 
mild to extreme.
Thus, the Poland of 2020 resembles a “bloody 
battlefield” over a vision of national culture, 
identity, public memory and history. The 
famous Orwellian statement of 1949, from his 
novel “1984”, “Who controls the past controls 
the future. Who controls the present controls 
the past” appears to be the key slogan on the 
banners on this memory battlefield wherein 
20th century Polish history constitutes the main 
target over which an aggressive war has been 
fought for the last five years since the double 
victory of the conservative and right-wing party, 
PiS (Law and Justice Party) in both the presi-
dential and parliamentary elections of 2015. 
PiS’sNarrative of the Past
Poland from 2015 to 2020 represents the case of 
a country in which the government in its inten-
sive and systematic efforts to reshape memories 
of the 20th century history of Polish society 
does not hesitate to launch a pretty systematic 
“zero-sum war” against scholarly research, 
national cultural institutions, social media and 
various NGOs that do not support its vision of 
The Museum of 
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the national past and national future. The PiS 
government does not hesitate to put forward a 
single, hegemonic, anti-pluralistic and skewed 
master narrative of the 20th century history of 
Poland in order to eradicate from the govern-
ment- controlled public sphere knowledge 
of historical events and their interpretations 
of which it disapproves and condemns. The 
PiS’s hegemonic single narrative of the past is 
forcefully disseminated throughout all gov-
ernment-controlled national institutions, mass 
media and social media. The heavy-handed re-
writing of the political and social history of Pol-
ish society of the 20th century encompasses the 
following five key areas: 1) the communist era 
1945–89; 2) the first Solidarity movement of the 
early 1980s; 3) the entire history of the Third 
Polish Republic after the fall of communism 
and the establishment of liberal democracy 
(1989–2015); 4) the history of the devastating 
impact of violent anti-Semitism on Polish Jews 
before, during and after the Holocaust; and 5) 
Polish society’s relations with other ethnic and 
cultural minorities, and the Polish state’s rela-
tions with neighboring countries.
T he main instrument in reshaping and en-forcing the PiS’s vision of the national past 
is historical policy (polityka historyczna) which, 
in the eyes of the PiS government, protects the 
Polish nation’s dignity, honor and reputation 
from national dishonor, indignity and the loss of 
its international reputation.3 Polityka historycz-
na aims to build and reinforce “national dignity 
and national feelings”.4 PiS’s understanding of 
the concept of the nation follows the ethnic, 
collectivist model in which membership is 
believed to be naturally determined. Thus, in 
the popular imagination, the concept of the 
nation tends to be limited to ethnic Poles of 
Catholic origin defined as the “true” members 
of the Polish nation, though in the Preamble 
to the new Polish Constitution of 1997, the 
Polish nation is defined in a broader sense than 
Catholic.5 Members of the PiS government and 
its core electorate tend to treat ethnic and cul-
tural minorities as guests of this “true” ethnic 
Catholic Polish nation. Consequently, the PiS’s 
historical policy aims to primarily protect the 
ethnic Catholic Polish collective, past and pres-
ent from being dishonored by those who are 
defined as “others” and “traitors” both within 
and outside the nation.
An interlinked major purpose of the PiS’s in-
tensive and systematic reshaping of the national 
past is to create a solid long-standing future – a 
populist authoritarian democracy, based on 
the collectivist, ethnic model of Polishness that 
would not allow for any political and cultural 
change, debate and opposing to official mne-
monic practices. Of course, the rejection of 
debate lies in the nature of all ethnic collectivist 
nationalism. Democracy within this type of 
nationalism is always authoritarian and difficult 
to change.6 
A ctually, the PiS government is not the only government in the region to draw on col-
lectivist ethno-national, political and cultural 
traditions in order to rewrite the future along 
the authoritarian model of democracy. In fact, 
the PiS government has followed in the foot-
steps of the authoritarian government of Victor 
Orbán in Hungary, which, after taking power in 
2008, has embarked on an illiberal “occupation” 
and “colonization” of the state and has replaced 
1989 – the year of peaceful transformation from 
communism,7 with 2008 being “year zero” in 
the history of post-communist Hungary.8 In 
October 2011, after the election defeat, Jarosław 
Kaczyński, leader of the PiS, openly promised 
that “the day will come when there will be Bu-
dapest in Warsaw”.9 
Since the PiS’s victory in 2015, the PiS 
government has systematically attempted to 
replace 1989 with 2015 as “year zero” in the 
history of post-communist Poland by emulat-
ing the Hungarian model of reshaping public 
memory and society. In both cases, the bright 
future of the nation relies on the “full and final” 
implementation of the ethnic collectivist mod-
el of nationalism that does not permit freedom 
of thought and the proliferation of heterodox 
ideas and a pluralistic public memory of the 
national past in society10 but, instead, is driven 
by exclusionary, illiberal and purifying policies 
directed at both the national past and contem-
porary society.
Democracy 
within this type 
of nationalism 
is always  
authoritarian 























What key factors have led to the weaponi-
zation of the national past by the PiS’s govern-
ing political party during the third decade of 
post-communist Poland? What changes have 
occurred in the character of memory govern-
ance during the last three decades that have led 
to the PiS’s implementation of the “total coun-
ter-memory revolution of the national past”?   
T his article begins with a short overview of memory politics in communist Poland 
from 1945 to 1989, followed by a discussion 
about the main phases of Polish memory poli-
tics since the political transformation and the 
ascendancy of liberal democracy in Poland in 
1989 until the present, paying particular atten-
tion to the key memory agencies, major events, 
debates and developments. However, given the 
broad scope of the subject, not all aspects of 
memory politics can be equally and fully treated 
in this paper. 
Key Agents and Key Problems  
of Memory Production
In general, during the communist era in the Pol-
ish People’s Republic (PRL), communist memo-
ry politics were characterized by manipulation, 
falsification, suppression and rejection of any 
events from the 20th century political, social and 
cultural history of Poland that clashed with the 
communist ideological interpretations of the 
past.  
Yet, none of the Polish United Workers’ Party 
(PZPR) governments succeeded in the total and 
full implementation of their communist mem-
ory politics. In fact, they failed to conduct what 
historian Anna Wolf- Powęska calls “memory 
genocide” (pamięciobójstwo) in Polish society11 
because of three main memory agents: 1.the 
Catholic Church; 2. Radio Free Europe, and 3. 
the “private, underground memory banks” of 
multi-generational Polish families, particularly 
of the intelligentsia.
With the crystallization of the first Solidary 
movement in the early 1980s, a new, powerful 
and pluralistic agency of “underground and 
counter memories” emerged in the public 
sphere that aimed to produce and disseminate 
all memories of suppressed, falsified and erased 
historical events from the pre-communist and 
communist past.12
Thus, one can agree with the thesis of anthro-
pologist Rubie S. Watson who, in 1994, contend-
ed that socialist states such as the PRL failed to 
convince society of its interpretation of the past 
and that, as a result, alternative “underground 
memories” always existed and were kept alive.13 
This position holds true in Polish society with 
respect to public memories of the pre-commu-
nist and communist past, including the bloody 
events of the Poznań Protests of 1956 and the 
Polish Workers’ Strike on December 14–19, 
1970. However, regarding the most shameful 
memories of the troubling relations with Polish 
Jews and other minorities before, during and 
after the Second World War, this position is 
false. These shameful memories were not kept 
alive in the “underground memory bank”, 
except for some individual members of Polish 
cultural elites and intellectual milieus in Poland 
and abroad,14 the left-wing democratic section 
of the first Solidarity movement of the 1980s, 
and Polish-Jewish survivors themselves. In 
fact, as argued by Michael Steinlauf in a pio-
neering study of the memory of the Holocaust 
in Poland, the official communist way of dealing 
with the memory of the Holocaust – an expul-
sion of it – ultimately reflected a popular need.15 
It was socially acceptable and accepted.   
T he troubling memories of the relationship between the Polish non-Jewish majority 
and Polish Jews before, during and after the 
Holocaust would become the main subject of 
highly emotional debates about the national 
past starting from the 1990s up to the present. 
They are still at the center – at the heart – of 
Polish debates about Polish democracy and the 
model of Polishness that Poles should endorse. 
In some ways, from the beginning, they have 
acted as the main trigger of the intense and 
systematic memory politics advocated by the 
PiS party and its right-wing ethno-national-
istic allies, and continue to remain one of the 
main subjects of contention in the PiS’s official 
historical policy, and among the more extreme 
right-wing, ethno-nationalist and fascist 
groups, including political parties and youth 
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movements, historians and pundits, as well 
as members of the so-called Closed Church. 
Currently, such groups and organizations are 
engaged in disseminating a radical version of 
the new, falsified Holocaust “anti-memoriali-
zation” by reworking the pre-1989 anti-Jewish 
tropes to suit the current political, cultural 
and social needs. The radical right wing social 
and mass media such as wSieci, w DoRzeczy, 
wPolityce.pl, Nasz Dziennik and Gazeta Polska 
are conducting an “assault” on the memory 
and memorialization of the Holocaust that had 
arrived, only after 1989, from the West in Poland 
and other post-communist countries.
 
The Jedwabne Debate and  
the Rise of Memory Politics
In 2000, anti-Jewish narratives forceful-
ly reemerged in the self-defensive position 
adopted by the right-wing conservative and 
ethno-nationalist camp, in the most salient 
national debate of the first three decades of 
the post-communist period. This debate was 
triggered by the publication of Jan Tomasz 
Gross’s book Neighbors in Polish in May 2000.16 
The book set out a definite counter-memory 
to all narratives of the post-1945 accepted, 
biased, hegemonic historical canon of Pol-
ish-Jewish relations and Polish society during 
World War Two, manifested in both communist 
and anti-communist models of remember-
ing. Crucially, it was Gross’s Neighbors that 
influenced the mission, aims and strategies of 
the PiS’s historical policy that had been fully 
developed during the Jedwabne Debate in the 
early 2000s as a fearful response to Gross and 
his supporters’ vision of retelling the national 
past of WWII anew, in a critical fashion. Gross’s 
camp was represented by politicians and mem-
bers of cultural elites of left-wing and liberal 
provenance and members of the Open Catholic 
Church, who advocated coming to terms with 
the difficult past in Polish-Jewish relations by 
exposing anti-Semitism before, during and after 
the Holocaust. Their actions gave a green light 
to new history research, educational projects 
and commemorative events and remembrance 
practices devoted to deceased Polish Jews on 
both local and national levels, in which the 
wrongdoings to the Jewish minority on the part 
of individuals and groups within Polish society 
is fully acknowledged.17 
The Boom of Memories and their 
Agents, 1989–2000s.
The Poland of 1989 experienced what historian 
Padraic Kenney called a “carnival of revolution” 
in communist Eastern Europe.18 The carnival 
International Day of 
Remembrance for the 
Victims of the Holo-
caust. Celebrations 
























was marked by the explosion of a plethora 
of “underground memories” into the public 
sphere. The peaceful political transformation 
and the ascendancy to power of liberal democ-
racy in the early 1990s opened the free flood 
of “suppressed and falsified memories” of the 
past and allowed for various skeletons from the 
national closet to be exposed to daylight for the 
first time since 1945. From 1989, the communist 
version of the national past began to be swift-
ly expelled from all spheres of public space. 
Spectacular removals and the destruction of 
around 2000 monuments, commemorative 
plaques, street names and statues representing 
communist “bearers of memories”, such as 
figures of Lenin and obelisks featuring the Red 
Army, had taken place throughout Poland by 
1993.19 However, in the eyes of the PiS party and 
its allies, the process of removal of “communist 
heroes/anti-heroes” had not been completed 
in the 1990s. As a result, the issue of removal 
of “communist heroes” re-emerged as a part of 
emotionally-charged debates during the tenure 
of the first PiS government (2005–2007) and 
most recently during the current rule of the PiS 
government (2015–2020).   
With the removal of communist monuments, 
new monuments, plaques and street names 
primarily dedicated to the non-communist and 
anti-communist heroes of national political, 
military and cultural history began to appear in 
the 1990s. Many monuments associated with 
World War II and commemorating the heroic 
struggle of the Home Army (Armia Krajowa) 
were erected in Warsaw.20 On the 45th anni-
versary of the Warsaw Uprising of  August 1, 
1944, the first monument to the Uprising was 
inaugurated in the capital, marking a major 
shift in the official memorial culture of the early 
post-communist era.
T he early 1990s witnessed the emergence of new and important memory agents 
representing civil society in different parts 
of the country, such as Lublin-based Brama 
Grodzka – Teatr NN, Sejny-based Pogranicze21 
and Olsztyn-based Borussia,22 which are still 
active. For these institutions, memory work has 
been explicitly regarded as crucial to building 
a democratic, forward-looking, pluralistic 
Poland that educates about and commemo-
rates its multi-ethnic and multi-cultural past. 
From the beginning, these memory agents have 
addressed the need for a dialogue with local 
ethnic, cultural and religious minorities and 
neighborly states. They are supported by grants 
from different institutions and foundations, as 
well as by private donors. 
A nother important memory agent repre-senting civil society, which was officially 
established in February 1990, is the Warsaw- 
based Centre Karta (Ośrodek Karta), originally 
founded as an underground organization by 
Zbigniew Gluza in 1982 during the period of 
Martial Law. From the outset, Centre Karta 
focused on documenting anti-communist 
activities, Soviet repression and Polish society 
during the communist Poland (PRL), as well as 
on strengthening democracy and tolerance. Its 
mission has been to “discover, safeguard and 
popularize history as seen from the perspec-
tive of the individual. Thus, we ensure that the 
past becomes the basis for understanding, for 
building a civic community and encouraging 
reconcilement. And that is how we repair the 
future.”23 The Centre Karta currently has an 
archive comprising 1500 meters of documents, 
testimonies and memoirs, 6000 oral histories, 
400,000 photographs, as well as precious 
private archival collections of leading deceased 
Polish intellectuals such as Jacek Kuroń, Hanna 
Świda-Ziemba and Jerzy Jedlicki, among 
others. 
The Centre Karta also has its own publish-
ing house and runs innovative and interactive 
educational historical programs on a wide 
range of topics such as the impact of the Second 
World War on individuals, totalitarianism, 
Polish-German and Polish-Jewish relations, 
discrimination and xenophobia. These pro-
grams are directed at youth, educators and the 
broader public. It cooperates with the Russian 
Memorial Foundation and the German Founda-
tion Memory, Responsibility and Future, and is 
a member of the Platform of European Memory 
and Conscience. The Centre Karta is support-
ed by annual grants from foreign and local 
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foundations, donations from local government 
sources, gifts and sales of publications, as well 
as archival and publishing services.24
The Emergence of Splits in the  
Memorialization of the National Past 
In spite of the emergence – in the early 1990s 
– of salient memory agents representing civil 
society, the restoration of the “frozen anti-com-
munist and non-communist memories” from 
the communist period was not a smooth, uni-
fying and unified process.25 In fact, it could not 
have been smooth and unifying, given the grow-
ing divisions in the post-Solidarity movement 
between the radical right-wing, conservative 
faction representing the vision of Catholic and 
exclusivist ethno-nationalist Poland on the one 
hand, and on the other, the left-wing and mod-
erate center camp of the Solidarity movement, 
representing the civic model of the Polish state. 
The new developments on the map of the 
post-Solidarity political elites of the early 
2000s, namely, the emergence in 2001 of the 
PiS from the Solidarity Electoral Action (AWS) 
and the establishment of the main rival of PiS, 
the  Civic Platform (Platforma Obywatelska, 
PO) as a split party from the liberal democratic 
Freedom Union (Unia Wolności, UW) the same 
year, further intensified the process of discord-
ance and contestation over the national past. 
The troubling political and social developments 
in Germany in the spring of 2000, particularly 
calls by the radical organization of the German 
Federation of Expellees (Bund der Vertriebenen, 
BdV) to hold Poland and the Czech Republic re-
sponsible for the forced migration of Germans 
in the aftermath of WWII from Poland and then 
Czechoslovakia, and the BdV’s desire to veto 
accession to the EU by Poland and the Czech 
Republic, touched a raw nerve in Polish-Ger-
man relations. It led to public outbursts of fear 
among the right-wing conservative Solidarity 
camp over Germany’s wish to rewrite the histo-
ry of WWII.26 
This fear would continue into the first two 
decades of the third millennium. As a result, 
the national past, particularly the memories 
of WWII, have become defined as “precious 
gold”, which must be fought over until the end. 
This, in turn, has heavily influenced the ways in 
which the PiS and different radical right-wing 
domestic parties have evaluated the painful 
process of coming to terms with the difficult 
past in relation to Polish Jews before, during 
and after the Holocaust. A good illustration of 
this fear are the various pronouncements of 
Jarosław Kaczyński. In contrast to his tragically 
deceased brother Lech, he is known for articu-
lating the extreme version of this fear: “We are 
faced with a situation where in the next few 
decades or less World War II will be understood 
as two great crimes: the Holocaust, in which 
Poles had allegedly taken part, and the expul-
sion of the Germans [from Poland in 1945], in 
general, the outcome of Polish actions.”27
 
A n article called “Hitlers europäische Helfer beim Judenmord,”28 published on 
May 18, 2009 in the German weekly Der Spiegel, 
in which the authors astutely discussed various 
official and non-official collaborators and vol-
untary perpetrators in the murder of six million 
Jews in Nazi occupied Europe, caused a similar 
reaction on the part of Jarosław Kaczyński and 
his political camp. In one voice, they accused 
Der Spiegel of foisting guilt for the Nazi crimes 
off onto others and announced that Germans 
had no right to refer to Hitler’s European help-
ers.29 
Of course, the competing and divisive re-
membering of the national past, including the 
central aspects of contemporary history – the 
end of communist Poland and the first Solidari-
ty movement – were already visible in the early 
1990s. The first post-communist government 
headed by Prime Minister Tadeusz Mazowiecki 
advocated the so-called policy of the thick line 
(gruba kreska), which oriented itself towards 
the future and building a forward-looking, 
pluralistic Poland based on the matrix of civic 
nationalism. Mazowiecki’s government was 
against launching a witch hunt – a total vetting 
(lustracja) of people who had been compro-
mised by the communist governing powers of 
the past. However, the right-wing conservative 
section of the post-Solidarity movement did 
not accept the thick line policy of Tadeusz 
Mazowiecki and accused the left-wing Soli-
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darity movement of being compromised – of 
being pink, (różowi) – by the cooperation with 
the communist camp and the post-communist 
political elite – the so-called red ones, (czerwo-
ni).30 
In January 1993, representatives of the 
right-wing conservative Solidarity faction 
led by Jarosław Kaczyński  burnt an effigy of 
Lech Wałęsa – the legendary leader of the first 
Solidarity movement – in front of the Belweder 
Palace, the residence of the Polish President in 
the capital.31 In this act, the future black legend 
of the first Solidarity movement was initiated 
and was followed by a chain of accusations 
against Wałęsa as being “a traitor and commu-
nist collaborator” allegedly known as “Bolek, 
a secret communist agent”. As part of creating 
the black legend of the first Solidarity move-
ment, the right-wing Solidarity camp raised 
questions about the importance of the Round 
Table negotiations of 1989 with the last commu-
nist government, which led to the peaceful and 
negotiated end of the PRL. 
The vicious attacks on Wałęsa and the 
Round Table negotiations of 1989 increased 
in the 2000s and continue up to the present 
day.32 They have resulted in a radical version 
of the history of the first Solidarity movement 
from which Lech Wałęsa, as the leader of the 
movement and national hero, has been erased. 
As part of the installment of radical mnemonic 
practices pertaining to the most recent history, 
the PiS has also created its own version of the 
first two decades of the post-communist era, 
claiming that the Third Polish Republic (1989–
2015) was still widely tainted by communism 
and it was 2015, when the PiS came to power, 
that marked the rebirth of a truly independent 
Poland, known as the Fourth Republic.33  
The 1990s witnessed growing discontent 
among the right-wing conservative faction of 
the Solidarity movement. This was directed at 
the ways in which the left wing and liberal dem-
ocratic elites were dealing with the national 
past.34 In contrast to the right-wing conserv-
ative Solidarity camp, the liberal democratic 
elites did not want to pursue a “hardcore” 
historical policy and did not define the memo-
rialization of the national past as being a central 
element of governing the country. The liberal 
democratic camp focused on the economic 
transformation of the state and on building a 
forward-looking, pluralistic and civic nation 
that would confidently join the European Un-
ion. Thus, it also accepted the Western require-
ment for the memorialization of the Holocaust 
as an international and European project that 
serves to educate civil society. It did not impose 
censorship on historical research, left the writ-
ing of history in the hands of professional histo-
rians and viewed professionalism as the key cri-
teria for funding historical research. It also gave 
the green light to collaborative international 
historical projects about the mutually difficult 
past in Polish-German and Polish-Ukrainian 
relations, which continued throughout the first 
decade of the third millennium.35 Similarly, in 
2008, a group of Polish and Russian historians 
convened to discuss difficult aspects of Pol-
ish-Russian relations.36 The latter discussions 
began to be increasingly challenging as a result 
of the implementation of the Russian hardcore 
memory politics by Vladimir Putin, which led 
to an outburst of old resentments in Poland and 
Russia in the post-2010 period.
During the peak period of work on the new 
Polish Constitution in the mid-1990s, a sym-
bolic continuity with the traditions and values 
of the pre-modern, multi-cultural and mul-
ti-religious Polish-Lithuanian Commonwealth 
and the Second Republic (1918–1939) was 
acknowledged and invoked as a precious past 
enrichening a future democratic Poland. Thus, 
this symbolic continuity was inscribed in the 
new Polish Constitution of 1997, signed on July 
16 that year by the (then) President of Poland, 
Aleksander Kwaśniewski, who represented the 
post-communist political camp which, given its 
dark communist past, wished to concentrate on 
the future.  
The Crystallization  
of Historical Policy
At the same time, the right-wing Solidarity po-
litical movement found intellectual support for 
its vision of making the national past the central 
element of governing the country and reshaping 

































































































model of a mono-cultural and mono-religious 
Poland. It was the milieu of conservative histo-
rians and philosophers such as the late Tomasz 
Merta, Marek Cichocki and Rafał Matyja who, 
in 1995, created the intellectual think tank, the 
Warsaw-based Club of Political Critics (WKPP), 
devoted to the development of historical policy. 
These young conservative thinkers, who were 
mostly born in the 1960s, became closely linked 
to Lech Kaczyński, who won the presidential 
election of 2005.
Thus, the period from 1997 to 1998 wit-nessed a crucial moment in the develop-
ment of the concept of historical policy as a 
vital instrument to be used by the future PiS 
governments. Three years after the party was 
created by Jarosław Kaczyński and his twin 
brother Lech Kaczyński, the concept of histori-
cal policy was articulated during the meeting of 
the Political Council of PiS in the same month, 
during which Jarosław Kaczyński called for 
“modern historical policy and for greater state 
patronage of culture.”37 The same month, histor-
ical policy was endorsed in the first program 
of the PiS party of September 2004. The key 
ideas behind the hardcore version of historical 
policy was the creation of a “sacred” monumen-
tal, affirmative history of a national past that 
cannot be debated, on the one hand, and on the 
other, the eradication from the public sphere of 
critical history writing and critical patriotism 
described by advocates of historical policy as 
the unpatriotic pedagogy of shame (pedagogika 
wstydy).38 Therefore, in the conceptualization 
of national history as proposed in the hardcore 
historical policy, there is no room for por-
traying complexities, nuances and paradoxes. 
Instead, moral assessment of events, people and 
their deeds is prescribed as an integral part of 
commemorating the past, history writing and 
historical education. 
The swift and spectacular establishment of 
the modern Warsaw Uprising Museum (MPW) 
in the capital, which opened on August 1, 2004 
on the 60th anniversary of the Uprising, was the 
first realization of the right-wing conservative 
vision of historical policy.39 The museum was 
created thanks to a decision by Lech Kaczyński, 
who was mayor of Warsaw at the time (2002–
2005) and the conservative intellectuals be-
longing to the Club of Political Critics (WKKP). 
The museum commemorates the heroic yet 
doomed efforts of the Home Army in its lonely 
battle against the German occupants and the 
immense human and material losses in the city 
during the Uprising. It also fulfills a symbolic 
act of de-communization of the capital.40 Since 
its opening, the museum has become a popular 
site that attracts around half a million visitors 
each year, which illustrates that there is a 
grassroots “hunger” for affirmative, heroic and 
martyrological accounts of the national past.41
 
A Growing Hunger for the History 
of the National Past
Throughout the first decade of the third millen-
nium, this “hunger” appeared to be organically 
growing in different sections of Polish society, 
including members of football clubs and their 
fans. Ordinary Poles from different generations 
began playing the role of “spontaneous memory 
agents” through their active participation in 
the popular annual singing of patriotic songs 
dedicated to the memorialization of the War-
saw Uprising of August 1, 1944 and to Poland 
regaining its independence on November 11, 
1918. Singing old patriotic songs together and 
participating in the popular reconstruction of 
historical events are not only good illustrations 
of a bottom-up growing interest in the national 
past, but also of a strong emotional attachment 
to that past in Polish society. Unsurprisingly, 
during the same decade, polls conducted by the 
well-known statistical institute Pentor in 2005 
and 2009, respectively, indicated that Polish so-
ciety was still not yet ready to accept the model 
of critical history that challenges soothing 
national memories. 
According to the first poll conducted a few 
months before Poland joined the European 
Union in May 2004, only 3% of those who were 
interviewed felt ashamed about the negative 
attitudes towards Jews in World War II.42 The 
name Jedwabne was not mentioned in any of 
the statements. The second poll conducted on 
the eve of the 70th anniversary of the outbreak 



























five years earlier.43 According to this poll, 73% 
of those interviewed were convinced that Poles 
had many reasons to be proud of their conduct 
during the war, including rescue activities 
extended to Jews, whereas only 17% stated that 
there were wartime events about which Poles 
should feel ashamed. Though Jedwabne was 
recalled by many of the interviewees, there was 
widespread cognitive confusion about the real 
perpetrators of the massacre; many of the inter-
viewees attributed the crimes to the Germans 
and not to the local Poles. The poll also showed 
that Poles still consistently perceived the war 
as being the embodiment of Polish collective 
martyrdom and heroism. With this background 
in mind, we can better understand the social 
acceptance of memory politics aimed at recre-
ating a predominantly positive portrayal of the 
collective and the strikingly persistent difficulty 
of integrating both the positive and negative 
aspects of national history together – integrat-
ing the difficult past into the national history of 
WWII.44
Shift to the Extreme right
Importantly, by the end of the first decade of 
the third millennium, the social “hunger” for 
an “affirmative soothing national past” became 
partially hijacked by extreme radical ethno-na-
tionalist and home-made fascist organizations 
such as the Polish National Community (Polska 
Wspolnóta Narodowa), National Revival of 
Poland (Narodowe Odrodzenie Polski, NOP), 
All-Polish Youth (Młodzież Wszechpolska) 
and its co-founded National Movement (Ruch 
Narodowy) and National Radical Camp (Obóz 
Narodowo-Radykalny, ONR). 
All these organizations became active mem-
ory agents of a radical version of the Polish 
national past with strong xenophobic, anti-Se-
mitic and racist aspects. From 2009 to 2012, 
an increasing fragmentation and radicaliza-
tion of the memory landscape in mainstream 
public life began to appear as a result of the 
flood of public events and activities staged 
by these radical groups on the streets and in 
social media. The radicalization of the mem-
ory landscape particularly manifested in the 
emergence and increasing social acceptance 
of new “national heroes” such as the extremist 
anti-communist National Armed Forces (Naro-
dowe Siły Zbrojne, NSZ) during the Second 
World War and its direct military and ideolog-
ical continuator between 1945 and 1950 – the 
anti-communist underground military camp 
whose members became to be known as the 
so-called “cursed soldiers”. From the begin-
ning, the memorialization of NSZ as a “chief 
collective hero” has been a clear indication 
of the fundamental aim of the radical eth-
no-nationalist historical counter-revolution: 
Polish nationalist political party, National Radical Camp (Obóz Narodowo-
Radykalny, ONR). Anniversary Day demonstration in Kraków, Poland, 2007. 
PHOTO: WIKIMEDIA COMMONS
A demonstration by the Unia Polityki Realnej (UPR) in support of the Instytut 
Pamiȩci Narodowej (IPN; Institute of National Remembrance) held in Kraków, 













































to make an extreme version of the national 
past a central part of the mainstream memory 
of the national past.45 The “cursed soldiers” 
were discovered in the 1990s by Warsaw-based 
memory activities chaired by a radical right-
wing journalist Leszek Żebrowski and linked 
to a new social memory agent, the association 
of the Republican League (Liga Republikańska) 
and the right-wing NGO, We Remember.46 But, 
the 2000s also saw the emergence of serious 
scholarly works dedicated to the anti-com-
munist underground and its partisans by first 
class professional historians such as Rafał 
Wnuk.47 
The critical history works of Wnuk and oth-
ers about the activities of the anti-communist 
military units in early post-war Poland reveal 
the complexities of their history, including 
the key dark aspects –  large scale theft, the 
murders of Catholic Poles and ethnic cleansing, 
resulting in the murder of Polish Jews, Lemkos 
and Belarussians by certain units and military 
commanders.48 However, at the same time, the 
legend of the “cursed soldiers” as the forgotten 
“national heroes” without any blemishes on 
their past increased as a result of the writings 
of right- wing historians and memory activists. 
Ironically, their idea that the “cursed soldiers”, 
as victims of the communist regime, deserved to 
be institutionally commemorated was accept-
ed by most of the political elites, including the 
post-communist Democratic Left Alliance (So-
jusz Lewicy Demokratycznej, SLD) in the Polish 
parliament on February 3, 2010 and led to the 
establishment, in 2011, of an official National 
Day of Remembrance of the Cursed Soldiers on 
March 1.49 
T he deep political crisis in the country in the aftermath of the plane crash in 
Smoleńsk on April 10, 2010, which resulted in 
the deaths of 95 representatives of the Polish 
political and cultural elite, including Polish 
President Lech Kaczyński and his wife Maria, 
no doubt played a pivotal role in the finaliza-
tion of the official recognition of the cursed 
soldiers. It was the successor to President Lech 
Kaczyński, Bronisław Komorowski, from the 
Civic Platform, who signed the law making the 
National Day of Remembrance of the Cursed 
Soldiers an official “sacred day” in the Polish 
national calendar.50 
Hence, by late 2015, it appears that the 
“cursed soldiers” and their direct predeces-
sor, the NSZ, including the military unit of 
the Holy Cross Mountains Brigade (Brygada 
Świętokrzyska), which openly collaborated with 
Nazi Germany, have begun playing the same 
parallel role in the national pantheon as the 
Home Army, the chief mainstream “collective 
national hero of WWII”. This is another un-
precedented act that reveals the internal shift to 
the radical right on the part of the PiS govern-
ment and state institutions. 
A good, current illustration of radical attempts to reshape the national pan-
theon is the wide range of annual national and 
local commemorative events for the “cursed 
soldiers” which, for example, lasted not just one 
day, but for two months between late February 
and early April 2017,51 the erection of six hun-
dred monuments, memorial sites and plaques 
related to the “cursed soldiers” throughout the 
country, as well as annual educational activities 
about the “cursed soldiers” for youth, both in 
the country and abroad.52 Perhaps the most 
disturbing symbolic example of this process 
was the laying of a wreath on the tomb of the 
soldiers of Brygada Świętokrzyska on Febru-
ary 17, 2018 by the PM, Mateusz Morawiecki, 
during his official visit to Munich in Germany.53 
Not only does this indicate a radicalization of 
the current PiS’s historical policy, but it actually 
demonstrates the ongoing merger of this histor-
ical policy with the extreme ethno-nationalistic 
vision of the national past, advocated by the 
political parties and movements in contempo-
rary Poland that have clear domestic fascist, 
xenophobic and racist roots in the pre-1939 
period. This situation constitutes another un-
precedented and dangerous development, not 
only for history writing and mnemonic practic-
es of the national past, but also for the state and 
civil society in Poland. 
In comparison to the inter-war period in Po-
land from 1918 to 1939, in which the post-1930s 
right-wing conservative Sanacja government at-
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tempted – not always successfully – to contain 
the radical fascists groups in order to prevent 
street violence, the post-2015 PiS government 
encourages radical organizations such as the 
above-mentioned Polish National Community, 
National Revival of Poland, All-Polish Youth 
and National Radical Camp to be an integral 
part of mainstream political life, including 
engaging in commemorations of “sacred” na-
tional events. Already in the early 2010s, these 
organizations have been empowered by being 
given a platform in the major annual national 
celebrations of Poland’s Day of Independence 
on November 11 to celebrate the reinstatement 
of sovereignty after the end of World War I in 
1918,54 and in conducting their own commemo-
rations of the Warsaw Uprising of August 1, 
1944. At no point after their revival in the post- 
1989 period did any of these organizations 
condemn and dissociate themselves from their 
pre-1939 fascist, racist and anti-Semitic ideolog-
ical heritage. However, the current Ministry of 
Culture and National Heritage unquestionably 
supports these radical groups by offering them 
grants for the development of their exclusivist 
mono-religious and mono-cultural vision of a 
national past and national future that is tainted 
by racism, xenophobia and anti-Semitism. For 
example, thanks to a grant in 2020 from the 
Ministry of Culture and National Heritage, the 
newly established Digital Library of National 
Thought (Cyfrowa Biblioteka Myśli Narodowej), 
“a self-proclaimed organization of young people 
who want to serve their homeland”, launched 
a new, free online library of pre-1939 works by 
various authors, including many publications 
by Roman Dmowski – the founding father of 
Polish modern ethnic collective nationalism 
and the core pre-1939 ethno-nationalist party 
and movement, the National Democrats, known 
as Endecja. This online library offers no critical 
commentaries about its contents.55   
The Rise of the IPN  
– the Ministry of Memory
The year 2000 witnessed the emergence of the 
Institute of National Memory, a public institu-
tion, “born in pain”56 to deal with the legacies 
of the communist past. After a long political 
struggle, the act on the IPN of December 28, 
1998 was passed in the Polish parliament and 
enabled the establishment of the IPN, modelled 
on the successful German Office of the Federal 
Commissioner for Preserving the Records of 
the State Security Services of the former GDR, 
also known as the Gauck Institute. However, 
in contrast to the German institute on which it 
was modelled, the IPN was given much more 
power and became a “national institution of 
great significance to the people in power and 
those who want to come to power”.57 
Not only was the IPN made the official 
“guardian” of the secret archives of the com-
munist secret services, but also the official 
“investigator” and “prosecutor” of two sets of 
major crimes: firstly, the Nazi German crimes 
of WWII from 1939–1945 against the Polish 
state and the Polish nation and, secondly, the 
newly defined communist crimes against Polish 
citizens or on Polish soil between September 
17, 1939 and July 1990. By the late 2000s, 70% 
of the cases under IPN investigation comprised 
communist crimes, 20% comprised Nazi crimes 
and 5% of the crimes were defined as crimes 
against peace, humanity and war crimes, mainly 
committed by Ukrainian fascist and ethno- 
nationalist military forces against Polish  
citizens, ethnic Poles and Polish Jews in  
Volhynia from 1943 to 1944.58 
A part from collecting, preserving and managing the archives of the communist 
security services and investigating and prose-
cuting Nazi and communist crimes, from the 
outset, the IPN has been engaged in research 
and education about the history of Poland 
between 1939 and 1990, and disseminating 
its finding in both Poland and abroad. Thus, 
its third major function has been to generate 
knowledge. In order to fulfil this function, a 
special department – the Public Education 
Office – was created within the IPN structure. 
The IPN also has its own impressive publishing 
house. One of its most popular journals is the 
IPN Bulletin (Biuletyn), aimed at popularizing 
and shaping historical awareness among youth 
and educators. In the second half of the 2000s, 
12,000 copies of the Bulletin from the 15,000 in 
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circulation were distributed free of charge to 
every type of secondary school in Poland.59
Since 2006, during the short rule of the PiS 
(2005–2007) after its first double victory in 
the presidential and parliamentary election in 
2005, the IPN was also put in charge of lustra-
tion, for which another separate department, 
the Lustration Office, was formed, employing 
10% of the entire IPN staff. Towards the end 
of the first decade of the third millennium, the 
IPN already enjoyed the privileged status of 
being the wealthiest public national institu-
tion with a budget that steadily increased from 
84 million złotych to 213 million złotych.60 In 
contrast, the internationally renowned POLIN 
Museum of the History of Polish Jews had a 
budget of 37,601,688 złotych in 2015, 34,108,589 
złotych in 2016 and 35,190,048 złotych in 2017.61 
In 2020, the IPN budget reached the huge sum 
of 405 million złotych and increased to 423 mil-
lion złotych, a budget that no other academic 
center or national institution could match.62  
In 2012, Dariusz Stola compared the IPN to “the Royal Navy dominating the sea” of 
research on 20th century Polish history and 
warned that the IPN was engaging in the  
unhealthy practice of maintaining a mono- 
poly over historical knowledge in the state.63 
However, Stola still then evaluated the IPN as 
a “Ministry of Memory”, not in an Orwellian 
sense, but as a self-centered, cost inefficient and 
overblown bureaucratic institution.64 However, 
since late 2015, we can talk about the IPN as 
being an institution that is on the path to be-
coming a “Ministry of Memory” in the original 
Orwellian sense.65 
A good illustration of this troubling process 
is the reshuffling and removal of in-house 
historians from the Department of Research 
and Education who do not agree with the PiS’s 
historical policy and do not implement it in 
their own research. Another example is the 
outright dismissal of a number of renowned his-
torians such as Krzysztof Persak, a key expert 
on the history of Jedwabne and the Second 
World War.66 Because of intellectual and ethical 
disagreements with the top-down implemen-
tation of the PiS’s historical policy, many other 
first-class historians have also left the IPN at 
different times since 2006. 
The process of purifying the guardians of 
national memory in the institution is well cap-
tured by historian Marta Kurkowska-Budzan, 
























who argues that the IPN replaces historians 
who represent “a critical historiography” with 
“young missionaries who undertake their tasks 
with a passion and fully identify themselves”67 
with historical policy. 
However, during the early period of its activities from 2000 to 2005, the IPN was 
characterized by a plurality of voices about 
historical knowledge of the national past among 
its staff. During the leadership of its first Chair-
man, Leon Kieres, (June 30, 2000–December 
29, 2005), the IPN was an apolitical national 
institution with a mission to serve the whole 
nation by investigating and popularizing knowl-
edge about different aspects of the contempo-
rary history of Poland. 
Thus, the IPN was committed to the vision 
of a forward- looking, pluralistic and liberal 
Poland that also aimed to come to terms with 
its dark past. For this reason, it also enjoyed an 
international reputation as an excellent pro-
fessional institute, particularly for conducting 
a painstaking historical and forensic investiga-
tion into the Jedwabne massacre, described in 
Gross’s Neighbors. 
However, representatives of the PiS and 
then PiS’s parliamentary allies, Liga Polskich 
Rodzin (League of Polish Families LPR) and 
Self-Defence (Samoobrona), were extremely 
critical of the IPN’s diligent investigation into 
Jedwabne – “the Polish heart of darkness” – led 
by the IPN’s legal and historical staff. The more 
extreme members of the LPR condemned the 
IPN findings and launched personal attacks 
against Kieres.68 The most severe personal 
attack took place on February 27, 2002 during a 
session of the Polish parliament during which 
Kieres delivered a report on IPN activities con-
ducted between the summers of 2000 and 2001, 
the period of peak events with respect to the 
Jedwabne massacre. He was called a “servant of 
the Jews” and was blamed together with (then) 
President Aleksander Kwaśniewski for “stoning 
the Polish nation.”69
Under the rule of the PiS between 2005 
and 2007, the IPN, with its newly appointed 
chairman, the late Janusz Kurtyka (1960–2010), 
became both an instrument and an implement-
er of historical policy, weaponizing the field 
of history for ideological goals. As a result, 
between 2005 and 2010, the pluralistic perspec-
tive on research on the contemporary history of 
20th century Poland began to be systematically 
replaced from the IPN’s mission by a monolith-
ic agenda of promoting “one and only one true 
version” of Polish history in which there was no 
room for any critical perspective. Prior to being 
appointed the President of the IPN, Kurtyka 
was involved in memory activism dedicated 
to the unknown heroes of the anti-communist 
underground from 1945–1950. As Chairman of 
the IPN, Kurtyka emphasized the memoriali-
zation of the anti-communist underground, the 
“cursed soldiers” and opposed critical history 
writing pertaining to the ethnic cleansing of 
Slavic minorities in the aftermath of WWII and 
to various acts of mistreatment and hostilities 
towards Polish Jews by members of the Polish 
ethnic/Catholic majority. 
A clear illustration of the latter is the official 
IPN’s reaction to Jan T. Gross’s next book to be 
published after Neighbors – Fear – which first 
appeared in English in the summer of 2006 and 
then in Polish on January 11, 2008.70 Fear analy-
ses the well-known massacre of Polish Jews in 
the early post-Holocaust period, the pogrom in 
Kielce on July 4, 1946, and discusses the etiol-
ogy of the early post-war anti-Jewish violence. 
The book became the subject of serious critical 
academic discussion by Polish historians 
outside the ethno-nationalist school. However, 
the champions of historical policy reacted to 
Fear with extreme hostility and unequivocally 
rejected it. The IPN launched an exhaustive 
promotion of the Polish translation of Marek 
Jan Chodakiewicz’s Po Zagładzie. Stosunki pol-
sko-żydowskie 1944–194771 as a “counter-mem-
ory” work to and official “whip” at Gross and 
Fear, one that would block the book’s positive 
reception and unmask its alleged anti-Polish 
character. 
In the response to Fear, the IPN initiated a skillful new strategy of marginalizing critical 
history writing about Polish-Jewish relations 
before, during and after the Holocaust. This 























































ments: The first is to present and promote a 
central “counter-memory” to counterbalance 
the “dark history”; the second is to systemati-
cally underscore the “feel-good soothing histo-
ry” of which Poles can be proud of concerning 
their relations with the Jewish community. The 
latter has particularly been achieved through 
the political manipulation of the history and 
memory of Polish rescuers of Jews, a subject 
that deserves a comprehensive study and that 
could be essential in educating civil society. 
However, at present, the history of rescuers has 
been almost entirely hijacked by the right-wing 
conservative political elites.
As a result of the implementation of PiS’s his-
torical policy, various local and national initia-
tives devoted to the history and memory of the 
Polish rescuers of Jews have begun to appear 
in the country, regrettably without addressing 
“the grey zone” aspects of the rescue: rescuers 
for profit, rescuers-abusers and rescuers who 
turned into perpetrators of Jewish charges, as 
well as denunciations and killings of “dedicated 
rescuers” by their co-patriots for sheltering 
Jews, the post-1945 hostilities towards the res-
cuers and their families, as well as the rescuers’ 
silence about their wartime deeds in their own 
local communities. 
The opening by the President of Poland, 
Andrzej Duda, on March 17, 201672 of a new 
museum devoted to the memory of the remark-
able Ulm family in Markowa, Southern Poland, 
as well as the creation of an annual institution-
alized National Day of Remembrance of Poles 
Rescuing Jews, established on March 24, 2018, 
on the initiative of President Andrzej Duda, 
are two examples, among many, of the ways in 
which the history of Polish rescuers is current-
ly being weaponized in memory politics and 
presented in a skewed form, devoid of nuance 
and wartime and post-war complexities and 
contexts.73
 
T he third element of the IPN’s strategy to eradicate critical history of Polish-Jewish 
relations is the orchestration of a wide “against 
campaign” in the mass and social media and in 
institutes of higher education in both Poland 
and abroad. A parallel milieu of both experts 
and members of non-elites – strong support-
ers of PiS’s historical policy – participates in 
the “against-campaign” as guardians of moral 
knowledge about the national past. The latter 
group also defines itself as offended and dis-
honored Poles by Gross. In the aftermath of the 
heated debate about Fear, the IPN’s three-el-
ement strategy would be employed as a model 
for opposing and “shutting down” any future 
important historical works belonging to the 
critical history writing about Polish-Jewish 
relations and for reinforcing and sustaining 
“soothing and comforting memories of the 
national past solely”. 
Under its current chairmanship of Jarosław 
Szarek (2015 to the present day), the IPN has 
fully implemented this model.74 One of its best 
recent examples is the official IPN reaction to 
the collective two volumes edited by Barbara 
Engelking and Jan Grabowski, Dalej jest noc: 
losy Żydów w wybranych powiatach okupowanej 
Polski, (“Night without End: The Fate of Jews 
in Selected Counties of Occupied Poland”) and 
published in early 2018. Dalej jest noc analyses 
the everyday struggles and survival rates of 
Polish Jewish fugitives on the Aryan side in the 
Polish countryside in nine districts. 
The 1700 page study reveals that 60% of the 
Jewish fugitives were denounced or killed by 
their Christian neighbors during the last phase 
of the Holocaust from 1943 to 1945. In order 
to oppose these devastating findings, the IPN 
extensively promoted a 72-page critical review 
of Dalej jest noc, produced in 2019 by a young 
in-house historian called Tomasz Domański. 
In September 2020, the IPN launched and 
promoted Domański’s 110-page report, Korekty 
ciąg dalszy – a second response to the response 
of the editors-in-chief and individual authors 
of Dalej jest noc towards Domański’s first report 
of 2019.75 Simultaneously, to counteract the 
scope of the dark past exposed in Dalej jest noc, 
the IPN orchestrated a variety of conferences, 
seminars and exhibitions in Poland and abroad 
devoted to the history of Polish rescuers of Jews 
during the Holocaust.76 
In addition, an international conference, 
organized in Paris between February 20 and 
22, 2019 to present the latest findings of the 
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Polish critical history school of the Holocaust 
to French academia was interrupted by a loud 
“against campaign” group that had accused 
the conference’s participants of “spreading lies 
about Poland”.77 
“Polish Holocaust Laws”
Interestingly, two weeks prior to the publi-
cation of Dalej jest noc, the infamous “Polish 
Holocaust Laws,” first stipulated in September 
2016 by Zbigniew Ziobro, Minister of Justice 
and Prosecutor General, were approved by the 
Polish parliament on January 26, 2018 in the 
midst of national and international protests.78 
The “Polish Holocaust Laws,” aim to prose-
cuting anyone who uses the false term “Polish 
concentration camps” and accuses the Polish 
collective of complicity in the Holocaust. The 
laws initially included the most controversial 
Article 55a, including the stipulations concern-
ing criminal prosecution, but also the exemp-
tion of scholarship and the arts from criminal 
prosecution.79 
The provisions of Article 55a were repealed 
on July 27 2018, but the controversies over the 
laws continue, since under the new amend-
ments, individuals, including scholars and 
artists, can be subject to the civil courts for un-
dermining the reputation of the Polish nation.80 
The ongoing civil court case against the chief 
editors of Dalej jest Noc, Barbara Engelking and 
Jan Z. Grabowski, is an intellectually, legally 
and morally troubling example of how the Pol-
ish Holocaust Laws, in their revised form, could 
be used against professional historians who do 
not subscribe to the PiS’s historical policy.81 
Such civil court cases are initiated and finan-
cially sponsored by a Warsaw-based right wing 
and conservative memory agent, (Anti-Defama-
tion League of Polish Name) (Reduta Dobrego 
Imienia-Polskiej Ligi przeciw Zniesławieniom), 
a non-governmental organization, under the 
chairmanship of Maciej Świrski. In its manifes-
to, the League sees itself as an advisory group 
to the current Polish government. Its main mis-
sion is to protect “sacred” affirmative memories 
of the national past against internal traitors and 
external enemies, including foreign authors 
and newspapers, who have allegedly engaged in 
slandering the good name of Poland”.82
O verall, the current PiS government, assisted by the League, the IPN and its 
offspring organisation, the Pilecki Institute 
founded in 2017, and other radical memory 
agents, exercises the repressive erasure of the 
field of critical history of Holocaust studies by 
applying legal measures and denying funding to 
academic institutions and individuals that con-
duct research into the dark national past. The 
prescriptive forgetting of Jedwabne and other 
dark aspects of Polish-Jewish relations before, 
during and after the Holocaust are presented 
as a necessary measure in the interests of the 
entire Polish collective – and are therefore pub-
licly acknowledged as being an essential part of 
historical policy to serve the Polish nation.
Circles of PiS’s  
Counter Revolution
The academic community of historians and 
other scholars and artists have been watch-
ing with concern, if not tribulation,83 various 
past and present attempts and future plans on 
the part of the PiS to reshape the humanities 
and the production of historical knowledge in 
higher education and the history curriculum 
at schools,84 national cultural institutions and 
various NGOs – agents of civil society.85 
The PiS government does not hide the fact 
that it financially supports institutions of higher 
education that propagate a “radical ethno-na-
tionalist Catholic ideology” such as the Higher 
School of Social Culture and Media in Toruń, 
an institute of journalism created by the radical 
Father Tadeusz Rydzyk. By mid- 2019, Rydzyk’s 
multiple “empire” was awarded 214 million 
złotych of state support from a wide range of 
government sources.86 
In this way, the PiS invests in building a 
strong parallel community of experts – a “coun-
ter-intellectual elite” – that would faithfully 
endorse and implement its hardcore historical 
policy.87 In 2017, as part of building a parallel 
“counter civil society” to the liberal civil society, 
the PiS launched the National Freedom Insti-
tute – Center for Civil Society Development 
(Narodowy Instytut Wolności – Centrum Ro-
zwoju Społeczeństwa Obywatelskiego),88 whose 
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main mission is to financially support such a 
parallel “counter civil society.” In August 2019, 
the National Freedom Institute distributed the 
first grants for around 86 million Polish złotych 
among 154 organizations. The recipients of sub-
stantial grants in the first round included two 
pro-PiS media foundations and a pro-PiS organ-
ization devoted to defending the good name of 
Poland.89 Among other awarded organizations, 
20 were directly linked to the ruling politicians, 
14 were linked to PiS allies and 24 were affiliat-
ed with the Church and Catholic values.90 
T he PiS government also does not hide the fact that it withdraws grants from 
institutions of higher education, such as the 
Warsaw-based Center for Holocaust Studies, 
that are engaged in critical history writing.91 
The denial of grants, the dismissal of directors 
of important cultural institutions and the ap-
pointment of loyal individuals to replace them, 
as well as not renewing employment contracts, 
such as was case of Dariusz Stola, the first Di-
rector of the POLIN Museum, have become key 
punitive methods in the PiS’s “zero-sum war” 
against the pluralistic liberal vision of the na-
tional past, its memory agents and its achieve-
ments in mnemonic practices. 
The PiS’s dismissal in early April 2017 of 
Paweł Machcewicz as the first Director of the 
Museum of the Second World War and the 
subsequent full merger of the Museum with 
the Museum of Westerplatte and the War of 
September 1939 is another example of the use 
of harsh punitive methods against national 
memorialization institutions and professional 
historians who do not propagate the “Polono-
centric” and ethno-nationalist vision of the Sec-
ond World War.92 In addition, the PiS appears 
to be launching another potentially successful 
strategy of disseminating its historical policy by 
creating parallel institutions to the institutions 
that it is unable to take over. 
The launching of the Muzeum Getta 
Warszawskiego (the Warsaw Ghetto Muse-
um) on February 28, 2018 can be viewed as a 
spectacular application of this latter strategy. At 
a press conference on March 7, 2018, Minister 
of Culture, Piotr Gliński, introduced the new 
museum as “a museum of brotherly love and 
solidarity between the two nations,” Poles and 
Jews.93 On the same day, the POLIN Museum of 
the History of Polish Jews opened its temporary 
exhibition, Stranger at Home (Obcy w domu), 
showing the devastating impact of anti-Semi-
tism on Polish Jews in 1968 and beyond. Some 
commentators are in no doubt that the Warsaw 
Ghetto Museum has been conceived as a coun-
ter-memory institution to the POLIN Museum. 
Though the official opening of the Warsaw 
Ghetto Museum is scheduled for 2023, the 
institution has already launched five temporary 
exhibitions and educational programs for high 
school teachers.  
Conclusion
Overall, various developments in the last three 
decades show that both elites and non-elites 
in the country share an increasingly strong in-
terest and emotional attachment to the history 
of 20th century Poland. The Polish memorial-
ization landscape is bulging in the number of 
memorial sites, a variety of commemorative 
practices on local, regional and national levels, 
and has many new special commemorative 
dates in the national calendar. 
The number of visits to the hundreds of new 
museums created after 1989 reached 38 million 
in 2018.94 However in Poland, in contrast to 
Germany, civil society has been increasingly 
marginalized in the memorialization practices 
under the rule of PiS government, which wants 
to maintain full control of memorialization gov-
ernance. Thus, the memorialization landscape 
has become heavily fragmented and divisive. 
L ike other countries of the post-communist region, the national past in contemporary 
Poland is still considered “precious gold” in the 
current culture wars over national identity and 
politics. Contemporary Poland has transformed 
itself into a “bloody battlefield” between vari-
ous versions of its national past. This national 
past cannot be easily overcome as it is pivotal to 
the current process of defining national identity 
and the shape and condition of the Polish state.
In the post-1989 period, two major phases of 
memorialization of the national past have de-
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veloped in the country and, at present, we can 
talk about the existence of the “memory bank” 
and mnemonic practices that belong to the 
pluralistic liberal restorative phase that origi-
nated after 1989 and the “memory bank” of the 
anti-pluralistic, illiberal restorative phase that 
fully emerged with the ascendancy to power of 
the first PiS government in 2005. Since 2015, 
the anti-pluralistic, illiberal restorative phase 
has gained the upper hand over the former and, 
in fact, has committed all its efforts to the mar-
ginalization, if not, the full-scale eradication of 
the former from the public sphere – for good. 
T here is no doubt that in the current cli-mate of the “zero-sum war” over nation-
al memories, the management of memorial 
sites, museums, educational and research 
facilities has increasingly become the subject 
of heavy-handed memory politics. Unlike in 
Germany, the current PiS government agencies 
appear to be intervening on a mass scale in 
memory management in order to achieve their 
goals by applying a variety of punitive measures 
such as the withdrawal of funding, the dismissal 
of directors, the censorship of exhibitions– and 
by legal means. Since 2015, the PiS government 
has openly proclaimed a counter-revolution of 
memory practices that aim to permanently mar-
ginalize the liberal democratic elites, its civil 
society and its pluralistic, liberal democratic 
memorialization culture. 
To accomplish the counter-revolution, the 
PiS government is engaged in the systematic 
building of a parallel “counter national panthe-
on of heroes”, a parallel “counter community 
of scholars/intellectual elites” and parallel 
“counter civil society”. At present, the PiS’s 
counter-revolution of the memorialization 
of the national past along the traditions of an 
exclusivist ethno-national, mono-religious 
and mono-cultural Poland, is not considered 
to be finalized. It is an ongoing project aiming 
at reshaping all aspects of national culture and 
history. The PiS’s counter revolution is also 
directed at reshaping the mass media, judiciary 
and educational systems. One of the key and 
unprecedented dangers of the PiS’s current 
memory politics is the radical shift to the right 
and a gradual merger with the most radical 
version of the ethno-nationalist past advocated 
by extreme fascist parties and organizations 
with a pre-war xenophobic, anti-Semitic and 
racist heritage. This actually means open-
ing a Pandora’s box of radical memories and 
radical memory practices that could not only 
significantly influence future memorialization 
governance and its practices, but it could also 
significantly influence the future condition of 
the Polish state and society.
T he PiS and its radical allies are particular-ly targeting the eradication of the Polish 
school of critical history writing on the difficult 
past in Polish-Jewish relations. At the same 
time, they are feeding on Holocaust memorial-
ization practices for the purpose of acquiring 
new models and strategies for developing their 
own version of remembrance of the national 
past. 
On the one hand, this process indicates the 
increasing rejection of the Western model of 
memorialization of the Holocaust as a funda-
mental event in European history of the 20th 
century95 and, on the other, a skillful exploita-
tion of this Western model of commemoration, 
in terms of both its forms and its content. It 
reveals that the cultures of apology and repent-
ance – the two pillars of European frames of the 
1990s – of commemorating the Holocaust as a 
pivotal event of the 20th century, are rejected 
by the right-wing conservative ethno-nation-
alist post-communist elites. Thus, the future 
memorialization of the Holocaust based on the 
Western model of the 1990s might be substi-
tuted by a new home-based memorialization/
(anti)-memorialization of the Holocaust.96 
That the new home-grown ethno-nation-
alist version of the (anti)-memorialization of 
the Holocaust is filled with new-old modified 
anti-Semitic narratives and anti-Jewish tropes. 
In many ways, it constitutes the counter-me-
morialization of the Western model of memo-
rialization practices of the Holocaust of the 
1990s and early 2000s.97 This is not only an 
alarming development in Poland, but also in 
other post-communist countries in which local 
radical ethno-nationalists have embarked on 
It is an ongoing 
project aiming 
at reshaping 















































similar strategies of reworking their national 
history of World War II and the Holocaust in 
order to emphasize their own victimhood and 
“collective innocence” with regard to the treat-
ment of their respective Jewish and also other 
minorities.98
 At this point, we do not know how the 
current PiS counter-revolution of memory 
governance will play out and when it will 
end. No doubt, the following troubling global 
developments such as the culture of post-truth 
and “alternative knowledge”, increasing social 
and psychological fear caused by the Covid-19 
pandemic and climate change, a shift to the po-
litical right in the Western world, including the 
USA, and the rise of extremism on the left and 
right, might influence future memory politics 
and memorialization culture and its practices in 
Poland. For now, what we can be certain about 
is that heavy-handed memory politics as a tool 
of a total counter revolution will remain a major 
feature of PiS’s governed Poland. ● 
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after the fall of 
the communist 
regime was 
an element of 
the democratic 
transition.
he article discusses the current position 
of Hungarian historiography towards 
the role of the recent history of Hun-
garian identity and its relationship to 
domestic policy. 
The democratic transition after 1989 con-
tributed to a substantial change in historical 
scholarship through the dismissal of censor-
ship, the opening of archives and the lifting of 
the ideological pressure on research. However, 
the change in the historical self-portrayal of 
Hungary after the fall of the communist regime 
was an element of the democratic transition. 
This article describes the process of the use 
of historical arguments in forming national 
attitudes and self-identity in several political 
circles in Hungary over the last three decades, 
with special attention being paid to the activi-
ties and ideas of Jozsef Antall and Victor Orban. 
The experiences of the 1956 revolution were 
initially focused on as an anchoring point for 
national identity after the fall of communism. 
During the course of these years, the center 
of political attention shifted to the proposed 
anti-communist and anti-left-wing interpreta-
tion of Hungarian history from March 1944 to 
May 1990, and, as will be discussed later, it is 
aligned with the attitude of the ruling circles. 
The state’s substantial initiatives in the field 
of the politics of memory in recent years are 
noteworthy, particularly in the early formation 
of the 1956 Institute (est. 1991), followed by 
the Institute of the 20th Century (XX. Század 
Intézet, est. 1999), the House of Terror Museum 
(Terror Háza Múzeum, est. 2002), the Institute 
for Research on Communism (Kommuniz-
muskutató Intézet, est. 2011), the Institute for 
Political Transformation Research and Archive 
(Rendszerváltás Történetét Kutató Intézet es 






















TAS Research Institute for History (VERITAS 
Történetkutató Intézet, est. 2013), the National 
Remembrance Committee (Nemzeti Emlékezet 
Bizottsága, NEB, est. 2013) and the Institute of 
National Heritage (Nemzeti Örökség Intézete, 
est. 2013). 
Contemporary History Discourses  
in Hungary after 1989 
The three decades since the beginning of 
democratic change in Hungary are a short time 
in the history of historiography. It is extremely 
difficult to draw up a report of these years that 
would cover all the issues of historiography 
– even about a relatively small country like 
Hungary. 
The Hungarian historiography of this 
period was presented most comprehensively 
in mid-2012 by two young historians: Balázs 
Trencsényi and Péter Apor.1 According to these 
historians, fundamental changes have taken 
place in this field, out of which, interestingly, 
the dissemination of theories and methods of 
social history were the most important. Hun-
gary has also experienced an apparent gener-
ational change (but not revolutionary), as well 
as some methodological innovations of West-
ern historiography. Nevertheless, this “guild” 
of historians remained adamant in its strong 
objectivist attitude (which could even be called 
a consensus). Trencsényi and Apor considered 
not only academic but also public discourse. 
They noted that parallel to the process of 
de-ideologization of the former, the latter was 
being re-ideologized. In their opinion, historians 
participating in public discourse are, to a large 
extent, researchers who are poorly integrated 
into the “guild” or have been excluded from 
it, remaining on the periphery of the field and 
unanimously opting for a nationalist perspec-
tive. In their publication, the authors also asked 
the following fundamental question: 
It remains to be seen —and most 
probably will be the topic of the essay 
somebody will write in 2015 about 
the Hungarian historiography of the 
first decade of the third Millennium 
—whether this apparent plurality will 
have a paideistic value. That would 
entail the socialization of the old and 
new participants into a communica-
tive culture where one has to accept 
the existence of radically divergent 
approaches and ideological directions 
and, what is more, learn to translate 
The House of Terror 
Museum, Budapest, was 
established in 2002, and 
has become an attractive 
destination for people 















































them into one’s language in order to 
utilize some of their findings. Alter-
natively, plurality might well lead to 
the formation of mutually exclusive 
sub-cultures, based on specific internal 
norms of selection and vehement emo-
tions towards the “insiders” who seem 
to possess the truth, and towards the 
“uninitiated,” who are at best “uninter-
ested” or right-away “inimical.” In this 
case, it is a further question whether it 
will be possible at all to retain the plu-
rality of sub-cultures in the long run. 
It may happen at some point that some 
political elite in power will tilt the 
balance to such an extent that it will 
become possible to re-impose a certain 
ideological homogenization.2
Trencsényi and Apor still then believed that 
Hungarian historiography:
[…] will be able to reformulate itself 
in a way that valorizes multiplic-
ity not only in terms of the usual 
post-Herderian (or post-modern) 
legitimation, according to which every 
national culture adds something to the 
completion of human culture, but in 
the other direction as well, realizing 
that a culture gets richer and more in-
teresting, and opens more windows to 
the external world, by the multiplicity 
of the pasts, sub-cultures, and alterna-
tive intellectual canons it manages to 
incorporate.3
T he following partial report is precisely an attempt to answer the question of wheth-
er this has actually happened. This will be 
achieved by presenting the general characteris-
tics of the current situation – in which I analyze 
the politics of memory, taking into account its 
general assumptions, discourse and institution-
al dimension. 
Before 1989, the elite of Hungarian histori-
ography (namely, the Institute of History of 
the Hungarian Academy of Sciences, several 
university departments and independent 
renowned researchers at various institutions) 
was part of the cream of European science. 
This group lived on a small island of freedom, 
relatively less restricted in freedom of decision, 
information exchange and opinion forming. In 
such conditions, significant works were creat-
ed, including the entire creative output of the 
authors; schools were formed, and personal and 
business contacts were established across bor-
ders.4 It could be argued that this elite – taking 
into account its personal experience of scien-
tific democracy – generally opted for liberal 
and democratic values. After 1989, the situation 
changed, and opportunities opened up for 
almost anyone who was able to take part in an 
unrestrained international and national debate. 
However, research on recent history was then 
in a particular situation. Like other Soviet bloc 
countries, there was hardly any historiography 
of the most recent scholarly history of Hungary 
before the fall of communism. Historians could 
not freely express their opinions or disseminate 
the results of their research (very few decided 
to publish in the underground circulation or 
in the West because, naturally, in this way they 
could write freely.) As a matter of fact, the en-
tire field of science was established after 1989. 
Thus, in comparison with the previous situa-
tion, progress was evident.
1989 also appeared to be a fortunate year for 
many other reasons. Firstly, the Soviet-type 
system not only controlled and limited scien-
tific and humanities research but paradoxically 
also gave it the status of a higher authority. Also, 
in the relatively liberal countries in this respect 
– Hungary and Poland – only research that 
was committed and “correct” from an ideolog-
ical point of view was called “academic”. This 
perception was one of the levers of the com-
munist modernization project. Now that they 
have been equipped with this kind of authority, 
recent history researchers have become among 
the main participants in democratic transfor-
mations. From 1988 to 1989, they could explain, 
without hindrance, the importance of the 
recent past for the emerging democracy.
Secondly, something else that happened in 
Hungary in 1989 was the “Archival Revolution”. 
The system’s information monopoly ceased to 
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exist and various archives became available. In 
the case of some research teams, the process 
was particularly challenging (and still is, as in 
the case of archives on the political police, for-
eign affairs, etc.). However, the fact that it was 
a breakthrough is undeniable. Having said that, 
the Act on Personal Data Protection of 1992 
limited access to files. Thus, only “research-
ers” who had “a statement of support from an 
institution established to conduct academic 
research” gained rights. In this way, democratic 
legislation established – not in a very demo-
cratic way – a virtual hierarchy of professional 
researchers.
A fter 1989, historians of modern history (as well as researchers of other epochs) 
faced several challenges. One of these challeng-
es concerned the rehabilitation and release of 
communicative memory5 and multilateral inter-
pretation.6 Until the end of the Soviet system, 
mythological and cult stories existed about the 
national past. These stories had been inherit-
ed and passed on, but were not really widely 
disseminated; dissemination was happening, 
but only to a small extent; see György on this 
subject.7 This traditional collective narrative 
concentrated on politics and nation – exploited, 
betrayed and innocent. The particular experi-
ences of each participant or witness of events 
have finally come to the fore. After such a long 
silence, if there was no confrontation between 
the different experiences, it worked like 
lightning. Access to the memories of Western 
emigration was extremely limited and, in Hun-
gary, only designated people from the group of 
authors responsible for presenting the official 
interpretation could comment on them. It was 
similar to publications in the underground cir-
culation – although memoirs were placed there, 
they did not reflect the pluralism of collective 
memory. An example was the independent 
magazine Beszélö. One can read about the the-
oretical aspects of this situation in a Hungarian 
and international context in Kovács.8 The sec-
ond challenge was to undermine the authority 
of science, which was taken over from its prede-
cessors and apparently strengthened during the 
period of political transformation. Who else, 
other than historians, supported the cosmo-
politan communist vision of the past? The third 
challenge was the need for methodological re-
newal. Epistemological doubts and skepticism 
also affected the scientific micro-community, 
who worked for the new historical legitimacy 
of democratic transformations. The challeng-
es added up. “Research” in vain indicated, for 
example, that the trend which came to the 
fore was actually a memory shaped by the new 
situation and filtered through the experience 
of thirty years of Kadarism. The conflict had 
become inevitable.
The biggest challenge was the new politics 
of memory. In the last phase of the Soviet-type 
system, this policy had increasingly less influ-
ence on historiography. In fact, it was limited to 
the supervision of a few taboo issues. This was 
particularly the case in 1956 when the critical 
moment was not October 23, or even November 
4, but actually December 1956, when the Kádár 
regime was set up. The official interpretation 
of 1956, canonical and carefully guarded, had 
stopped being willingly conceptualized already 
a few years after the revolution. Memorials, cre-
ated within the framework of the former mem-
ory policy, were not numerous or perceived 
by everyone as empty. In 1989, the politics of 
memory began to strive for new aims, and the 
history of Hungary began to be explained in a 
more pluralistic way. The representatives of the 
political sphere reported a need for history – 
each of them for their own ends. Sooner or later, 
each of them began to claim exclusivity for their 
particular narrative. In Hungary, however, the 
use of history, the intensity of the phenomenon, 
and its dynamics have taken on a specific form – 
on the use of history.9
T he political elite is always keen to use historical arguments and this is also the 
case in Hungary. Among the forces that took 
part in the political changes, it was the liberal 
opposition to a Soviet-type system (the repre-
sentatives of this trend defined themselves in 
the publications of the time as the “democratic 
opposition”) that primarily referred to the dem-
ocratic chapters of recent Hungarian history. 
These chapters included modernization and 
Until the 
end of the 
Soviet system, 
mythological 
















































the anti-nationalist radicalism from the begin-
ning of the 20th century, the democratic oppo-
sition of the Horthy era and, in particular, the 
democratic and left-wing ideological trends of 
the post-war period (particularly the thoughts 
of István Bibó, whose “discovery” is a merit 
of the democratic opposition) and 1956. The 
popular nationalist opposition trend originated 
precisely in the opposition to Horthy’s rule and, 
for a long time, it appeared that it would adopt 
the democratic traditions of the periods after 
1945 and 1956. It also appeared that it would 
contribute to the development of an everyday 
discourse necessary for undertaking collective 
actions and achieving common goals. The sym-
bolic space of 1989 was dominated by history, 
including the memory of the revolution and 
uprising of 1956.
However, the shared history soon came to an 
end. In the new democracy, the participants of 
public life took a different view of the need for 
historical legitimacy. They built their identi-
ty unevenly based on a common, historizing 
language – and even used different stories in 
its construction. When the first law on the 
historical significance of the events of 1956 
was drafted in the new democratically elected 
parliament, the seemingly common politics of 
memory turned out to be fractured. The win-
ners of the election, the leaders of the Hungar-
ian Democratic Forum (MDF), overlooked the 
name of Imre Nagy in the text of the resolution. 
In doing so, they made it clear that they rejected 
the leftist interpretations of the revolution and 
its symbolic leader (who was a communist). 
The differences became even more pronounced 
during the disputes over the coat of arms of the 
Republic of Hungary and national holidays. 
Instead of the so-called “Kossuth Coat of Arms” 
from 1956, they opted for a coat of arms with a 
crown that was in force until 1944, and Au-
gust 20 was nominated for the status of a public 
holiday, equal to both March 15 and October 23. 
This meant that the focus shifted from the 
commemoration of the late-modern democratic 
and independence movements to an emphasis 
on the thousand-year-old historical continuity 
of the Hungarian state, within which the issue 
of democratic emancipation could best be 
emphasized. The new Prime Minister, József 
Antall, was a historian by education, so it can be 
assumed that this turn of events was the result 
of a conscious decision.
Antall made it possible – without any ex-ceptional successes – to take up the issue 
of the vetting of members of parliament and 
officials, as well as reparations for the victims 
of communism, but was not very active in other 
areas of the politics of memory. Despite various 
attempts, he did not change the institutional 
shape of the Hungarian Academy of Sciences 
(MTA). Instead, he respected the autonomy of 
universities, the effect of which was that uni-
versity staff did not change for some time. The 
archives of the Communist Party (1948–1989) 
were nationalized, but the remnants of the for-
mer party archives and Party History Institute 
were transformed into a research institute of 
recent history, only moderately linked to the 
Hungarian Socialist Party. The only newly 
established institution that was dedicated to 
research into contemporary Hungarian history 
was the 1956 Institute (1991). The establish-
ment of the 1956 Institute proved the unique 
role that the memory of the revolution played 
during the period of political changes. The 
second new institution entirely related to the 
name of George Soros, who also supported the 
1956 Institute. The Open Society Archives were 
established in 1995 within the framework of the 
Central European University, which has since 
become a significant research institution and 
archive of contemporary history, using modern 
methods in its work.
In the first years after the fall of communism, 
the strongest opposition to national conserva-
tives was the liberal side of the political scene. 
The liberals attempted to develop an alternative 
vision of the past in which a clear emphasis was 
placed on the opposition and critical activities 
against the Soviet system (which the conserva-
tive side tried to present as unimportant at the 
time). At that time, the socialists were passive 
in this respect for obvious reasons – many of 
their leaders came from the second or third 
row of the elite of Kádár’s time. After winning 
the 1994 elections, the socialists made several 
In the first years 




to national  
conservatives 
was the liberal 























gestures (the party leader and Prime Minister 
Gyula Horn ostentatiously placed a wreath on 
the grave of Imre Nagy) but left the politics of 
memory to their coalition partners, the Alliance 
of Free Democrats (SZDSZ). From then on, 
the national conservatives began to emphasize 
their anti-communism, which until then was 
just one of the elements of their eclectic politics 
of memory. When the Hungarian Civic Alliance 
(FIDESZ), formerly a liberal-alternative group 
– which at the time was changing its point of 
view to a national-conservative one – won 
the elections in 1998, its leader, Viktor Orbán, 
partially drew on Antall’s achievements. The 
thousand-year-old Hungarian statehood had 
once again become the center of the politics of 
memory, rhetoric and symbolism. From 2000 to 
2001, a real ceremony was conducted in which 
the crown of St. Stephen was moved from the 
National Museum to Parliament and placed in 
the center of the most representative and im-
pressive hall under the dome of the building.
A ntall was also associated with the view that the era of communism was a “dead 
end” in the history of Hungary. According to 
this thesis, the events of 1944–1945 interrupted 
the (legal) continuity of Hungarian statehood. 
The only exception to the whole post-war 
period was 1956 – a mythical event that lasted 
only a moment and remained ineffective. In the 
meantime, Orbán inscribed the year 1956 very 
strongly in the narrative of the politics of mem-
ory on the subject of recent history. According 
to it, from 1945–1990, Hungarian society experi-
enced a series of injustices that gradually, and 
with no exceptions, touched the entire commu-
nity. The repressions had a double character: on 
the one hand, they were created by foreigners 
(Soviets) and on the other hand by the Hungar-
ian left. 
In order to develop and present this nar-
rative, new institutions were created. The 
Institute of the 20th Century was established in 
1999 to deal with the period after the Second 
World War, and the Institute of the 21st Century 
in 2001 to study the new Hungarian democra-
cy. At the same time, in 1998, state support for 
previously established institutions dedicated 
to recent history (such as the 1956 Institute and 
the Institute of Political History, which were 
supported by both the MDF and socialist gov-
ernments), was withdrawn. Finally, in 2002, the 
House of Terror was established which, in the 
new narrative, served as the central memorial 
site. Its permanent exhibition established a 
direct continuity between the Hungarian Nazis 
and the communists. This opinion was not 
only supported by the accidental fact that the 
secret communist police seized the abandoned 
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headquarters of the Hungarian Nazi staff in 
1945. According to the creators of the House of 
Terror (the most important of which was Mária 
Schmidt, political advisor to Viktor Orbán, 
Director of the Institutes of the 20th and 21st 
centuries and the House of Terror), the main 
criterion for continuity was violence. However, 
according to the exposition of the House of Ter-
ror, the violence used by the communist regime 
was more widespread and overwhelming than, 
for example, the participation of the Hungarian 
state in the extermination of the Jews. Natural-
ism in the style of Madame Tussauds (torture 
chambers recreated in basements) skillfully 
and on a large scale, combined with interactive 
multimedia forms of the 21st century, together 
created a very suggestive form. The exhibition 
triggered strong emotions. The problem was 
its simplistic perspective and proportions. For 
this reason, the House of Terror has provoked a 
fiery debate and contributed to an even greater 
politicization of the discourse on recent history.
T he government of the socialist-liberal coalition, which returned to power in 
2002, did not limit the activities of the House 
of Terror. The exhibition has not changed, and 
the museum has become an attractive destina-
tion for people with national and conservative 
views. It has also become one of Budapest’s 
attractions. The socialists still had no answer; 
only after his second election victory in 2006 
did Prime Minister Ferenc Gyurcsány present 
his own initiative in the politics of memory, 
although it was strictly addressed to his own 
political camp. He admitted that the Socialist 
Party had to choose between the legacies of 
Imre Nagy and János Kádár. He himself opted 
for Nagy and the leftist heritage of 1956. The 
Conservatives accepted this with mistrust, 
considering it empty rhetoric or even fraud, 
just as they rejected all other moves of the Head 
of Government. However, Gyurcsány’s polit-
ical environment did not accept it with much 
enthusiasm.
Meanwhile, the discourse on recent history 
(along with the main dividing lines) also  
covered the period of political transformation. 
The growing extreme right-wing developed 
two old conservative theses on the subject, both 
from the early 1990s. The first was critical of 
the transformation, mainly due to the lack of 
a radical exchange of elites. According to the 
second, the consequences had to be delivered 
against those who were responsible for the 
“sins” of the previous system. The radical right 
wing claimed that there had been no change of 
regime at all because “old communists” held all 
the decision-making positions. Thus, not only 
the perpetrators responsible for the old system 
but also the authors of the transformation must 
be brought to justice. 
In 2010, once again, the victorious right-wing, national-conservative politics of memory 
could draw on the experience of the past 20 
years. In fact, it was supplemented by one 
element, peculiarly “modernizing” the thesis 
from the interwar period, which stated that 
in the 20th century, every left-wing party was 
always anti-national in its aims, sometimes 
directly serving foreign powers. This appeared 
to be a continuation of one of the fundamental 
areas of Horthy’s discourse, according to which 
the Treaty of Trianon was the responsibility 
of Hungarian liberals, radicals, leftists, Jews 
and communists. The Declaration of National 
Cooperation issued in 2010 called the period 
from 1990–2010 “decades of confusion after 
the transformation of the political system.” The 
preamble to the constitution adopted in 2011, 
partially contradicting the previous declaration, 
stated that “We proclaim that the self-determi-
nation of our State, lost on March 19, 1944, was 
restored on May 2, 1990, with the formation of 
our first freely elected representative body.” 
This step backwards only shows that in the eu-
phoria of the great victory of 2010, the politics 
of memory used very extreme ideas, such as the 
concept of the “revolution” of 2010 (an expres-
sion used by Victor Orbán in his speech after 
the announcement of the 2010 election results). 
The national rhetoric remained unchanged, 
emphasizing the injustice suffered, denying 
and postponing responsibility. The entire 20th 
century is inscribed in the uniform history of 
national suffering. The history of Hungary is 
devoid of continuity, but its dead end is not just 
The House 
of Terror has 
provoked a fiery 
debate and 
contributed to 


























a Soviet-type system in all its forms. The narra-
tive has been extended to include the negation 
of the value of modernization (of the Western 
type). The number of socio-political traumas 
that had already dominated the discourse about 
the past may be increased by those from the pe-
riod of political transformation. Among them, 
the subject of the extermination of Hungarian 
Jews, including the responsibility of the Hun-
garian administration and society for the deaths 
of more than half a million Hungarian citizens 
and the disenfranchisement of even more of 
them is still not present.10
A fter 2010 in Hungary, the state invested heavily in consolidating this vision of the 
past. A number of new institutions have been 
established: the Institute for Political Trans-
formation Research (Rendszerváltás Történetét 
Kutató Intézet), the VERITAS Research 
Institute for History (VERITAS Történetkutató 
Intézet), Institute for Research on Communism 
(Kommunizmuskutató Intézet), the National 
Remembrance Committee (Nemzeti Emlékezet 
Bizottsága), the Institute of National Heritage 
(Nemzeti Örökség Intézet), in which at least 
three or four times as many people are engaged 
in research into the history of the 20th century 
as were engaged at the end of the previous dec-
ade. The research conducted there is gener-
ously subsidized – in the Hungarian budget for 
2015, approximately HUF 3 billion was allocat-
ed to these institutions. In 2016 the amount was 
even higher as the government allocated 13.5 
billion forints to celebrate the 70th anniversary 
of the revolution and the 1956 uprising. These 
funds are administered by a committee headed 
by Mária Schmidt, the leading representative 
of the politics of memory of the FIDESZ party. 
It is planned that more than one half of this 
sum will be donated to central ceremonies and 
other state celebrations). The heads of these 
institutions do not hide the fact that they have 
set themselves a militant goal – to get rid of the 
“left-wing interpretation of history,” which, 
according to them, previously dominated. Part 
of their strategy is the introduction of a new 
canon into centralized state education. It is only 
a matter of time as a framework curriculum is 
already in place. Also, an entire series of uni-
form and compulsory textbooks is being pre-
pared. Attempts were made to create and renew 
existing places of remembrance (in real and 
virtual space), the culmination of which was to 
be the Monument of the German Occupation, 
erected on Liberty Square in Budapest in 2015. 
Unexpected social resistance partially foiled 
this intention, because the monument actually 
Monument to the victims 
of the German occupa-
tion, Szabadság square, 
Budapest. Live exhibition 
of the demonstrators.














































became an essential place of protest against 
nationalist historical politics.
From the above description, we can clearly 
see how one-sided this history is. The Hungari-
an right-wing, from its folk origins through An-
tall’s conservative experiment to the right-wing 
radicalism of Orbán and his companions, has 
always pursued the politics of memory. Many 
times (even today) one can get the impression 
that in relation to the humanities and culture, 
the right wing is basically only interested in 
recent history. However, the silence of the Hun-
garian left on issues related to the politics of 
memory remains almost unchanged. The efforts 
of the liberals to disseminate a realistic picture 
of their own nation proved to be inadequate 
and ineffective. The alternative left-wing vision 
of the past is primarily defensive. And even if 
this is not always the case, at the heart of it is 
often an abstract understanding of progress and 
modernization.
To some extent, this also applies to the period 
of the Soviet-type system. However, it does not 
bring any extraordinary successes. The current 
visions of the recent history of the individual 
political camps are incompatible. The “left-
wing interpretation of history” faces the same 
dilemmas for the future as all non-political (or 
non-nationalist-ethnicist) narratives about 
history, just like every kind of representation 
of the past, such as conservative, avant-garde 
and all those in between that are analytical and 
comprehensible, faces the same dilemmas, or 
perhaps those in particular.
In the mid-2000s, Balázs Trencsényi and Péter Apor, in the text cited in the introduction, 
expressed doubts as to whether a pluralistic 
Hungarian historiography would develop a dis-
course between the camps of different method-
ological and ideological approaches. They also 
did not rule out a scenario in which particular 
trends would be transformed into subcultures, 
closed to each other and not undertaking a 
substantive dialogue. As they warned, in such 
a case “it could be that at some point some polit-
ical elite in power will tilt the balance to such an 
extent that it will become possible to re-impose 
a certain ideological homogenization”.11 More 
than ten years later, it can be said that modern 
Hungarian historians are guided by a funda-
mentally different ethos in their work. There 
is still little dialogue between the methodolog-
ical subcultures. Today, political procurement 
contractors are primarily active on the national 
and conservative side, and they perform this 
role with extraordinary commitment. Although 
there are some conversations, at the present 
time there is virtually no hope that debates on 
historiography will be conducted in a reasona-
ble way on the basis of common democratic or 
professional values. Balázs Ablonczy saw it in a 
similar way: 
Historians and researchers of society 
generally note with resignation the 
lack of precise notions, the confusion 
of orders, important and unimportant 
aspects, the interference of politicians 
in the sphere of collective memory; 
they address new and fiery appeals to 
the nation/society or to taxpayers in 
which they call for a pluralistic view of 
history. Unfortunately, that will never 
work. Because it cannot. (...) Public 
opinion still prefers simple expla-
nations; there is no need for despair 
about it. Sentences starting with ‘let 
politicians not interfere in this’ will 
only make sense if the slogan ‘Trianon’ 
no longer evokes emotions among vot-
ers. Until this happens, politicians will 
talk about it. It will improve if we stop 
the suicidal tendencies and instead of 
‘Trianon or…’we say ‘Trianon, so…’. If 
we understand and acknowledge the 
suffering of others and do not treat our 
own history as a game.12
The regime in power since 2010 is clearly 
striving for ideological homogenization and 
this goal is, of course, shared by the camp of 
national-conservative historians. A pessimistic 
scenario predicted by Trencsényi and Apor has 
now become a reality.
A positive politics of memory could be an 
opportunity for the future. But do we even need 






















between historiography and this influential 
form of communicative memory look like? 
The question is difficult, not only regarding 
the current situation in Hungary. A “positive” 
politics of memory means accepting critical 
and comprehensible descriptions of the past, 
encouraging such a perspective and cultivating 
a tradition based on democratic values. From 
such a standpoint, the answer to the first ques-
tion may be affirmative. However, historiogra-
phy – with its constant changeability, creation 
of new stories and dynamics that undermine 
the truthfulness, approach and methods of 
previous narratives – should stay away from 
any politics of memory. For this, it would be 
enough to acquire knowledge, understanding 
and guarantees of free debate, if any. A historian 
does not need the politics of memory. Of course, 
regardless of what happens, it still exists and 
will continue to exist.
A t the beginning of 2015, the organizers of a discussion asked the participants, 
historians, whether historiography has the 
tools to enable a nation to develop its own 
realistic self-image. Is there anything we can 
do about the actions of politicians who attempt 
to mythologize history and re-evaluate it? The 
answer to both questions is rather negative. Of 
course, proposals can be made about specific 
topics. for example, indicating the extent to 
which research on solidarity and social tradi-
tions, workers’ and peasants’ movements, social 
democracy, direct democracy of 1956, as well as 
democratic opposition, has disappeared from 
the agenda of Hungarian historiography. For 
example, in the European Union Framework 
Programme Horizon 2020, one of the main 
priorities of the specific program in the field of 
social sciences known as “Reflective Societies” 
is called “Cultural opposition in the former 
socialist countries” since 2014. So even if this 
topic is not particularly popular in individual 
countries, it has provoked some interest in the 
international academic world. However, the 
situation of historiography in Hungary will only 
change when the entire country frees itself from 
the impasse. This depends on the will of the Hun-
garian people and their determination. ●
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have been  
prosecuted.
y now, post-communist Romania 
has had three decades to reckon 
with the legacies of its repres-
sive pasts and the results are 
rather modest. By the time Nicolae Ceausescu 
was ousted from power, Romania had to come 
to terms with three recent pasts marred by 
gross human rights violations. The legacies of 
all of these pasts were likely to affect the new 
democracy, their rights abuses had never been 
adequately addressed before December 1989, 
and these three pasts differed in the nature 
and scope of their rights violations.
The most immediate past was the brief but 
violent December 1989 Revolution, during 
which 1,100 people died and 3,300 were 
wounded by police and armed forces.1 The 
communist regime of 1945–1989 was the 
second past that claimed the attention of the 
new leaders, since none of the crimes the 
regime perpetrated had been redressed and 
the surviving victims still called for recogni-
tion and justice.2 Third, the pro-Nazi rule of 
Marshall Ion Antonescu and the Iron Guard 
(1940–1944) constituted yet another grue-
some past characterized by a distinct set of 
state-led crimes that affected another set of 
victims who, in turn, demanded justice.3 In 
what follows, let me first summarize Roma-
nian transitional justice efforts as I see them, 
and then raise some points about its efficacy.
Reckoning in Post-Communist  
Romania
Numerous judicial and non-judicial programs 
have been adopted during the last three dec-
ades in an effort to reckon with the legacies of 
these three repressive pasts. During the 1990s, 
Romanian courts prosecuted the army officers 
who ordered troops to shoot at the protesters 
who in December 1989 peacefully gathered in 
public squares to revolt against Ceausescu’s 
dictatorship. By contrast, only a handful of the 
communist-era prison guards and Communist 
Party officials responsible for human rights vio-
lations have been prosecuted, and none of those 
associated with earlier Nazi crimes.4 
The country set up two history commissions 
tasked with investigating the crimes of the 
pro-Nazi regime and of the communist authori-
ties. The International Commission on the  
Holocaust in Romania, widely known as the 
Wiesel Commission after its president, Elie 
Wiesel, was created by President Ion Iliescu 
in October 2003 and delivered its report the 
following year. The Presidential Commission 
for the Study of the Communist Dictatorship in 






















Commission, was set up in 2006 by President 
Traian Basescu. Chaired by political science 
professor Vladimir Tismaneanu, the Commis-
sion submitted its report later that same year. 
On the basis of that report, President Basescu 
officially condemned the communist regime 
during a joint session of the two chambers of 
Parliament.5 Former communist-era political 
prisoners have also been rehabilitated, provided 
that they were not associated with or involved 
in Nazi crimes. Some of the property, land and 
assets confiscated by the Nazi and communist 
regimes have been returned to individuals, re-
ligious groups or ethnic communities. Rewards 
and compensation packages have been granted 
to victims of all three repressive regimes as 
lump sums or in the form of free transportation, 
cemetery plots, radio and television subscrip-
tions, access to health facilities and sanatoria.6
The most visible were the repeated efforts 
to change the “city-text” and “memoryscape”,7 
together with the memorialization of former 
victims. Statues, paintings and bas-reliefs of 
Ceausescu, his wife and other communist lead-
ers and symbols were quickly removed from the 
public space during or immediately after the 
1989 Revolution. For a time, some of the statues 
were left abandoned in a desolate park on the 
outskirts of Bucharest, a sad reminder of the 
recognition and praise Ceausescu, Gheor- 
ghiu-Dej, Lenin, Stalin and other communists 
had received until 1989. The communist slogans 
that adorned almost every factory, industrial 
plant and agricultural cooperative were erased, 
and the names of streets, parks and public 
buildings that evoked communist values and 
luminaries were replaced with names sugges-
tive of more democratic values or even neutral 
names (of flowers and trees, in some localities). 
In what turned out to be a fierce competition 
among legislators to please their local con-
stituents, Parliament bestowed the title of 
“martyr-town” (oras-martir) on a number of lo-
calities where protesters were met by army and 
police forces during December 1989 and even 
on sleepy towns where residents watched the 
revolution unfold on their television screens.8 
History museums quickly removed commu-
nist artifacts, and in some cases even exhibits 
depicting the pro-Nazi Antonescu regime, and 
a handful of new museums dedicated to victims 
of communism were opened in new locations. 
However, pro-fascist and pro-communist 
groups also insisted on commemorating the 
likes of Ceausescu or Antonescu in defiance of 
national and international criticism and despite 
the fact that new legislation prohibited Nazi 
and communist symbols. Even the majority 
Orthodox Church engaged in commemora-
tions of former priests and faithful who were 
persecuted by the communists but who had also 
been supporters of Nazi policies, leaders and 
propaganda.9
T he least known have been some symbolic initiatives meant to educate the public 
about past human rights abuses. The citizens’ 
opinion tribunal organized by some activists in 
Cluj-Napoca in September 2006 to condemn 
the crimes of the communist dictatorship has 
gathered almost no attention domestically and 
internationally, leading to no visible effects, 
although it has been one of only two such tri-
bunals organized in post-communist Europe.10 
Similar to other attempts by private individuals 
to force the speedy and complete public iden-
tification of former communist torturers, the 
The National theater 
in Piata Univesitatii, 
Bucharest, and a 
monument in remem-
brance of the events 
of December 1989 and 
June 1990. It reads “For 
Liberty and Democ-















































disclosure of the identity of former Securitate 
secret agents through the so-called “Armaged-
don” emails in 2002 was unable to convince 
the Romanian political elite to embrace a more 
thorough access to the secret archives or a more 
radical vetting program.11 Enjoying a better 
reception among at least some teachers, parents 
and children, a new textbook detailing the 
crimes of the communist regime was written 
in 2008 by researchers associated with the 
Institute for the Investigation of Communist 
Crimes in Romania, a new institution created 
in 2005 and subordinated to the Romanian gov-
ernment.12 During the 2010s, historian Marius 
Oprea and his group carried out forensic inves-
tigations in an effort to locate and identify the 
remains of some victims of communist abuse. 
And a number of oral history projects have 
been launched by civil society organizations 
like Memoria and historians associated with 
various local universities to record testimonials 
of victims of all three pasts mentioned at the 
beginning of this article.
T he most controversial was the lustration program, which was denounced as being 
too lenient by the anti-communists and too pu-
nitive by the leftist sympathizers. Rejected even 
by the legislator who single-mindedly pushed 
it through Parliament, the law which allowed 
Romanians to access the files compiled on them 
by the communist-era Securitate also permitted 
the public disclosure of past involvement with 
the secret police of individuals occupying (or 
seeking nomination and election for) a wide 
range of public offices funded by the govern-
ment.13 Verifications affected not only the 
president, legislators, magistrates and heads of 
public utilities, but also Orthodox priests, since 
their salaries were partly covered by grants 
from the government. But the wide scope of 
verifications was not matched by significant 
punishment for past collaboration. 
Indeed, instead of losing their positions of 
power and influence, these individuals were 
just asked to sign declarations stating wheth-
er they collaborated with the Securitate as a 
political police force that infringed on the rights 
of others. Those who admitted to their past 
collaboration could continue to hold public of-
fice regardless of the number or nature of their 
crimes. Those who falsely declared no involve-
ment with the Securitate had their names listed 
in the official gazette for Romanians to see; but 
most members of the public took little notice 
of those lists and made their electoral choice 
based more on economic or ideological consid-
erations than the candidates’ communist-era 
behavior.
A Preliminary Assessment
All in all, Romania’s post-1989 transitional jus-
tice record has remained modest both in scope 
and in depth. A closer look suggests that almost 
all of the initiatives adopted in that country 
have been poorly or incompletely implemented 
and have generally missed their mark. Some 
initiatives have been rejected in favor of weaker 
alternatives with less bite. For example, neither 
of the two commissions created in Romania 
was a truth commission that collected testimo-
nials from victims (and possibly victimizers) 
in public sessions like the South African or the 
Latin American truth commissions; instead 
both resembled the history commission model 
adopted in other post-communist countries. 
While some local advocates have argued that 
the length of the communist dictatorship or the 
remoteness in time of the Nazi crimes preclud-
ed the creation of truth commissions, neither 
of these arguments is sufficiently compelling: 
After all, Canada’s Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission was able to address adequately 
and successfully past crimes that were commit-
ted over a much longer period stretching back 
many more decades. 
In addition, a number of former victims have 
been overlooked not because they were fewer 
than the victims who did benefit from reckon-
ing programs. Take, for example, the property 
restitution process which generally overlooked 
ethnic minorities in favor of the Romanian 
ethnic majority, and the pre-communist indus-
trialists, bankers, landowners and art collectors 
in favor of the working class empowered by 
the communist authorities. Equally important, 
lustration was diluted to the level of a public 
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associated with the Securitate, an identification 
that remains poorly known and understood by 
the voters and seldom informs their electoral 
choices.
D ifferent categories of victims have been played against each other by various 
post-communist governments eager to justify 
their reluctance to engage in transitional justice 
or their preference for specific reckoning 
measures. Calls against the pre-communist 
“exploiters” who owned nicely located homes, 
land or assets were predominant during the 
early 1990s, being fueled primarily by parties 
representing former Communist Party mem-
bers such as the Social Democrats and nation-
alist formations like the Greater Romania Party. 
Openly or tacitly, almost all post-communist 
parties have downplayed the demands of ethnic 
minorities, especially those of the Jewish 
minority, drastically reduced by decades of out-
migration, and of the Hungarians, seen as a sort 
of a fifth column that could possibly be used by 
Budapest to claim back Transylvania as part of 
Hungary. Similarly, the many privileges granted 
to the “revolutionaries” who participated in 
the December 1989 anti-communist protests 
were only later and reluctantly expanded to the 
victims of communism and fascism, although 
they were more numerous and their suffering 
more significant and more prolonged. The focus 
on the victims of the earlier Stalinist regime of 
Gheorghiu-Dej to the detriment of those of the 
milder and more recent regime of Ceausescu 
was rooted in the more gruesome nature of the 
human rights abuses they suffered as much as in 
the reluctance of the early 1990s governments 
to reward victims of a regime with which some 
of their members had been closely associated.
The Romanian case also shows the impor-
tance of civil society initiatives in furthering 
the reckoning project, even if imperfectly and 
partially, when state actors (cabinets, courts 
and governmental agencies or their subordinat-
ed institutes) are perceived as slow, hesitant or 
downward hostile to transitional justice. The 
first efforts to apply pressure on the govern-
ment to adopt a lustration program that would 
have marginalized all former Communist Party 
officials and Securitate secret agents were 
represented by the Timisoara Proclamation, 
which was proposed during the December 1989 
protests by a small group of anti-communist 
residents of the town where the Romanian 
Revolution started. Organizations represent-
ing former communist-era political prisoners 
and former owners whose property had been 
expropriated by the communist authorities 
were instrumental in keeping the rehabilitation, 
compensation and restitution programs in the 
public eye and on the government agenda. Not 
only groups but also individuals, sometimes 
acting in isolation and with little support from 
others, have succeeded in pushing transitional 
justice forward. Throughout the 1990s, Senator 
Ticu Dumitrescu stubbornly championed a 
draft law that gave ordinary Romanians access 
to the Securitate archives. Once the Securitate 
archives were opened, the anonymous author 
of the Armageddon emails named some former 
Securitate secret agents in an effort to enlarge 
and speed up investigations into the human 
rights abuses of the communist state security. 
As chairs of the history commissions, Wiesel 
and Tismaneanu lent their credibility to those 
bodies and the results of their investigations. 
Political entrepreneurs can also block reckon-
ing, as was the case of Dan Voiculescu, a con-
troversial politician who used his influence to 
thwart public identifications of communist-era 
secret agents.
Romania’s transitional justice record further 
suggests that Grodsky14 was right in stating that 
reckoning is just one of the many public goods 
delivered by post-communist governments and 
as such it competes with all the other public 
goods expected by the electorate – good infra-
structure, investment in education and health 
care, astute foreign policy initiatives, and the 
like. The former communists who dominated 
the 1990–1996 governments preferred to pro-
tect the rights of the tenants whom the commu-
nist authorities had allowed to rent nationalized 
dwellings rather than recognize the property 
rights of the initial owners. As such, property 
restitution was considered less important and 
urgent than keeping a roof over the heads of the 
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as a result of restitution would have obliged the 
government to invest in social housing. The 
anticommunist governments of the Democratic 
Convention of 1996-2000 deprioritized reck-
oning in favor of pursuing an aggressive policy 
meant to bring Romania among the members 
of NATO and the Council of Europe, seen as the 
definitive acceptance of the country as part of 
Europe. Grodsky15 was also right when suggest-
ing that governments will pursue transitional 
justice only to the extent that it boosts their 
legitimacy and credibility. The Wiesel Commis-
sion was created by President Iliescu more out 
of a desire to stop international criticism than to 
rectify and clarify the past, suggesting that the 
transitional justice body was set up to further 
foreign policy more than reckoning goals.
T he country also demonstrates that Horne
16 
was right in claiming that some transition-
al justice initiatives like lustration can be pur-
sued even outside of the “window of opportuni-
ty” initially identified by scholars like Welsh.17 
Indeed, during the 1990s a number of scholars 
believed that reckoning could be pursued only 
during the first years following the regime 
change; once that “window” closed, interest in 
transitional justice would fade away (since new 
generations would be less inclined to punish the 
perpetrators and celebrate the victims of the 
communist regime) and reckoning initiatives 
would lose their effectiveness (since, for exam-
ple, an unreformed political elite dominated by 
former regime perpetrators would undermine 
democratic values). 
However, the very fact that the Wiesel 
Commission was constituted decades after the 
fascist regime of Antonescu showed that the 
“window of opportunity” assumption was too 
restrictive. Indeed, it was two decades after the 
end of World War II that the German govern-
ment and people showed genuine interest in 
reckoning with the many crimes of the Third 
Reich. In post-communist Romania as well, 
debates about reckoning’s usefulness, feasi-
bility and success have characterized not only 
the 1990s but also the 2000s and, in addition, 
initiatives such as compensation, memorial-
ization and diminishing the pensions of the 
former communist perpetrators were proposed, 
legislated and implemented decades after the 
1989 regime change.
Looking Forward
Perhaps the question that remains unanswered 
to date relates to how much truth and justice 
was delivered by the many transitional justice 
programs and initiatives the country has pur-
sued during the first three decades of post-com-
munism. The scarcity of court trials and the 
even fewer convictions handed down to former 
perpetrators, the indifference with which 
government officials attend annual commemo-
rations, if at all, and the meagre compensation 
packages granted to communist-era political 
prisoners have been unable to give former 
victims the closure and sense of justice they 
needed so badly. Time and time again, repre-
sentatives of victims’ associations have pointed 
to this justice deficit that makes them dissatis-
fied with subsequent post-communist govern-
ments. In addition, Romania’s failure to adopt 
a radical accusation-based lustration program 
that would have excluded former Communist 
Party officials and Securitate secret agents from 
post-communist politics and from the new 
economic and cultural elites has made former 
victims feel that the undeserved disadvantage at 
which they were placed before 1989 perpetuat-
ed itself in democratic times. Again, their gener-
al sense has been one of injustice for themselves 
and impunity for the former perpetrators.
The former victims’ dissatisfaction becomes 
even more evident when Romania’s reluctance 
to reckon with past human rights violations is 
compared to the more radical and sustained 
transitional justice pursued in Central and East-
ern Europe. Lustration in the Czech Republic 
and Germany, for example, identified larger 
categories of former communist perpetrators 
and provided for their removal from post-com-
munist politics.18 This type of lustration gave 
a sense of justice to more former political 
prisoners than in Romania, where former 
perpetrators were generally not removed from 
the government. In the Czech Republic, Poland 
and Hungary, a comprehensive restitution of 






















alized by the Nazi and communist regimes 
benefited larger numbers of initial owners 
than in Romania, where numerous owners of 
well-located historical homes were sidelined by 
well-connected politicians, who managed to ac-
quire these homes through legal loopholes. The 
House of Terror in Budapest has given symbolic 
recognition to former victims, while Romanian 
victims of communism still wait for a Bucharest 
museum that would recognize their plight.
Are Romanians today more familiar with the 
crimes of the 1989 Revolution and the fascist 
and communist regimes than they were during 
late communism? By now, a new generation 
with no personal memory of the 1989 Rev-
olution, communism or fascism has come 
to maturity. A tiny minority of it has studied 
history with the help of the textbook men-
tioned earlier, has visited the Sighet Memorial 
and thus learned of communist-era political 
prisoners and their plight, and has heard about 
at least some of the public identifications of 
former Securitate secret agents. Many more of 
these young people, however, know about com-
munism from their parents and grandparents, 
through reminiscences that are often colored 
by these relatives’ nostalgia for communist-era 
job security or much-touted equality, even 
below the poverty line, and post-communist 
loss of status or income. The past is, therefore, 
a foreign country for a significant segment of 
the younger generation who hears little about 
communist-era human rights abuses and a lot 
about its economic stability. ●
Note: I want to thank the Social Sciences and 
Humanities Research Council of Canada for 
generously supporting my research on transitional 
justice as well as Luc Turcescu, Nels Svensson, 
Sabina Stan, Walter Schmidt, Aurelian Craiutu 
and Fernando Silva Santos for their support.
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A Chronicle of an  
Anachronism:  
The Struggle for  
Adequate Education  
about the Communist Past
Bulgaria
ulgaria is the only country in the 
former Eastern bloc where there 
is no official policy of remem-
brance and commemoration of 
the Communist regime and its victims, which 
means that not even one museum has been 
created to deal with the traumatic past or to 
enlighten new generations about this period 
in history. Even history textbooks have still 
not been radically revised. Today, the country 
is ranked number one in the European Union 
regarding the level of “socialist nostalgia”. Last, 
but not least, there was no transitional justice 
in Bulgaria as a whole, meaning that Bulgaria 
has never dealt with the crimes committed 
during the Communist regime. Not even one of 
the Communist leaders responsible for mass ex-
ecutions and the organization of concentration 
camps was ever sentenced in Bulgaria.
 
The above picture of overall silence and oblivion in relation to the communist 
period is further mirrored by various sociolog-
ical surveys conducted over the years. A survey 
conducted in 20141 revealed the generational 
gap; 94% of the young generation in Bulgaria 
knew nothing about the Communist era, against 
31% amongst the population old enough to have 
at least faint memories of their own from this 
period. The 2014 survey also revealed that 44% 
of Bulgarian citizens regarded socialism in pos-






















2014 survey can also be compared to previous 
findings from a survey in 19922 showing the 
rate at which this oblivion has grown. In 1992, 
76% of the population had a negative attitude 
to the last Communist dictator Todor Zhivkov, 
whereas in the survey in 2014, only 45% had a 
negative attitude.
The latest figures, from a survey conducted in 
2019 about the level of awareness and assess-
ment of the Communist regime, reveal a clear 
tendency towards a leftward shift among young 
people whose de-politicization stood at 40% 
in 2014 and 14% in 2018. The latter is assessed 
as functional political illiteracy of the young 
generation in Bulgaria between 16 and 31 years 
of age.3
In the conclusions the authors suggest that 
the survey indicates sentiment in favor of more 
sociality, yet:
At the same time, for young people, the 
search for a social solution remains in 
the realm of the informal environment, 
in dialogue with relatives and friends, 
and not in political institutions. Polit-
ical leaders and parties do not possess 
the necessary authority. Young people 
have distanced themselves further 
from politics. Deinstitutionalization is 
a fact of life. Motivation to participate 
is low. The mechanisms of the political 
system in Bulgaria are not recognized 
by young Bulgarians as a way of pre-
senting and defending their interests. 
A large number of Bulgarian young 
people, in their values, attitudes and 
behavior, are on the left of the political 
spectrum without suspecting it, and 
probably would not accept such an 
assessment. The troubled situation in 
Bulgaria has triggered a reaction to so-
ciality, but not political self-reflection.4
The general public cannot be blamed for their 
ignorance or nescience as both are the result 
of clever manipulation policies well-crafted by 
propagandists and official historians associ-
ated with the Socialist Party. They are simply 
trying to post-factum legitimize the Communist 
regime and its crimes. The chief functionaries 
that rule the country are in fact often still the 
same persons as during the Communist regime. 
There are strong forces behind the efforts to let 
the past be forgotten.
Soon after the Fall of Communism an archival 
revolution began and the new historiography on 
Communism was produced. Oblivion, substi-
tution and, ultimately, historical falsification of 
the nature and consequences of the Communist 
regime in Bulgaria dominated public discourse 
until very recently. There is still a huge gap 
between history that is academically produced 
and history as public (non)knowledge.
Thus educational reform, through which the 
Covers of textbooks 
on Bulgarian history, 
used in the education 
on different levels. 
Note: not necessary 














































totalitarian Communist past could be stud-
ied by younger generations (who did not live 
through it and have only vague ideas about 
communism), became the ultimate segment of 
decommunization in Bulgaria.5 By implement-
ing such a reform in education, the democratic 
state could counter fake nostalgia for Com-
munism while emphasizing the true meaning of 
basic human values. 
It is an important and crucial step to counter 
the manipulation and falsification of history 
and the efforts to exonerate everything done 
by the dictatorship of the Communist Party in 
Bulgaria. 
Here is a brief chronology of the process to introduce an educational reform over the 
last 20 years. This is a process in which I have 
been taken a very active part both as a research-
er and an activist; therefore I give a chrono-
logical overview of the steps taken, before I 
summarize lessons learned and place them in a 
broader context.
Chronology of the Struggle  
for Educational Reform
May 2000
The 38th National Assembly of the Republic of 
Bulgaria passes a law declaring the Communist 
regime in the country to be criminal. The Bul-
garian Socialist Party (BSP) votes against this. 
All the crimes of the regime related to the econ-
omy, various types of political terror, and vio-
lence are listed, including the continuous policy 
for the assimilation of the Muslim communities 
in Bulgaria. Unfortunately, this law is in fact 
only a declaration, as it does not provide for any 
sanctions. Despite this law, the adherents of the 
Communists/Socialists constantly oppose initi-
atives related to the creation of new policies of 
“memory”, the erection of monuments and me-
morials, or the creation of museums, and block 
a number of attempts to introduce transitional 
justice for the perpetrators of crimes during the 
Communist regime. The BSP is most consist-
ent in its policy of preventing a wide public 
debate – a debate on the totalitarian, inhumane 
nature of the ideology and political practice of 
the Bulgarian Communist Party, whose direct 
successor it is.
July 2003
The European People’s Party, led by René van 
der Linden, supports the proposal by Bulgarian 
European parliamentarian Lachezar Toshev to 
adopt a resolution: “The Need for International 
Condemnation of the Crimes of Totalitarian 
Communism.”
December 2005
At a meeting of the Committee on Political 
Affairs at the Parliamentary Assembly of the 
Council of Europe (PACE) in Paris, the resolu-























A meeting of 73 communist parties from around 
the world takes place in Athens, declaring their 
position against the report condemning the 
crimes of communism and including it on the 
PACE agenda.
January 2006
The fifth PACE session, chaired by René van der 
Linden, is held in Strasbourg. Goran Lind-
blad’s report presents the crimes of totalitarian 
communist regimes (100 million killed, 20 
million thrown into concentration camps, over 
10 million victims of forced starvation, etc.) 
Following a fierce debate, mostly between Russia 
and Greece, the report is adopted by a vote of 99 
deputies for, 42 against, and 12 abstentions. It is 
called “The Need for International Condemna-
tion of the Crimes of the Totalitarian Communist 
Regimes” – Resolution 1471/2006. It condemns 
the crimes of totalitarian communist regimes 
and encourages historians around the world to 
continue their research on them. Paragraph 5 
of the resolution reads: “... The perpetrators of 
these crimes have not been brought to justice 
by the international community, as was the case 
with the horrific crimes of Nazism.” And para-
graph 6 states: “Society’s response to the crimes 
committed by totalitarian Communist regimes 
is very weak. Communist parties are legal and 
active in some countries; in some cases they have 
not even distanced themselves from the crimes 
committed by totalitarian Communist regimes”.
June 2008
A conference titled “European Conscience 
and Communism” is held in Prague, Czech 
Republic. It is emphasized that the crimes of 
communism have not yet received a sufficient-
ly clear assessment and condemnation from 
a legal, moral, political and historical point of 
view. The conference, attended by politicians 
and representatives of various state institutions 
involved in the study of communist crimes, 
adopts a special declaration signed by the 
Czech President (1993-2003) Vaclav Havel and 
Joachim Gauck (the first Federal Commissioner 
for the Records of the State Security Service 
in the GDR, and subsequently President of 
Germany). The document, entitled Declaration 
on European Conscience and Communism, calls 
for a pan-European understanding that both 
Nazi and communist totalitarian regimes, each 
judged on its own terrible “merits”, are destruc-
tive in their policy of systematically applying 
extreme forms of terror and trampling on all 
civil and human freedoms. Therefore, they 
must be considered the greatest evil to strike in 
the 20th century. It also calls for school curricula 
to be replaced by new ones in which the true 
facts of communism are to be represented.
April 2009
The European Parliament supports the Prague 
Declaration and adopts the resolution “Euro-
pean Conscience and Totalitarianism”, which 
“strongly and unequivocally condemns all 
crimes against humanity and mass violations of 
human rights by all totalitarian and authoritar-
ian regimes” and calls for an assessment of the 
crimes of communist totalitarian regimes.
November 2009
By decision of the 41st Bulgarian National 
Assembly, the majority of MPs support the 
two European resolutions. BSP deputies vote 
against them.
October 2011
The educational initiative Platform for Euro-
pean Memory and Conscience is created by the 
Visegrad Four countries during the Polish pres-
idency of the EU. It is supported by a number of 
European governments and non-governmental 
organizations and aims to arouse interest in the 
crimes of the communist regimes, and to fight 
intolerance and extremism.
January 2012
The study “Topoi of Historical Memory” is pub-
lished in Bulgaria.6 This field research is a joint 
initiative from researchers of the New Bulgar-
ian University and the American University in 
Bulgaria. The aim is to investigate those places, 
events, and protagonists which have a formative 
role for the identity of modern Bulgarian citi-
zens – and in a comparative perspective with 
Balkan and European history. The study was re-
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leased and caused much discussion in Bulgaria. 
In this study I, as the initiator and a contribut-
ing author, noted the fact that Bulgarians have 
no memory of key places of repression under 
the Communist regime, such as the Belene and 
Lovech concentration camps. I wrote a warning 
that “careful manipulation of the past continues 
to be a priority for certain circles who need to 
maintain their now-defunct ideology with huge 
historical falsifications”. Such falsification is 
in itself any thesis that “normalizes”, that is, 
exonerates, everything done by the dictatorship 
of the Communist Party in Bulgaria.”
September 2013
The conference “Education for the Commu-
nist Regime and European Democratic Values 
of Young People in Bulgaria Today” is held in 
Sofia. It is an initiative of the Konrad Adenauer 
Foundation, the Center for European Studies 
in Brussels at the EPP and the Hannah Arendt 
Centre Foundation. An extensive national 
representative survey by Bulgaria’s state polling 
agency NCIOM is presented; the findings show 
huge gaps in information and knowledge about 
the communist regime in Bulgaria among young 
people between the ages of 15 and 35.
The conclusion is that in the years of transi-
tion from a totalitarian Communist regime to 
democracy, state policy in Bulgaria does not 
aim to reveal the truth about the dictatorship 
in the period 1944-1989, but to conceal it from 
young people at school. Thus, Bulgaria’s young 
people know nothing about the political terror, 
the concentration camps, and, for example, the 
infamous murder of dissident writer Georgi 
Markov by the State Security in London in 1978.
February 2014
At this point I felt a need to take action and 
mobilize for change. As professor of history at 
the American University in Bulgaria, I initiated 
a Petition for the need to change the school cur-
ricula, which insists on introducing the study 
of totalitarian regimes in comparative terms in 
education, as well as specifically on Bulgarian 
communism. The initiative is announced at 
an event at the American University in Bul-
garia with the participation of relatives of the 
anti-communist resistance fighters (Goryany) 
from South-Western Bulgaria. The petition 
soon gathers more than 2,000 signatures in sup-
port. It is signed by Presidents Zhelyu Zhelev, 
Petar Stoyanov and Rosen Plevnaliev, as well as 
many public figures and representatives of the 
academic community.
November 2014
Under the auspices of President Rosen Plev-
neliev, a nation-wide initiative is organized to 
celebrate the 25th anniversary of the beginning 
of the democratic changes in Bulgaria. A public 
opinion poll conducted by the sociological 
agency Alpha Research is presented during 
the conference “The Transition: Myths and 
Memory, 25 Years Later”. The study shows that 
a total of 94% of the youngest generation (16-30 
years) know almost nothing about the period of 
Communism 1944–1989. 40% of them cannot 
state whether the end of Communism is marked 
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by the collapse of the Berlin Wall, or ... the Great 
Wall of China (!). The study clearly shows that 
universities and high schools do not provide 
students with the necessary knowledge about 
the Communist regime.
May 2015
President Rosen Plevneliev publicly criticiz-
es the inaction of the ruling party (then the 
rightwing coalition between GERB and the 
Reformist Bloc) for not including the history of 
the communist regime in history textbooks, and 
rather trying to obscure its essence.
September 2015
The 43rd National Assembly, during the second 
government of Boyko Borissov, does not accept 
the proposals of the Reformist Bloc MP Boris 
Stanimirov to amend the Public Education Act. 
The specific amendment reads: “Principles of 
democracy and the rule of law, human rights 
and freedoms include awareness of the crimes 
of totalitarian regimes in Europe, including 
the Communist regime in Bulgaria within the 
meaning of the Law on Declaring the Commu-
nist Regime Criminal (2000)”. The reason for 
the failure to pass this text is the position of the 
GERB deputies, most of whom abstain.
December 2015
At the initiative of MPs from GERB, led by 
Metody Andreev, a second political petition is 
launched on Internet, calling for a more serious 
study of 20th century totalitarian regimes in 
Bulgarian schools. It collects the signatures of 
over 103 deputies – but none from the Socialist 
Party. The document is addressed to the Minis-
ter of Education and Science, Professor Todor 
Tanev: “The reason for our request is the fact 
that Bulgaria remains the only country in the 
former socialist camp in which the recent past 
is not taught to adolescents. The formation of 
civil values among the young generations... is in 
our hands.”
There is no reaction from the Minister.
January 2016
President Rosen Plevneliev and all his secretar-
ies in the Presidency sign this second political 
petition to study the Communist regime at 
school.
March 2016
Representatives of civil society and politicians, 
including myself, Evelina Kelbecheva and MP 
Metody Andreev, meet with the Deputy Prime 
Minister and new Minister of Education and 
Science Meglena Kuneva. We submit to her the 
petitions about the need to study the commu-
nist regime at school. Kuneva declares that: 
“We are ready to discuss all specific proposals 
of the initiators of the petitions about the need 
to study totalitarian regimes at school”, but in 
practice does absolutely nothing.
March 2016
MEP Andrey Kovachev (GERB/EPP) organiz-
es a discussion in the European Parliament in 
Brussels under the title “Knowledge of the Past 
– Memory for the Future”, dedicated entirely 
to the problem of not studying communism 
at school. The initiative involves me, Evelina 
Kelbecheva, sociologist Lyubomir Pozharliev, 
author of the study “Communism in History 
Textbooks”, MP Metody Andreev (GERB), etc. 
Minister Kuneva is also personally invited to 
participate, but she sends a written response, 
apologizing for not being able to attend the 
discussion. I presented the outlines of steps 
needed to be taken from now on in order to 
study the communist regime in school in the 
most adequate way. 
May 2016
The Truth and Memory Foundation7 brings to 
the attention of Minister Kuneva a list of the 
main facts and assessments of the totalitarian 
rule of the Bulgarian Communist Party, without 
which history textbooks cannot be relevant to 
current Bulgarian and international historiog-
raphy: “The main task of teaching our recent 
history in middle school is to create a critical 
attitude towards the totalitarian regime in Bul-
garia (1944–1989), as well to its metastases in 
the next period. Young people in Bulgaria need 
to build their identity, referring both to their 
national history and common European values. 

























































standards for the study of history, which will 
lead to the creation of a young generation with 
sufficient knowledge and understanding of the 
dynamically changing world".
The Ministry of Education and Science re-
mains silent.
June 2016
The Truth and Memory Foundation organizes 
the conference “Knowledge and Values – (non) 
Study of Totalitarian Regimes in the Bulgarian 
School” in the House of Europe in Sofia. The in-
itiative is the first of its kind and brings together 
prominent politicians, academics, educational 
experts, as well as fiction and documentary 
movie directors. The Minister of Education and 
Science, Meglena Kuneva, is invited, but she 
ignores the conference, and does not even send 
a representative from the Ministry.
The conference ends with the following 
conclusion: “Due to the lack of clear state policy 
and political will, the fact is that education is 
not a priority of the various cabinets during the 
transitional period (1989–2016). The broken 
relation between the academic community 
and the educational system, the manipulative 
concealment of facts and events for the period 
1944-1989, as well as the outdated textbooks, 
are among the main reasons for inadequate 
public knowledge of the totalitarian commu-
nist regime in Bulgaria – unlike in all other 
countries in the former Eastern bloc (with the 
exception of Russia) that survived Soviet-style 
totalitarianism.”
July 2016
The Truth and Memory Foundation submits the 
final resolution of its conference to the Ministry 
of Education and Science. The non-govern-
mental organization invites Minister Kuneva 
to organize an open expert discussion on the 
creation of the new state educational standards 
and new curricula for secondary education in 
history. 
There is no answer from the Ministry.
February 2017
At a pre-election meeting with the Union of 
the Oppressed by Communism, called Pamet 
(“Memory”) in Arbanassi, GERB leader Boyko 
Borissov pledges that if his party won the par-
liamentary elections and formed a government, 
he would insist that the Ministry of Educa-
tion and Science (MES) be their portfolio – in 
order for the necessary legislative reform to be 
carried out and the truth about the Commu-
nist regime to be finally adequately studied in 
Bulgaria. He declares education is a priority for 
his party.
September 2017
Lilyana Drumeva, Chief Adviser to the Minister 
of Education and Science, and president of the 
Union of the Repressed by the Communism, 
“Pamet”, now decides to invite me, Evelina 
Kelbecheva, and Lachezar Stoyanov (from the 
New Bulgarian University) to a public discus-
sion of the new program with representatives 
of the academic community from Sofia Uni-
versity “St. Kliment Ohridski” and from the 
Bulgarian Academy of Sciences (BAS). The 
meeting that took place at the Ministry of Ed-
ucation and Science (MES), concludes that 
the current program is well designed, and no 
serious changes are required. We, Kelbecheva 
and Stoyanov, strongly express the opposite 
opinion, demanding a revision of the period of 
totalitarian Communism and the introduction 
of new concepts and inclusion of missing facts. 
We offer to present our prepared proposals for a 
radical change of the history curriculum.
October 2017
Now we, Kelbecheva and Stoyanov, submit 
these proposals, but the second expert meeting 
at the MES on the issue is constantly postponed. 
During this period, a game of cat and mouse 
begins. At the administrative level, the Ministry 
is reluctant to accept the proposals made by us, 
the two historians.
November 2017
On November 9, 2017, the Executive Director 
of the Truth and Memory Foundation, jour-
nalist Hristo Hristov, submits to the Council 
of Ministers a statement to the Prime Minister 
on the issue of the lack of adequate study of 
the totalitarian Communist period in Bulgar-
At the admin-
istrative level, 



























ia. Borissov’s pre-election promise to carry 
out this reform if GERB wins the election is 
recalled.
On November 10, 2017, a conference titled 
“100 Years since the Bolshevik Coup in Russia 
and its Influence in Bulgaria” is held in Lovech. 
The initiative is attended by the deputy chair-
man of the ruling GERB party and chairman 
of the party’s parliamentary group, Tsvetan 
Tsvetanov. I again bring up the problem of 
inadequate study of the Communist regime. 
The pre-election promise of Boyko Borissov 
and the unwillingness in the MES to carry out 
the necessary reform is recalled. Tsvetanov 
initiates a meeting between the minister Kas-
simir Valchev and me. As a result the minister 
orders that the program in history be returned 
for updating.
On November 21, 2017, I give an interview 
to the website Faktor.bg, in which I warn of 
the danger that the necessary reform will not 
be carried out: “We expect the Ministry of 
Education and Science to do its job and to really 
revise the history curricula. It is mandatory that 
future textbooks include the proposals made by 
our team. We insist on radical changes.”
A new round of discussions on the issue be-
gins at the MES.
A few days after this interview, in which the 
curtain is lifted on the intensified talks at the 
MES, five non-parliamentary parties (DSB, Yes, 
Bulgaria, the Greens, DEOS and the Agrarian 
Union) announce that they had sent a letter to 
Minister Valchev, asking him about the problem 
of inadequate study of the Communist regime. 
This happens four years after the first petition 
raised this issue in 2014. Most of the politicians 
who sign the document are part of the Reform-
ist bloc. In the previous government the Bloc 
had two ministers of education (Prof. Todor 
Tanev and Meglena Kuneva), to whom they 
never addressed such a request.
December 2017
Kelbecheva and Stoyanov continue active work 
on the development of the new curriculum. A 
series of heated discussions take place at the 
MES, some of which are attended by the Minis-
ter of Education, Krassimir Valchev. He says he 
would approve the program only after receiving 
endorsement from a wide range of historians 
and politicians.
January 2018
The final discussion of the new curriculum in 
“History and Civilizations” with the participa-
tion of historians, MPs, politicians, experts from 
the MES, Sofia University, and BAS, is focused 
on the period 1944–1989. 90% of the proposals 
made by Kelbecheva and Stoyanov are accepted. 
One particularly crucial part during the 
final editing of the new history program was 
the discussion on the inclusion of the term So-
viet occupation of Bulgaria (September 1944) 
and the two attempts to merge Bulgaria to the 
USSR made in 1963 and once again in 1973.
It is very indicative that under the pressure 
from professors at the Department of History 
at Sofia University, the topics of the Soviet occu-
pation of Bulgaria 1944–1947 and the attempt 
to turn Bulgaria into the 16th republic of the 
USSR are thrown away from the revised history 
program.
On January 15, 2018, the Ministry of Edu-
cation and Science announces on its website 
the adoption of the new programs. The most 
significant revision is introduced to the history 
curriculum for the 10th final grade for high 
schools, especially the study of the period of the 
communist regime.
On January 19, 2018, the Bulgarian Social-
ist Party (BSP), which has been “sleeping” 
throughout the whole process, makes a decla-
ration in the National Assembly, demanding the 
cancellation of the newly adopted history pro-
gram. There is also a request for the resignation 
of Minister Valchev, who was forced to answer 
questions from the left-wing opposition during 
parliamentary control. He refuses to return to 
the old history program.
June 2019
The Truth and Memory Foundation sends an 
open letter to Minister Valchev, insisting that 
the already approved textbooks on History 
and Civilizations for the 10th grade be stopped, 
because most of them do not correspond to the 
spirit of the already adopted new program. The 
We expect 
the Ministry of 
Education and 
Science to do 
its job and 















































foundation initiates a petition, gathering more 
than 4,700 signatures, insisting: “... We strong-
ly disagree with the attempts to conceal key 
facts and events from Bulgarian history in the 
period 1944–1989 and the period of transition to 
democracy after 1989. There is a manipulative, 
misleading or tendentious presentation in the 
new textbooks. We insist that they be funda-
mentally revised and reworked.”
Well-known historians, politicians, and jour-
nalists join the Truth and Memory Foundation’s 
call.
On the other hand, the BSP and academic 
circles close to the socialists organize a coun-
ter-petition supported by about 800 people (al-
though it is disseminated by the Socialist party 
regional structures). This petition presents the 
same paranoid reaction as the one from January 
2018, when the new history program was adopt-
ed and a declaration against it was presented in 
Parliament.
Under an order by the Ministry, the edi-
tors-in-chief of the Bulvest 2000, Anubis, Domi-
no and Riva publishing houses force the authors 
to change their texts. The greatest resistance 
comes from the authors of Bulvest 2000 and 
Anubis. At the end of August, Minister Valchev 
approves the new textbooks, in which the most 
serious shortcomings, mistakes and manipula-
tions are eliminated. 
August 2019
What happened in Bulgaria is commented on by 
the Russian Government on their website Rossi-
yskaya Gazeta in an article by Alexander 
Samozhnev, entitled “History Textbooks in Bul-
garia were Rewritten in Line with Euro-Atlan-
tic Ideology”.8 The article from August 15, 2019 
appeared immediately after the news on August 
14 that the Minister of Education and Science, 
Krassimir Valchev, had approved the textbooks 
of all five publishing houses, after finally serious 
corrections were made in the texts about the 
Communist regime (1944-1989) and the tran-
sition period toward democracy (1989-2019). 
The article in Rossiyskaya Gazeta, however, 
produced false information about the changes 
in the sections dedicated to the Communist 
regime in the new Bulgarian history textbooks. 
The author of the publication, Alexan-
der Samozhnev, stated that “the Ministry of 
Education of Bulgaria has ordered the history 
textbooks for the upper grades to be rewrit-
ten.” This is a false news, because on June 25 
Minister Valchev announced that he would not 
approve the textbooks and asked the publishing 
houses to make numerous corrections.
“By order of the authorities, the Communist 
regime in the period from 1944 to 1989 was de-
clared ‘criminal’”, writes the official press body 
of the government of the Russian Federation, 
whose article was distributed in Bulgaria by 
FOCUS News Agency. 
This statement is also false, as the Russian ar-
ticle fails to inform the reader that the correct-
ed and amended textbooks contain information 
that was previously missing – including the fact 
that the totalitarian regime of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party was declared criminal by an 
act passed in the Bulgarian National Assembly 
in 2000.
Further, Rossiyskaya Gazeta claims that a 
commission for new textbooks existed, that 
came up with the initiative to revise the text-
books and that: “The reason was allegedly the 
statements of teachers who disagree with the 
assessments of the activities of the Bulgarian 
Communist Party, sent to the commission/…/
In this connection, information has been added 
about the repressive policy of the communists, 
about political prisoners and the economic 
crises caused by the large foreign debt”, the 
Russian edition reads.
Here, too, it misrepresents the facts since 
Bulgarian teachers informed the Truth and 
Memory Foundation about some of the most 
striking manipulations in the new textbooks. 
The Russian publication found this fact incon-
venient and failed to publish it.
However, the Russian publication refers to 
a little-known anonymous Bulgarian site Rico-
chet, which has advertised itself since 2018 as 
a “a project of independent journalists seeking 
the truth in the manipulated media space.” 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta cites an article from this 
site from June 24, 2019, entitled “Whom are 
you deceiving, gentlemen?”: “It seems that the 






















anti-communism and that Education Minister 
Krassimir Valchev praised the ‘civil position’ of 
the activists from the American University.”9 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta republished most of the 
above-mentioned article on its new site, which 
states that “Teachers will howl with resentment 
at the new curriculum. But they will hardly 
dare to object because they will be immediately 
labeled ‘red renegades’. This is the situation 
in Bulgaria with freedom of conscience – and 
textbooks, of which half of the country’s history 
has been thrown away”, concludes the article in 
Rossiyskaya Gazeta, which copied the text from 
the Bulgarian site in question, published almost 
two months earlier.
The Present Problematic Situation
There are still highly problematic texts in the 
textbooks, revised in the summer of 2019, with 
arbitrarily selected facts, and therefore, with 
highly manipulative conclusions.
Here is one of the most striking examples 
relating to the largest political terrorist act in 
Europe that took place in Bulgaria in 1925. The 
bombing of the Cathedral Church in Sofia, where 
150 people were killed was organized and spon-
sored by the Communist International (Co-
mintern) in Moscow. How is this fact presented 
in the textbook of Bulvest 2000 publishing 
house? 
The Communist Party turned to organ-
izing a major terrorist attack. It took 
place on April 16, 1925, when the attack 
on Sofia’s Sveta Nedelya Cathedral 
took place. The government respond-
ed to the terror with terror and in a 
short time succeeded in physically 
liquidating the Communist Party elite, 
the left-wing Agrarian party, and the 
anarchists, as well as many leftist in-
tellectuals. This eliminated the danger 
from the left.
In a small box next to the text of the lesson, 
data are given on the victims of the suppres-
sion of the July and September riots of 1923, 
giving only figures of those who fell on one 
side – between 1,500 and 2,000 people. It is 
unknown why the thousand victims from 
the army and the state police were not men-
tioned. The fact that in 1924 the government 
gave a full amnesty to all participants in the 
riots is not mentioned at all... One sentence 
mentioned the victims of the bombing in 
1925, which numbered 150 people, including 
women and children, without mentioning the 
more than 500 injured. Thus, the emphasis is 
entirely on “white terror”, without seeing the 
historical motivation - the terror was caused 
not by Tsankov’s government, but first by the 
June Paysan revolt, and then by the Commu-
nist Party under the orders of the Comintern. 
But the biggest distortion of the picture is 
the almost complete fog that has been cast on 
the activities of the Comintern to undermine 
Europe and in particular the decision to raise 
an uprising in Bulgaria to be called “the first 
anti-fascist uprising in the world.” Not to men-
tion the missing fact that terrorists in Bulgaria 
were generously paid by Moscow throughout 
the entire interwar period.
T he narrative in the Domino publishing house’s textbook is no less problematic. 
There is an account of the repression of the 
banned Bulgarian Communist Party in 1924, 
but there is no mention of the State amnesty on 
the one hand, and on the other, the escalation of 
terrorist activity ordered by Moscow. As for the 
previous events of 1923, no textbook mentions 
that the communist leaders Georgi Dimitrov 
and Vasil Kolarov, sent by the Comintern to 
Bulgaria, did not “transfer” to Yugoslavia, but 
fled there on the second day after the riot was 
announced. At least their “Open Letter” to the 
Bulgarian workers and peasants was omitted 
– a cynical document written in Vienna, where 
the headquarters of the Comintern for Europe 
were located.
Anubis Publishing House reports that the 
“red terror” was answered with “white terror”, 
but the role of Moscow and the policy of de-
stroying the state and military political elite in 
order to clear the way for the imposition of a 
Soviet republic in Bulgaria is concealed. 
The texts in three of the new textbooks for 
the period of the communist regime in Bulgaria 




















































and the so-called “transition” after 1989 also 
caused a real scandal.
There was a drastic lack of facts, of correla-
tions between the events, and of historical as-
sessments of the significance and consequences 
of the ruling parties’ policies. The role of the 
former Communist State security agents and 
repressive authorities were only mentioned, 
and the history of the communist concentration 
camps was reduced to a few figures and com-
pletely insignificant memories. The three state 
bankruptcies (so-called ‘debt crises’) caused by 
the failed economic policy of the Communist 
Party are not present in the texts. Only one 
textbook mentions that Bulgarian Communist 
party and state leader Zhivkov twice proposed 
in 1963 and again in 1973 to the Soviet authori-
ties that Bulgaria merge in one way or another 
with the USSR!
Not one of the textbooks clarifies the ideology of communism and the implicit 
political terror embedded in it. There is no data 
about the political terror in Bulgaria in order 
compare it to other countries in the Eastern 
bloc. The fact is that in absolute and relative 
numbers, it was greatest in Bulgaria. The 
process of total ideological control, carried out 
through propaganda, education, and art, is not 
traced. The forced change of the socio-cultural 
foundation of the Bulgarian nation is not ex-
plained. There is not a single photo of the long 
line of the new propaganda symbols and espe-
cially of the monuments to the Soviet soldiers 
who “liberated” (not occupied!) Bulgaria from 
the non-existent (here) “monarcho-fascism” 
there.
But it seems that the most dangerous longue 
duree effect of this school propaganda is that 
the current state of Bulgarian society is no 
longer associated with its genesis, that is, the 
communist dictatorship; that the political ter-
ror and beheading of the Bulgarian political and 
cultural elite is not assessed as one of the most 
tragic genocides in Bulgarian history; that the 
economic and banking crises of 1991 and 1997 
were not seen as part of a series of bankruptcies 
during the Communist regime; that it is not 
shown how half a century of social engineer-
ing has led to a lack of initiative, responsibility 
and freedom of choice; that the mass exodus 
from Bulgaria was also the result of Bulgaria’s 
post-communist rule, not of “democracy.”
So where does that leave us? It turns out that 30 years after the fall of Communism 
in Bulgaria, the public “memory” of it is not 
only suppressed but also unarticulated. The 
reasons are numerous, but it is above all due 
to the extremely skillful substitution of the 
narrative about communism by particular com-
munist and post-communist elites. Last but not 
least, non-communist circles were slow to come 
up with a coherent strategy for studying the 
recent past and the wide public dissemination 
of this knowledge in Bulgaria. 
The ultimate result is that Bulgarians today 
have no clear reflection of the economic, social, 
cultural or psychological consequences of 
communism.
The fundamental question, however, is: what 
is the main reason for the refusal of the Bulgari-
an public as a whole to focus on the understand-
ing and evaluation of communism both as an 
ideology and as a practice? Are these the skill-
fully directed media policies that have slowly, 
gradually and invariably abandoned the topic 
of communism in Bulgaria? Is this the “origi-
nal sin” – the still not radically revised history 
textbooks? Is this the aging, fatigue, and frus-
tration of the generation that went through this 
period? Is this the misunderstood “Bulgarian 
tolerance”, which will again bury the opportu-
nity for historical and social assessment of our 
recent history? The pro-communist propagan-
da is successful because of the huge circulation 
of their historiography. And this historiography 
does not remain confined to the academic “ivo-
ry tower”; it daily maintains the myths of the 
“soz” in popular knowledge. This propaganda 
has created such a falsified historical “memory” 
that the efforts to correct it, unfortunately, have 
proved futile (In addition, the State Security 
officials preserved the monopoly on archival 
information until 2008).
For thirty years, we have remained an almost 
isolated island in the midst of the real historio-

































































stirred Europe and changed forever the way a 
nation knows, understands and values its past.
Conclusion
The battle to implement the discussed educa-
tional reform does not end with the adoption 
of new curricula or the revision of textbooks. 
It must continue with retraining teaching staff 
and vigorous activities involving extracurricu-
lar forms of education offered by experts in the 
field. Unfortunately, the Bulgarian Communist 
Party’s successor – the Bulgarian Socialist 
Party – is again emerging as a fierce opponent of 
this form of decommunization in education by 
trying to obstruct the reform in every possible 
way and to maintain the old propaganda cliches 
about the communist regime between 1944 and 
1989.
Unlike in Bulgaria, in all other former Soviet 
bloc countries the political debate on the com-
munist past has come to an end, educational 
reform has been completed and the peers of 
Bulgarian students in Poland, the Czech Re-
public, Romania, Hungary, Germany, and all the 
Baltic States have long had the opportunity to 
not only study this period but have a clear idea 
and assessment of the nature and consequences 
of the communist regimes forcibly imposed 
by the USSR on more than 100 million people 
across Eastern Europe following the Second 
World War.
Adequate teaching of the communist period 
and the subsequent period of transition in Bul-
garian history is one of the most important tools 
for shaping young people’s civic awareness 
and their understanding of universal human 
values. ●
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or Complicity:  
The [Im]possibility of  
Memorializing the Victims  
in a State of Denial
Turkey
emorializing acts of gen-
ocide, pogroms, assassi-
nations of leading figures, 
racist lynchings and 
attacks are the most difficult issues that socie-
ties and states have to address, as the institution 
of the modern state lies at the core of these 
crimes. Contextualizing these crimes within 
the framework of human rights would perhaps 
make them visible. However, in essence, they 
are about collectivities and institutions. The 
structural and institutional superiority of the 
one side (the perpetrator), and the inferiority 
and weakness of the other (the victim), is not 
necessarily related to the individuals involved. 
The power relationship is dictated by the supe-
rior side and its institutions. 
I n this article I will examine the role of two organizations in the context of Armenian 
genocide commemoration practices in Turkey, 
namely the Human Rights Associations’ (IHD) 
Committee Against Racism and Discrimination 






















tionalism (DurDe), which was established after 
the assassination of Hrant Dink in January 
2007, mobilizing various activists and grass-
roots networks. I will argue that despite the 
emergence of social and grassroots networks 
commemorating Armenian genocide, a clear 
vision of the state’s responsibility to recognize 
the Armenian genocide, to apologize and to 
take necessary steps for reparations have once 
again been marginalized and criminalized. I 
will refer to the commemorative acts, press re-
leases and statements of IHD and DurDe ana-
lyzing the reasons for the marginalization of 
the former and the popularity of the latter. To 
this end, this paper will discuss the background 
and meaning of commemoration and memory 
politics in the absence of recognition and the 
pervasive denial of the crimes committed. 
Turkey is the only state in Europe which has 
structurally, politically, economically, cultur-
ally and socially institutionalized the denial of 
the annihilation of the indigenous populations 
of the region who, at the same time, had lived 
for centuries under Ottoman rule, constituting 
a considerable part of its Christian populations. 
I will demonstrate the path which led to pub-
lic commemoration practices that memorialize 
the mass violence, pogroms and/or genocide in 
Turkey. I will introduce the main actors behind 
these initiatives and analyze the connections 
between them, as well as their relationship to 
the state and its policies. 
T he victims of genocide, massacres, exiles, pogroms and the murders of leading 
public figures had not been publicly commem-
orated in Turkey until the mid-1990s.1 Instead, 
commemoration practices and policies were 
almost exclusively handled by the state in order 
to heroize the perpetrators of the above-men-
tioned crimes. 
These strategies of memory politics can 
be seen in the naming of streets throughout 
Turkey after Talat and his fellow leaders of 
the Committee and Union Progress Party, who 
were responsible for conceiving and executing 
the genocide. 
Furthermore, almost all national holidays 
and national festivities2 are directly connect-
ed to the annihilation or exile of Christian 
IHD commemoration 
event in front of 
the Train Station 
in Kadıköy/Haydar-
paşa, in Istanbul. This 
is the place, where 
Armenian intellectuals 
after April 24 were 














































populations from their historic lands. Hence, 
as a country in denial, Turkey has vehement-
ly denied all crimes committed by the state, 
even those of the Ottoman State. It should be 
stressed that it is the post-1923 elites, intellec-
tuals, public opinion makers and civil society 
agents who have been mostly complicit in this 
denial, helping the state to normalize the crime 
and give impunity to the perpetrators. Thus, as 
I suggested elsewhere, Turkey has a post-gen-
ocide habitus of denial, in which everyday life 
and daily practices were all embedded in the 
denial of genocide, and crimes continued to be 
committed based on the reservoir of experienc-
es gathered between 1915 and 1922.3 Conse-
quently, any commemorative event or practice 
also includes an interpellation to denial in one 
way or another. 
First Commemorative Exhibit:  
Pogrom of September 6–7, 1955
I had the good fortune to participate in one of 
the first public commemorative events to be 
organized by the Human Rights Association’s 
(IHD) Istanbul Branch in 1996.4 It commemo-
rated the Pogrom of September 6–7, 1955 with 
an exhibit containing visual material from the 
pogrom in Istanbul accompanied by inform-
ative texts. It marked the event’s 41st anniver-
sary and was the first public commemoration 
to condemn the Pogrom on September 6–7, 
1955, a state-orchestrated attack took place in 
which shops, houses, cemeteries, churches, 
synagogues and schools belonging to Chris-
tians and Jews were vandalized and plun-
dered. Fahri Çoker, who was head of the Mili-
tary Court of Cassation and who had collected a 
considerable amount of visual material and doc-
umentation of the destruction during his tenure 
as a judge, gave the number of attacked stores 
and shops as 4214.5 According to the American 
Consular Archives (NARA), in Istanbul alone, 
36 schools and over 60 churches were vandal-
ized and plundered.6 While these organized 
attacks are known to have occurred in Istanbul, 
İzmir and Ankara, their repercussions in other 
cities in which Christians and Jews continued 
to live during the mid-20th century remain un-
known. The attacks completely destroyed some 
districts, shops, houses of Christians, and death 
toll, number of rape cases and exhumations of 
the dead were never officially declared. Nor did 
the state apologize for this crime, pay repara-
tions or make restitution to the victims.  
T he mid-1990s witnessed a series of intel-lectual activities and the flourishing of 
new publishing houses and publications which, 
in turn, gathered certain groups of people 
around issues that had remained untouched un-
til this time. In 1993, the Aras Publishing House 
was established in Istanbul, predominantly 
publishing the works of Armenian authors in 
both Armenian and Turkish. The AGOS Weekly 
began publication in April 1996. The same year, 
Yelda Özcan, a leading feminist and anti-racist 
in Turkey, published her books through the Bel-
ge Publishing House, Istanbul’da Diyarbakır’da 
Azalırken7 (Getting Minoritized in Istanbul 
and Diyarbakır) and Çoğunluk Aydınlarında 
Irkçılık8 (Racism Among the Intellectuals of the 
Majority Population). She was a member of the 
HRA Istanbul Branch’s Commission to Watch 
Minority Rights, founded in 1994. Her books 
were – and still are – mind openers for the read-
ership in Turkish. 
Belge published9 a number of important 
books in Turkish for the first time, including 
Yves Ternon’s Les Armeniens Historie d’un 
genocide in 1993, Vahakn Dadrian’s Genocide 
As a Problem of National and International 
Law: The World War I Armenian Case and 
Its Contemporary Legal Ramifications, Franz 
Werfel’s most famous literary work on the 
Armenian genocide, The 40 Days of Musa Dagh 
in 1997, as well as the memoir of an Islamcizied 
Pontus Greek, Tamama, in 1996. In March 1995. 
Birikim, one of the monthly magazines closely 
connected to the intellectual circles mentioned 
here, published a special issue entitled “Ethnic 
Identities and Minorities.”10 In 2004, one of the 
organizers of the 1996 commemorative exhibit, 
a long-time editor-in-chief of the Toplumsal 
Tarih monthly, founded his own publishing 
house, Birzamanlar Publishing, which publish-
es works  mainly about the Ottoman Empire 
and Turkey’s non-Muslim intellectual and  
cultural heritage.
[Yelda Özcan’s] 
books were – 

























W hile it can be seen that the activists’ publishing scrutinized human rights 
issues, with an emphasis on racism, discrim-
ination and minorities in the history of the 
Republic, in contrast, the knowledge produc-
tion of scholars from Turkey and about Turkey 
followed a more conventional and conservative 
path. 
The critical historiography of the 1990s and 
2000s attempted to look at certain events and 
peaks in state violence, but these attempts 
went no deeper than seeing them as part of 
an unpleasant chronology devoid of context, 
a chronology that particularly neglected the 
continuities between the Ottoman past and 
today’s Turkey in terms of the state’s criminal 
culpability and the complicity of the majority 
population. Instead, a romanticized fantasy 
of Turkey’s multi-ethnic and diverse past was 
emphasized. All the “new” historiography had 
to offer was a basic list of ‘events’, starting with 
the Armenian genocide, continuing with the 
enactment of a long list of discriminatory laws, 
organized attacks, massacres and pogroms car-
ried out against non-Muslims and non-Turks, as 
well as military coups.11 
Needless to say, this “new chronology” had 
neither scope for self-critique nor questioning 
the meaning of genocide as a founding act, 
creating structural and institutional differences 
that divided the whole society into perpetra-
tors and victims. On the contrary, this time, the 
very well-known rupture thesis, arguing that 
there was a colossal rupture from the Ottoman 
Empire to the Republic of Turkey based on 
the changes undertaken in the 1920s such as 
clothing, the adoption of the Western alphabet, 
time and calendar was reframed as disconnect-
ing people from their own histories.12 Further, 
arguing that the foundation of a nation state is 
a “traumatic experience,”13 without explaining 
why, serves to normalize and relativize the 
experiences of the victims of the genocide. This 
assumption may or may not be true, but not 
every nation-state is founded upon genocide 
and not every traumatic experience equates to 
genocide. 
Through this relativization, the best of both 
worlds is enjoyed: Genocide as Turkey’s foun-
dational act has been deliberately denied and a 
discourse of almost universal and equal victim-
hood for everyone is created. Further, the deep 
roots of the Turkish modernization project to 
which the annihilation of its own populations 
and the confiscation of their property were both 
central, is avoided and marginalized, and gen-
erations benefiting from this crime are turned 
into victims. Parallel to the equally victimized 
society and state,14 reiteration of the meaning of 
diversity15 in an imagined and yet never-existing 
harmonious age produces a patronizing, appro-
priating discourse of the past. Devoid of context 
and consequences, the new style of historiogra-
phy, with its century-old content, can claim to 
be a very critical historiography, as it dares to 
mention the criminal past of the state. 
Hence, it can be argued that this line of 
argumentation – a “traumatic experience” for 
all in an equally victimized society, without 
perpetrators and without victims, and therefore 
without consequences – can be considered to 
be an intervention of the genocide recognition 
process in Turkey, which was started in the 
1990s by a handful of activists and publishers 
gathered around the IHD.  
T he discourse of feeling/commemorat-ing the pain of the victim, in which no 
perpetrator was named, no recognition was 
prioritized, no responsibility was assigned and 
no compensation was claimed has to be read 
within this scholarly context. The newly es-
tablished non-profit-organization DurDe (Say 
Stop to Racism and Nationalism) embraced and 
reproduced these claims, which were primarily 
rooted in the intellectual trajectory of Turkey’s 
academic circles in 2000s. The lack of self-cri-
tique, disregarding the genocidal roots of 
Turkey’s modernization project, the structural 
and irreversible consequences of the crime of 
genocide, imagining that various oppressions 
and victimizations equaling one and other, all 
remained unquestioned.
First Genocide Commemoration  
by the Human Rights Association
The Human Rights Association’s Istanbul 
Branch (IHD) started commemorating the 
Not every 
nation state
 is founded 
upon genocide 

















































Armenian genocide through press conferences, 
the first of which was held in 2005 on its 90th 
anniversary, April 24, 2005, with press releases. 
Prior to public events, the IHD’s annual press 
release on the genocide used to be read at a 
press conference by the leading human rights 
advocate, lawyer Eren Keskin and only a hand-
ful of newspapers would publish it as a news 
item. Its first press release called for respect for 
the pain of the Armenians:16 
“On the 90th anniversary of April 24, 
1915 we, as the human rights defenders 
in Turkey, deeply share the grief of 
both the Armenian citizens of Turkey 
and the children and grandchildren 
of those Armenians who were driven 
from their homeland and who wit-
nessed the murder of their beloved 
ones. We say to them ‘your grief is 
ours.’ We too will not forget what has 
happened in order not to let it happen 
again.”17  
A year later, on April 24, 2006, the IHD empha-
sized the continuity of the crimes throughout 
the 20th century and connected the human 
rights struggle in Turkey with the mourning of 
Armenian losses resulting from the genocide. 
“Today we, as the human rights 
defenders, would like to address all 
Armenians in Turkey and elsewhere 
in the world and tell them ‘we want to 
share the pain in your hearts and bow 
down before the memory of your lost 
ones. They are also our losses. Our 
struggle for human rights in Turkey is 
at the same time our mourning for our 
common losses and a homage paid to 
the genocide victims’.”18
In both press releases, genocide was contex-
tualized within Turkey’s continuing history of 
collective violence, and argued that without fac-
ing this history and calling what had happened 
by its proper name, no intervention would be 
possible into the vicious circle of human rights 
abuses in Turkey. Secondly, both press releases 
argued that the “losses and pain” of Armenians 
were shared by the organizers.
D uring these years, there was no public de-bate among scholars or intellectuals about 
what a commemoration would mean or how it 
could be carried out in a country in which both 
the state and society have been deeply commit-
ted to denial for almost a century, a commitment 
which has continued to take lives.19 In the same 
vein, while a group of Turkish and Kurdish ac-
tivists were commemorating the “losses and the 
pain of the Armenians”, the question of agency 
was hardly ever discussed. Simple questions 
were completely ignored. Such questions includ-
ed: “Who is entitled to commemorate whom?” 
and “In the absence of any official recognition by 
the perpetrator state, are the representatives of 
the perpetrator generation’s descendants enti-
tled to commemorate the victims?”  
DurDe came into being as a response to Hrant 
Dink’s assassination and was supported by the 
organizers of the I Apologize campaign, which 
will be discussed in this paper.
In 2007, the murder of Hrant Dink radical-
ly changed the situation. It was particularly 
after the foundation of the AGOS Weekly that 
Hrant Dink became one of the most popular 
faces on Turkish television. It should be noted 
that at that time, Turkish viewers were used to 
watching open-ended talk shows that would 
go on for hours, often not finishing until the 
early hours of the morning. Turkey’s recent 
history, including its discrimination against 
Christians and Jews, were publicly and almost 
regularly discussed on television. After Dink’s 
murder in January 2007, public events com-
memorating the Armenian genocide started 
to be organized, initially (again) by the IHD, 
with a panel discussion at Bilgi University.20 In 
December 2008, the I Apologize campaign was 
launched. 
“My conscience does not accept the 
insensitivity showed to and the denial 
of the Great Catastrophe that the 
Ottoman Armenians were subjected 
to in 1915. I reject this injustice and for 
my share, I empathize with the feelings 



























and pain of my Armenian brothers. I 
apologize to them.”21
30,000 people put their names under this text. 
Organized by four people,22 the I apologize cam-
paign was supported by a substantial group of 
journalists, activists and academics. The large 
number of signatories suggests it was successful 
in engaging people who had previously never 
taken a stance on the issue. 
T wo detailed and critical analyses showing the context, background, shortcomings 
and conceptual inadequacies of the I Apologize 
campaign, as well as its repercussions both 
inside and outside Turkey, including a textual 
analysis, was written by Marc Mamigonian23 
and Ayda Erbal.24 The center of their critique 
included the following salient points: the use of 
one of the many Armenian terms for the geno-
cide, Medz Yeghern (which translates as Great 
Catastrophe), while avoiding the use of Arme-
nian genocide, as the former lacked agency;25 
the possibility or impossibility of apologizing 
for crimes committed by others,26 as, in this par-
ticular case, intellectuals and individuals signed 
the text for an unnamed crime whose perpetra-
tor was not mentioned in the text; the contin-
uing demonization of the Armenian diaspora 
by the organizers of the apology campaign;27 
aspects of the organization of the campaign, its 
top-down character; the reproduction of power 
asymmetry between Armenian public opinion 
makers, activists and academics and the organ-
izers of the campaign throughout the entire 
process28 and, most importantly, the organizers’ 
desire to facilitate the work of the state.29  
In retrospect, it may be appropriate to con-
sider the murder of Hrant Dink by state-orches-
trated forces and the I Apologize campaign that 
followed at the end of 2008 as a turning point in 
the crystallization of the divisions in commem-
orative activities. 
Dink’s assassination was ultimately the result 
of his visibility as an outspoken Armenian. His 
statements on the Armenian genocide and his 
publication of the news item on the Armenian 
origins of Mustafa Kemal’s adopted daughter 
Hatun Sebiliciyan, known as Sabiha Gökçen, 
and the fact that he was threatened by three 
National Security Agents (MIT) at the gover-
nors’ office of Istanbul as a result of the item’s 
publication, were all decisive factors that led to 
his assassination.30 
W hile members of the Human Rights As-sociation’s Committee against Racism 
and Discrimination reflected on the critiques 
by Mamigonian and Erbal and contributed to 
the debate,31 these pieces were ignored by the 
organizers of the I Apologize campaign. 
Their deafness to such critiques became vis-
ible once more in a March 2015 conference or-
ganized by the IFEA (Institut Français d’Etudes 
Anatoliennes) in Istanbul on the occasion of 
the 100th anniversary of the Armenian geno-
cide. Three of the organizers of the I apologize 
campaign were on one panel in which they em-
phasized the difficulties and persecution they 
had endured as organizers of the I Apologize 
campaign. 
They also stated that many of the signatories 
had retracted their signatures after a while as 
they had felt threatened by the potential danger 
or even the possibility of losing their positions 
once their names had been discovered on the 
list, which was particularly “dangerous” for 
civil servants who had signed the text.32 Implic-
it in the campaign organizers’ presentations 
was their consensus that as their actions had 
taken place under dreadful conditions of state 
denial, the realization of the campaign had to be 
regarded as an extraordinary achievement. 
From 2010, a new chapter began as both the 
IHD and the groups organized around DurDe 
held commemorative events in public. The IHD 
chose places of memory: the prison in Sultan-
ahmet in which the Armenian intellectuals had 
been held before their exile and death in 1915; 
or Haydarpaşa train station, from where the 
intellectuals had been transported to Çankırı 
Prison.33 DurDe prioritized visibility and 
centrality in its commemorative events, which 
were held in Istanbul’s Taksim Square.  
After the IHD’s considerably smaller event, it 
joined the much larger event in Taksim Square 
which was attended by around 3,000 people and 













































were much higher. Gathering under the central 
statue of the founders of the Republic in Taksim 
Square to commemorate the Armenian genocide 
was one of the most oxymoronic experiences. 
Egemen Özbek, who also participated in these 
events, wrote a doctoral dissertation on the com-
memorations in Turkey (2016) in which he right-
ly discusses at length the meaning of commem-
orating the Armenian genocide under the most 
central and nationalist monument in Turkey.34 
In 2010, DurDe used a similar statement to the statement used by the IHD in 2005: “This is 
our pain, this mourning is for all of us.” While 
the IHD changed its emphasis from “loss and 
pain” to recognition of the genocide, naming 
the crime and bringing the memory of the plac-
es associated with the crime back into the pub-
lic mind, the larger groups organized around 
DurDe continued along the line of “pain” and 
“mourning” for “all of us.” Following the mur-
der of Sevag Balıkçı in 2011, the argument of a 
“common pain” was even more problematic as 
it was obvious there were no “common” targets. 
Each year on April 24, a small group of 
Armenians would visit the Armenian ceme-
tery, mourning and praying for their dead. In 
2012, the IHD added Sevag Balıkçı’s grave to 
the Şişli Armenian Cemetery at the places of 
commemoration for that day.35 First, with the 
murder of Hrant Dink and later with the mur-
der of Sevag Balıkçı, new victims were added, 
and the commemorative events on April 24, 
have become a full day program starting from 
in the early morning and continuing until the 
late evening. 
The events in 2015 to commemorate the 100th anniversary of the Armenian geno-
cide started before April 24.36 The first event 
was a concert “In Memoriam: April 24” which 
involved Armenian musicians and artists from 
around the world. Although the texts and po-
ems recited and referred to during the concert 
were related to the genocide, the content and 
structure of the concert itself had no specific 
characteristics of a commemoration. A con-
cert organized in Istanbul on the occasion of 
April 24th was seemingly transformed into a 
commemorative event merely by the involve-
ment of both Armenian and non-Armenian 
artists. Two days later on April 24, activities 
started early with visits to the houses of the 
Commemorative 
event of DurDe in the 
























Armenian ethnomusicologist Gomidas and 
writer Rupen Sevag in Istanbul. The event was 
organized by a group of Armenians with the 
ultimate goal of placing “stolpersteins” in front 
of these houses, however the plan was never 
permitted to materialize. This was followed 
by the Armenian commemorative event at the 
Armenian cemetery. The IHD gathered in front 
of the Ibrahim Paşa Palace where the Armenian 
intellectuals had been kept on the night of April 
24, 1915 and were later taken to the Haydarpaşa 
train station on the Asian side of the city. The 
group walked from the palace to the shore, 
crossed over to the Asian side of the city and 
continued the commemorative event in front 
of the station. This meant that the participants 
walked through the most crowded parts of the 
city, attracting the attention of passersby. The 
IHD’s message for the 100th anniversary was 
directed at the state, asking it to stop denying 
and recognize the Armenian genocide, as well 
as issue an apology and offer compensation.37 
The next stop was the grave of Sevag Balıkçı, 
after which they were unable to continue on to 
Taksim Square like in some previous years as 
it had been closed to demonstrators due to the 
2013 Gezi Protests. Thus, the 100th anniversary 
of the Armenian genocide, organized by DurDe, 
was held further down in the first quarter of 
the İstiklal pedestrian street. Members of the 
Armenian diaspora, predominantly from the 
United States, participated in the commemora-
tion and one of them read the opening speech.38 
One of the 100-year-old problems resurfaced 
yet again at this point, namely, the issue of 
representation. What is the meaning of a Dias-
poran Armenian making the opening speech 
at a commemorative event in Istanbul on the 
occasion of the 100th anniversary of genocide 
in the absence of recognition? Who did she 
represent? Or better put, can anybody represent 
the Armenian diaspora – or Armenians in gen-
eral? These questions remain unanswered, as 
they were for the last 100 years. While the first 
speech related to the speaker’s family history, 
the second speech was delivered by one of the 
spokepersons representing the organizers.39 
This spokesperson made an appeal to acknowl-
edge history and asked for an apology. However, 
left unsaid was by what method are we to face 
this history, who specifically should be doing it, 
and what the consequences of doing so would 
be. Thus, the way, content and agent all re-
mained anonymous. Nor Zartonk, an Armenian 
grassroots organization, joined the group from 
the other end of the street, carrying posters 
of the Armenian intellectuals killed in 1915, as 
well as posters showing the recently murdered 
Armenians: Sevag Balıkçı (2011) and Maritsa 
Küçük, an elderly woman attacked and killed in 
the Samatya district of Istanbul (2012). 
Self-denial and invisibility are the precon-ditions of Armenian existence in Tur-
key. The commemorative events over the last 
decade, particularly the larger events organized 
by DurDe, insisted upon not addressing the per-
petrator, the responsibility of the perpetrator 
generation’s and, more importantly, failed to ad-
dress the state as the organizer and executor of 
the crime. The exact same points that were crit-
icized in the case of the I apologize campaign, 
whose organizers were among the supporters 
of DurDe, can be applied to the messages given 
at this commemorative event. The discourse of 
a “common pain” and vague concepts of “facing 
the history”, “apology”, with no specific content 
or plan, placed the victims at the center of the 
commemoration while, on every level, the per-
petrators remained untouched and anonymous. 
The principle of impunity for the perpetrators 
prevails to this day and makes Armenian the 
target of racist attacks, regardless of which 
country they live in. 
After 2016, visibility for these commemora-
tive events was no longer welcome. The Taksim 
Square commemorations were moved to the 
end of the 1.4 km long İstiklâl Street and, in 
2019, people were no longer allowed to gath-
er on this street at all but had to move to the 
Şişhane district, which has a much smaller pe-
destrian area. In the summer of 2016, one of the 
two leading figures of DurDe, attached himself 
to the government forces and resigned from the 
organization. He continues his career in one of 
the think tanks funded by the ruling party. In 
2018, DurDe, as in previous years, contacted the 













































event and was given permission to hold the 
event on the condition that it did not use the 
word “genocide.” As always, the IHD used this 
word, asked for recognition of the crime, apol-
ogy and reparations. Four of its members were 
taken into custody. In 2019, the police heavily 
intervened in the IHD’s commemorative event 
in Sultanahmet, in front of the building used as 
prison. The organizers were forced to move to 
the IHD’s office. 
F ollowing the coup attempt in July 2016, two of the four organizers of the I apologize 
campaign left Turkey, like many others who 
were actively involved either as participants or 
organizers. The judicial process which started 
right after Hrant Dink’s murder has fallen far 
short of establishing a sense of justice over the 
last 13 years. 
Analyzing the commemoration practices and 
discourses reveals a wider and even more com-
plicated pattern in Turkey, namely the denial 
of her foundational act. Under the autocratic 
regime since 2016, the need for justice, rec-
oginition of the crimes committed, and con-
demnation of criminal impunity became much 
more relevant to larger segments of its society. 
Disconnecting this reality from the state’s gen-
ocidal foundation conceals the systemic nature 
of the problem, and more dangerously reduces 
the ongoing situation to a regime problem stem-
ming from the ruling party.  This in turn fuels 
the denialist machinery in every aspect of life. ●
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as a Weapon for  
Political Manipulation
Many contributions to this report on memory cul-tures in the Baltic and East European region reveal 
disturbing tendencies to control and politicize, at times 
even weaponizing how the past is to be remembered. 
Some articles show the great extent to which authoritari-
an and authoritarian-leaning governments actively inter-
vene in how crucial parts of their country’s history is to 
be written, taught, researched, remembered, commemo-
rated or neglected and ignored. Other articles document 
the failure of governments to deal with restitution for 
past injustices, how they forbid access to important state 
archives, hinder the teaching of the history of contempo-
rary events, withdraw funding for or close independent 
research institutions. While these manipulative tenden-
cies are not new, the degree to which present-day East 
European politicians involve themselves in the memory 
of the past is a growing academic and civic concern as 
they contribute to undermining trust in scientific and 
humanities research and further polarizing society. In 
addition, the violent protests over election fraud in the 
Belarusian 2020 election show the collapse of dialogue 
between the government and civil society that, as Andrej 
Kotljarchuk reveals, through the use of seemingly inno-
cent symbols such as flags, visualize deeply antipathetic 
politicized forms of remembrance of the history of that 
country’s national symbols now playing out in the streets. 
The Multi Catastrophic Past
The countries of Eastern Europe have experienced a 
series of horrific periods during the 20th century which 
most West European countries were spared. Harsh 
politicized debates rage in the East over which period 
or regime was more catastrophic, more unjust, more 
anti-national than the any others. In the Baltic states and 
Eastern borderlands of present-day Poland and western 
Ukraine there was the following succession occurred: 
first, a heavy-handed occupation 1939-41 by the Soviet 
Union with accompanying confiscation of property and 
wealth, arrests, destruction or deportation of elites. This 
was followed in 1941-45 by occupation by Nazi Germa-
ny accompanied by the near total extermination of the 
Jewish and Roma minorities, seducing the population to 
collude with the killings. 
The third disaster was the destruction and population 
dislocation that was the consequence of the World War II 
battles between the Soviet Union and Nazi Germany that 
were fought along the eastern front. Fourth, the long pe-
riod of totalitarian communist rule under Soviet tutelage 
followed, with repression of human rights, persecution of 
dissidents and economic mismanagement. Finally, after 
the fall of the Soviet Empire in 1989-91 came a short peri-
od of tense scary excitement at the prospect of becoming 
like the “West” but quickly disintegrated into depress-
ing social and economic shock-therapy with ensuing 
industrial collapse that some countries still suffer from, 
when coupled to bank failures, bankruptcies, inflation, 
devaluation, recession, ingrown patterns of corruption 
and misused tax revenue. In some countries, politicians 
rooted in the fallen communist regime were able to estab-
lish new parties and hold on to power, employing similar 
but milder methods of domination and cronyism while 
upholding the appearance of democracy. According to 
by David Gaunt and Tora Lane
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Bulgarian political scientist Ivan Krastev, in the final 
analysis Eastern Europeans have become distrustful of 
democratic institutions and lost belief in both the market 
and the state, questioned the truthfulness of media and 
the legitimacy of authority.1  
A cultural climate of confusion emerged in which there was reason to doubt state sponsored versions 
of history. But instead of putting a lid on the discourse on 
the past, it created a surfeit of rival historical memories 
competing for dominance in the public sphere. Solitary 
frozen or supressed memories, that were worshiped 
only as local truths or developed by political émigrés, 
directly challenged Soviet-era history 
teaching. A case in point is the Cana-
dian-Ukrainian diaspora’s commem-
oration in the 1980s of the 1932-33 
famine, now known as Holodomor as 
well as its glorification of the Organi-
sation of Ukrainian Nationalists. Soviet 
historiography focuses solely on their 
collaboration with the Nazi occupation. 
The competition between memory 
warriors was never balanced and those 
who ruled could use the power and 
influence of government to let their version dominate 
in the form of various newly-created institutions for 
“national memory”. At the same time the monopoly on 
recounting the past slipped out of the hands of profes-
sional historians and became a plaything of varieties of 
public discourse, media communications, entertainment, 
and politics, all of them clamouring for attention.  
This shift is well illustrated in the article on Poland in-
cluded here by Joanna Beata Michlic. She identifies two 
post-Cold War phases in official treatment of the national 
past. The first phase that extended from 1989 to about 
2010 she characterizes as “pluralistic” in which previ-
ously repressed “frozen memory” was invited into public 
discourse, sometimes for the very first time outside the 
circles of family and friends. This found the support 
of scholarly research into “the most purged, neglected 
and shameful memories of the national past, namely, 
the memories of the dark past concerning the attitudes 
[to] and treatment of Polish Jews and other ethnic and 
religious minorities such as the Lemkos by the majority.” 
However, this pluralistic phase of retrieving repressed 
memory was followed by its complete opposite. Since 
2010, and particularly since the right-wing PiS party 
took power in 2015 a rejection of pluralism has occurred. 
Michlic sees this as part  of a “radical counter revolution” 
and official memory of the past is now driven by “narrow, 
ethno-nationalist visions of mono-cultural and mono-re-
ligious Poland and its values, symbols and traditions, 
manifested in a variety of forms ranging from the mild 
to extreme.” The exclusion model of remembrance has 
not been able to wholly root out the pluralistic model of 
memorialization, resulting in overlapping “wars over 
history” including “bloody battlefields”.  For instance, 
there is on-going conflict between the PiS party and the 
European Solidarity Museum in Gdansk over how to 
represent the importance of the Round Table Agreement 
negotiations in 1989 between, among others, the lead-
ers of labour union Solidarność with 
the communist government, that led 
to semi-free elections. The museum 
presents this as a heroic break-through 
even though the deal was not ideal, 
while PiS sees it as an abandonment of 
“Poland’s conservative national values” 
and is particularly critical to the role 
of Lech Walęsa, the first freely-elected 
president 1990-1995.  The government 
has been also critical of the representa-
tion of Polish-Jewish relations by the 
very successful POLIN Museum of the History of Polish 
Jews in Warsaw and refused, in the face of compact 
protests, to reinstate its founding director, Professor of 
History, Dariusz Stoła.
A very similar picture of the transition away from pluralistic to monolithic national conservative 
memory is drawn by János M. Rainer for Hungary. Here 
the watershed came in 2010 in the form of the electoral 
victory of the nationalist FIDESZ political party (the 
Hungarian Civic Alliance) led by Viktor Orbán. Although 
liberal from the start, this party changed radically to 
claim that all liberal or left-wing parties were inherently 
anti-national and served the interests of foreign powers. 
It began a coordinated campaign to rid Hungary of the 
“left-wing interpretation of history.” In the Hungarian 
perspective, according to Rainer, the issue of how to 
remember the past was a matter of ideological impor-
tance only for “right-wing radical” politics, whereas 
the liberals and left-wing governments encouraged 
professional historical research and preserved academ-
ic freedom in the universities. But as trained histori-
ans de-ideologized, the public discourse on history 
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counter-institutions was established in 2013 to aggres-
sively propagate the new brand of memory. They are: 
the Institute for Political Transformation Research and 
Archive, the Veritas Research Institute for History, the 
National Remembrance Committee, and the Institute for 
National Heritage. One prong in this attack was re-in-
terpreting the consequences of the bloody 1956 upris-
ing which FIDESZ preferred to see as a national insult 
created by communist politicians and shaped through 
Soviet foreign intervention, rather than the heroic revolt 
previously commemorated by the Hungarian left. As is 
well-known after years of harassment, beginning in 2017, 
the Central European University was forced to leave 
Hungary in 2019 and its founder, the philanthropist 
George Soros has been demonized in countless antise-
mitic political rants.
A different trajectory emerges in Yuliya Yurchuk’s article on Ukraine but is has the same ending with 
governmental management and control over the re-
membrance of contemporary history. Ukrainian mem-
ory unfolds as a reaction to Soviet historiography and 
Russian aggression. In newly independent Ukraine and 
Lithuania, forms of remembrance that countered the 
Soviet narrative had been formed by a diaspora of politi-
cally-active refugees and a collective of non-government 
organizations, intellectuals, groups of former political 
prisoners, local activists and amateur historians. They 
emphasized the centrality of the Holodomor famine and 
accused the Soviet leadership of intentional genocide, 
and they glorified World War II armed resistance of the 
Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists and the Ukraini-
an Insurgent Army. 
At the time that it made its political breakthrough, the 
new Ukrainian narrative of anti-Soviet victimhood and 
resistance had very little support in historical research, but 
nevertheless all presidents since independence have pro-
moted the memory of the Holodomor famine as a political-
ly orchestrated disaster targeting particularly Ukraine. 
The anti-Soviet and anti-Russian memory trend 
spiralled after 2014 after Russia occupied Crimea and 
launched a hybrid war in the Donbas region. From that 
moment on having the correct interpretation of histo-
ry became a matter of national security. A package of 
“De-communization laws” passed the legislature. Among 
the laws was a prohibition on criticizing those warriors 
who fought for the “independence of Ukraine in the 
20th century”, which was particularly relevant for the 
nationalistic resistance groups. Professional historians of 
the Ukraine Institute of History supported the war effort 
by, among other things, forming the Likbez Historical 
Front. In 2016-18 this group published a series of volumes 
named “History Without Censorship”. Yurchuk con-
cludes “history becomes a weapon in the on-going war in 
Ukraine.”     
In contrast, the shift in the thrust of memory in Belarus 
took place after 1994 with the first election of Aliaksandr 
Lukashenka as president. Immediately after Belarus be-
came independent in 1991 there was an important revival 
of the memory of its medieval greatness in the form of the 
sprawling Grand Duchy of Lithuania with its continual 
wars against Muscovy and its role in the Polish-Lithua-
nian Commonwealth, which was famous for its religious 
tolerance and multi-ethnic social structure. However, 
with Lukashenka in power came a re-orientation towards 
rapprochement with Russia. This involved creating a 
positive image of the Soviet past which emphasized the 
centrality of the “Great Patriotic War” and portrayed all 
forms of nationalist freedom fighters as Nazi collabo-
rators. The pro-Soviet trend, however, has been toned 
down even before Russia invaded and annexed Crimea. 
The government of Belarus has been stable until 2020 as 
an authoritarian police-state and, according to Aliak-
sei Lastouski, it practices an “exaggerated level of state 
control over the politics of memory”. Also, in 2014 Russia 
enacted a Law to prevent the “rehabilitation of Nazism” 
(called the Yarovaya Act after its promoter) but which 
in reality criminalized any criticism of Soviet military 
activities during World War II.  
Other recent cases of the direct intervention of East 
European politicians and governments in historical 
research or in public memorialization are recorded in 
the Network of Concerned Historians Annual Report 
of 2020. These include the efforts of Albanian parlia-
mentarians to prevent the Institute for the Crimes of 
Communism, created in 2010, from investigating possible 
war crimes committed by communist guerrilla fighters 
during World War II. 
A slightly similar situation evolved in Kosovo resulting 
in the Prime Minister dismissing his adviser historian 
Shkelzen Gashi who had maintained that some soldiers in 
the Kosovo Liberation Army had committed war crimes 
in the 1998-99 war. Parliamentarians introduced a law for 
the “Protection of the Kosovo Liberation Army War Val-
ues” that would prohibit any future criticism. In Belarus, 
before the present conflict between the people and the 
government, there were clashes over commemorating the 
Dzien Voli (Freedom Day) in March which is seen by the 
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opposition as the foundation of the first independent Be-
larusian State in 1918. Efforts to commemorate on March 
25, 2018 were broken up by heavy-handed police.      
Cultures of Victimization  
Increasingly, appeals are made to governments and par-
liaments to recognize the historical traumas of groups, 
usually repressed or subjected minorities. The most well-
known campaigns to gain official recognition of historical 
injustices concern genocide, slavery, 
colonization, and racial discrimination. 
Urgent and well-documented claims 
for recognition of the genocide of 
millions of Christians in the Ottoman 
Empire during World War I have been 
made by the Armenians, Assyrians, and 
Greeks. The Republic of Turkey, that 
Empire’s successor state, has denied 
this and countered by claiming that far 
greater numbers of Turks were killed 
during the same war. Activists pressure 
parliaments in other countries to defy Turkey and make 
statements recognizing the events specifically as “geno-
cide”. They put effort into mobilizing like-minded sup-
porters and become dependent on the support of third 
parties, who are often not very informed about the events 
in question. Such political recognitions of Ottoman gen-
ocide have been made in a handful of countries, among 
them Sweden, and on the lower level in a range of federal 
and municipal agencies, always under the threat of Turk-
ish retaliation. As Talin Suciyan’s contribution shows, 
making compromises by using alternative formulations 
that avoid the term “genocide” prove unacceptable to the 
families of the victims and their organizations. Some-
thing similar can be seen in the case of Roma and Sinti 
(formerly called Gypsies) who demand that as victims of 
Nazi Germany repression and partial extermination, they 
be included under the term “Holocaust”. This caused 
immediate and hitherto unresolved conflict with Jewish 
representatives who see the annihilation of Europe’s 
Jews as completely unique, arguing that to include the 
Roma would dilute the power of the term.
Calls for third-party political instances to recognize the 
past victimization of a group is a relatively new phenom-
enon. Sociologists Bradley Campbell and Jason Manning 
speak of a “culture of victimization” that they found in 
university environments, but which has bearing on other 
forms of discourse on past traumas. They see transitions 
of moral responses from that of an “honour” culture in 
which a person who is wronged by another is expect-
ed to retaliate directly as in a feud, shoot-out or verbal 
challenge, into a culture of “dignity” in which wronged 
persons takes the position of ignoring the hurt, standing 
morally higher than the perpetrator. This transition final-
ly results in a culture of “victimhood” in which victims 
do not or cannot retaliate or ignore but instead appeal 
to higher authority for redress.2 It is possible to see this 
shift in the representation of the Holocaust in Israel. As 
Per Anders Rudling observes victim-
hood played little role in early memory, 
instead the heroic Jewish resistance 
of the Warsaw ghetto was central. 
Later and after the trial of Eichmann 
representation re-focused on victim-
hood in the extermination camps. One 
aspect of the argument within this 
final stage is emphasizing a position of 
innocence vis-vis the thoroughly evil 
perpetrators, which involves raising 
the status of victim into a moral virtue. 
Victimhood understood as virtue makes genocide into 
the worst imaginable of crimes, thus raising the stakes 
of the campaigns for political recognition as well as the 
vehemence of the denial. And the question is to what 
extent the powerful narrative of victimization has come 
to frame the relation to memory amongst certain groups. 
Florence Fröhlig in her essay explores how “forced mem-
oralization”, which does not recognize past suffering, can 
cause trauma, also for generations after, and yet how this 
shared victimhood serves as the denominator of their 
identity. Yet, when groups reclaim the right to speak out 
their memory, one can note a troubling tendency to make 
memory into a narrative for a group identity, character-
ized by “a competition for victimhood” that leads to “new 
abuses of memory”.
In what would seem to be an application of Campbell and Manning’s theory, Ukraine historical memory uses 
a mixture of the religion-inspired language of victimhood 
and the politics-inspired language of dignity. About one 
hundred persons died in the protests against the decision 
of Viktor Yanukovych to abandon an agreement with the 
European Union. The protests in Kyiv now go under the 
alternate terms Euromaidan, after the Maidan Nezalezh-
nosti square where much of the action too place, or more 
symbolically as the “Revolution of Dignity”. Those who 
were killed are commemorated as martyrs who sacrificed 
their lives for the nation and memorial monuments ded-
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icated to them bear the phrase: “Heroes of the Heavenly 
Hundred”. 
As Muriel Blaive underlines in “Codeword ‘Criminal’: 
Moral Remembrance in National Memory Politics”, the 
discourse of victimization can also become a masked 
form of politicization with the purpose of “appropriating 
victimhood for political capital and discrediting the left.” 
Institutions financed on the national level of the Czech 
state and the supra-national level of the European Union 
investigating into communist crimes have lobbied to 
promote a historical narrative of “moral remembrance”. 
Many countries build up a national identity out of a 
geopolitical destiny to sacrifice themselves for the sake of 
European Civilization and Christianity. Poland and Ser-
bia take pride in medieval monumental battles to stave off 
the advance of the Ottoman Empire further into Europe. 
Romanians also remember their country’s centuries-long 
defence against Tatar invaders coming from the East.
     
Extreme Nationalism
In comparing the South Caucasusian countries Arme-
nia, Azerbaijan and Georgia, Thomas de Waal, finds that 
they are similar in developing extreme forms of ethnic 
nationalism. The Soviet system had encouraged intellec-
tual nationalism since the 1960s as a way for regimes to 
counter the growing popular antipathy to the reality of 
communism as an ideology in practice. However, in the 
violent period just before and after the fall of the Soviet 
Union extreme and toxic nationalisms developed in all 
three countries. The explanation is that as communism 
with its discourse of cosmopolitanism collapsed a seri-
ous vacuum emerged and the sole available idea-based 
alternative able to fill the void was strong mythologized 
nationalism.
Each of the South Caucasian countries experienced 
traumatic events with scores of civilian victims as the 
Soviet Union fell apart. War broke out between Arme-
nian and Azerbaijan with Azeri soldiers killing Armeni-
ans fleeing from the town of Sumgait in February 1988 
and Armenians killed Azeris escaping from the town 
of Khojali in February 1992. The Georgians had their 
own catastrophe when Soviet police killed protesters in 
Tbilisi in April 1989. In de Waal’s view it was natural to 
commemorate these events, however the way they were 
remembered perpetuated hatred between the countries, 
finally leading to renewed warfare between Azerbaijan 
and Armenia in 2020. Official memorialization of these 
mass killings of persons who are often deemed sacred 
martyrs “re-enacts the trauma or perpetuates conflict 
rather than seeks to overcome it.” This situation re-
sembles that described by sociologists in the theory of 
cultural trauma – in which persons not directly involved 
in traumatic events are enculturated by their leaders into 
integrating the original trauma in their own identity. For 
this to happen a single unified narrative of catastrophe 
must be crystalized, and then taught in multiple ways to 
those inside the group and over generations.3 The pro-
duction of cultural trauma has been particularly noticea-
ble in the cases of Armenian and Assyrian remembrance 
of the genocide to which their ancestors were victims 
during World War I in the Ottoman Empire. Attacks on 
the Armenian enclave of Nagorno Karabakh in 2020 
sparked quick reactions equating Azerbaijan’s Turk-
ish-supported invasion as continuation of the Ottoman 
genocide with the intention of annihilating the Armeni-
ans as a nation.
Many East European states excel in dramatically re-en-
acting their bloody victimization and the heroic sacrific-
es of their inhabitants, but some countries do completely 
the opposite and neglect mention of the injustices of 
the past. In Bosnia and Herzegovina, until 2019, school 
children did not learn about the history of the Yugoslav 
wars. In Bulgaria the history of the communist regimes 
is not part of the curriculum, reports Evelina Kelbeche-
va. Lukashenka’s government in Belarus prohibits the 
commemoration of the founding of the first Belarusian 
state in 1918. In Romania transitional justice has stalled, 
describes Lavinia Stan. In Lithuania, writes Violeta 
Davoliūtė, transitional justice had a focus on the crimes 
of the Soviet-regime and little attention was given to the 
murder of over ninety percent of Lithuania’s Jewish pop-
ulation during the Holocaust.  And in many countries the 
dossiers in the archives of the secret police are still kept 
from public investigation. 
H istory is not the only component of national securi-ty, but the treatment of the past can involve feelings 
of insecurity in relation to others. In one of the first 
essays in this report, Barbara Törnquist-Plewa considers 
the question whether it is possible to uncover a regional 
politics of memory in the Central and Eastern European 
region. The content of this report answers this question 
by showing that there are many common features in the 
way the governments in this region control and manage 
the way the past can be remembered, with various forms 
of censorship, prohibitions, legal hinders, disrespect for 
scientific history, and confrontations with the past as 
remembered by neighboring countries. This pattern has 
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been with us for a long time, however there was a water-
shed after 2010. Extreme nationalist politics kidnapped 
remembrance to support the position of governments. 
It is possible to link this widespread phenomenon to 
the well-known fragility of nationalism in the Eastern 
European realm. In many countries, nationalism is a 
vague sentiment among the people that they, or most 
of them, belong to a collective and belong to a definite 
territory. They can take the name of the geographical 
area where they live or the language variant most of 
them speak. At the end of the 19th century Belarusians 
answered the question of their nationality with we are 
the “people from here”. However, a national identity has 
several components. One is the collective group-feeling 
of mutual togetherness, but the other is the legitimation 
coming from neighboring “others” through recognizing 
their long-standing right to a certain territory. In several 
cases, described in this report, such external respect for 
nationalism of the neighbor is missing, leading to war and 
annexation, and in peaceful times to mutual suspicion 
and anxiety over possible future aggression.
  
The Desire and Consummation  
of Images of the Past
If there was a belief in the redemptive power of memory 
and the emancipatory role that cultural heritage could 
have, today, all over Europe, and in many other parts of 
the world, the fields of cultural memory and cultural 
heritage have taken a politicized, if not nationalist turn. 
The past has generally become a resource to be used for 
a renewal of national and other political myths, and it is 
explored as such by different actors, and not in the least 
by right-wing politicians all over Europe. And although 
the course in Eastern Europe, as this region report shows, 
is distinct, because the politicization of the past is so mul-
ti-layered and ripe with contested memory narratives, 
there, as elsewhere the past seems to be torn between a 
simple demonization and a nostalgic glorification of it in 
the general movement of what Zygmunt Bauman4 calls 
retrotopia, to define the presence of a neoliberal utopian 
desire and consummation of images of the past. In her 
article on “communist visuality without communism”, 
Irina Sandomirskaja shows how the past of communism 
has entered an ahistorical phantasm and “reactionary 
flight from history” in accordance with the neoliberal 
logic of retrotopia. And she goes on to ask if we not also 
in Communism as a cultural asset can find resources in 
the history of communist visuality to oppose the use of 
the past for consumerist pleasures or political purposes. 
An instance is the Russian-Ukrainian film director Sergei 
Loznitsa’s use of left-over footage to create new films that 
help us “un-forget the inconvenient heritage of commu-
nist visuality”, as Sandomirskaja writes. Thus, the article 
suggests that we cannot establish a new truth about the 
past, but that we need to retrieve the suppressed truth 
from its own erased pages, wounds and contestations, 
inquiring into this history as it were from its own blanks. 
A s this state of the region report has shown beyond doubts, the past of political history has become 
the object of political struggles over the past. In a strange 
reversal, it would seem that the significance attested by 
the communist regimes to the narratives of the past have 
resurged in the new contemporary nationalist narratives 
for the Baltic and East European countries. The history 
of national struggle has become a means of explaining 
the necessity of the demise of communism. But it’s not 
only in countries where there are memories or histories 
of national resistance towards Soviet interventions that 
history is used as a means of explaining a triumphant or 
victimized historical narrative; but we can also see in 
Russian memory politics see how the communist past 
is used in a national discourse. This indicates the fact 
that history as well as politics have become confused in 
the appropriations of the past in ways that point to the 
confusion of political discourses and strategies both then 
and now. And one distinguishing feature among political 
parties in some countries in the former Soviet bloc is the 
relation to the past. Of course, one way out is to retrieve 
historical truth in its truth as political history, but we also 
need to scrutinize our need for retrotopia and contrast it 
with the need and lack of real visions of change that do 
not feed into empty discourses of empowerment, but can 
indeed “quicken our activity”, as Nietzsche with Goethe 
demanded of all instructions, past, present and future.5 ●
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The CBEES State of the Region Report 2020 reveals disturbing tendencies to control and politicize the 
past in several countries in Central and Eastern Europe. 
Also, the report documents the great extent to which 
authoritarian and authoritarian-leaning governments 
actively intervene in how crucial parts of their country’s 
history are to be written, taught, researched, remem-
bered, and commemorated – or neglected and ignored. 
Furthermore, the report discusses the failure of some 
governments to deal with restitution for past injustices, 
and the way some politicians forbid access to important 
state archives, hinder the teaching of the history of con-
temporary events, or withdraw funding to or even close 
down independent research institutions altogether.  
The report is the first in a series of annual reports, reporting and reflecting on the social and political 
developments in the Baltic Sea Region and Central and 
Eastern Europe, each year from a new and topical per-
spective. The report is written by researchers and area 
experts, from within as well as outside of CBEES (Centre 
for Baltic and East European Studies), Södertörn Univer-
sity, Stockholm. The overall purpose with this initiative 
is to offer a publication that will be of great interest to 
fellow researchers, policy makers, stakeholders, and the 
general public. 
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